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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
This research report comprises of several documents, including four Issue Papers, four 
summaries of the discussions organised by CERRE throughout the second half of 2020, and the 
recommendations paper drafted by a team of academics on the basis of the Issue Papers and the 
related discussions.  
This report is in line with CERRE’s ambition to remain at the cutting edge of regulatory developments 
in the digital and network industries and to constructively and independently contribute to the EU 
policy making process.  
Objective and topics 
Building on previous and on-going CERRE work1 on the regulation of the online platform economy, 
this report focuses more specifically on the following four main sets of topics: 
1. The conduct and theories of harm;  
2. The thresholds for intervention; 
3. The remedies; 
4. The institutional considerations. 
Methodology 
For each of the four sets of topics, the following steps were followed: 
• The CERRE academic team prepared Issue Papers that summarised, on the basis of the 
most recent academic literature and policy reports, the issues and their trade-offs as well as 
the main policy proposals made so far. 
• Each Issue Paper structured a brainstorming discussion during an exclusive e-
workshop reserved for representatives of the CERRE members supporting the project and 
the academic team. A summary of the discussion, underlining the main issues, trade-offs 
and possible solutions, as well as divergent views, was also written under Chatham House 
Rule after each webinar.  
• On the basis of these issue papers and the brainstorming discussions, the CERRE academic 
team drafted a recommendations paper aimed at feeding the policy makers’ reflections 
















1 These include ‘Big Data and Competition Policy’, ‘Internet Platforms & Non-Discrimination’, ‘Market Definition 
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ISSUE PAPER | Conduct and theories of harm 
1 Introduction 
In its February 2020 Digital Strategy Communication,2 the Commission announced that the proposal 
of the Digital Services Act package would include one pillar aiming to achieve a fair and 
competitive economy through economic regulation. In their June 2020 Inception Impact 
Assessment, the Commission services indicated that they are considering the following three policy 
options: 
1. Revising the horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-Business Regulation;  
2. Adopting a horizontal framework empowering regulators to collect information from large online 
platforms acting as gatekeepers; 
3. Adopting a new and flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers. This option is divided into the following sub-options:  
3a. Prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices (“blacklisted” practices); 
3b. Adoption of tailor-made remedies addressed on a case-by-case basis where necessary 
and justified.3 
This Issue Paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 deals with the main 
difficulties and trade-offs in assessing the competitive and welfare effects of a conduct in the digital 
economy. Section 3 deals with the forms of unilateral conduct which are mainly exclusionary. Section 
4 deals with the forms of conduct which are mainly exploitative. Of course, some types of conduct 
may be at the same time exclusionary and exploitative (for instance, the decision of the German 
competition authority against Facebook mentions that the data collection by Facebook could have 
exclusionary and exploitative effects).  
2 Assessing the competitive and welfare effects of 
firms’ conduct in the digital economy 
2.1 Main characteristics of the digital economy 
The Crémer Report mentions three key characteristics of the digital economy, namely the extreme 
return to scale, network externalities and the crucial role of data as a key input for many online 
services and AI. Those characteristics lead to strong economy of scope and favour the development 
of ecosystems. Petit (2020:127-150) identifies six properties common to many of the big tech firms: 
(i) diversification in different markets and conglomeralism; (ii) discontinuity due to the uncertain 
evolution of technology, entry and regulation; (iii) long-termism relying on patient capital; (iv) 
growth, (v) exploration and discovery and (vi) flexibility.  
On that basis and different other policy reports, we can identify the following key characteristics 
of the digital economy: 
- Economies of scale and scope on the supply-side; 
- Direct and indirect network effects on the demand-side; 
- Conglomeralism and creation of an ecosystem; 
- High rate of innovation, hence the importance of controlling the key innovation capabilities: 
data, skills, computing power, user base, risky and patient capital; 
 
2 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM(2020) 67. 
3 Inception Impact Assessment on Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with 
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- Uncertainty in the evolution of technology and markets. 
Some platforms may have a gatekeeper function when their customers mostly single-home and 
have no – or little - ability and incentive to multi-home because of lack of information, high switching 
costs or biases and heuristics. In this case, such a platform is the main gate, or bottleneck, to this 
customer base. This may raise competitive issues when the platform is providing intermediation 
services and competing with other firms in providing some of the intermediated services. 
2.2 Assessing competitive effects in the digital economy 
2.2.1 Economic and non-economic effects 
Online platforms bring many benefits which can be estimated in different manners.4 One way is 
to assess how much users are ready to pay for the service. Brynjolfsson, Collis, and Eggers (2019) 
ask Facebook users to specify what monetary compensation they would need to give up their use of 
the service for a month and found that in 2016-7, the monthly figure for US participants in the 
survey was at the $35-50 level. The figure for access to search engines was even higher. Another 
way is to estimate the value of the content provided by attention platforms. Evans (2017) indicates 
that, in 2016, American adults spent 437 billion hours on ad-financed attention platforms. On the 
basis of the opportunity cost of the time, Evans calculates that this time was worth $7.1 trillion using 
the average after-tax hourly wage rate and $2.8 trillion using the average after tax minimum wage 
rate, which can thus be the value of the content of those platforms. 
However, online platforms also increase risks. Some risks are broad and societal. For 
instance, Allcott et al. (2020) found that a four-week period without Facebook ‘improves subjective 
well-being and substantially reduces post-experiment demand, suggesting that forces such as 
addiction and projection bias may cause people to use Facebook more than they otherwise would.’ 
Also, some intermediaries have become so large that they do not merely manage a private space 
but control part of the public sphere, or that they have acquired very substantial information and 
surveillance power, which may need to be tamed (Cohen, 2019; Zuboff, 2019). Other risks raised 
by the platforms are linked to the working and the contestability of the markets as the size 
and business models of some platforms may threaten competition and innovation. This issue paper 
focuses on those latter risks. 
2.2.2 Assessing economic effects 
In the digital economy, the assessment of the economic effects of firms’ conduct is particularly 
complex because a behaviour often leads, at the same time, to pro and anti-competitive 
effects. For instance, the growth of a digital platform within the same relevant market and the 
tipping of such a market is beneficial to consumers when there are important direct or indirect 
network effects and when interoperability is difficult, impossible or costly to do or to impose. 
Similarly, the extension of a digital platform from one core market to another related market in order 
to offer a more complete suite of products and enlarge the ecosystem may benefit consumers as 
such an extension increases the ecosystem’s synergies; such conglomerate diversification may also 
increase the economies of scope on the supply-side.5 However, such an extension may also lead to 
the exclusion of as-efficient niche competitors. Thus, assessing the competitive effects of conduct in 
digital markets often requires a difficult balancing of pro and anti-competitive effects. This is not 
specific to digital markets, but possibly more frequent in digital markets. 
Thus, assessing the economic effects of digital firms’ conduct involves several trade-offs 
between different values and interests. Examples of those trade-offs are the following: 
- Short-term and long-term: a type of conduct may increase consumer welfare in the short-
term, for instance by increasing short-term competition or innovation, but at the expense of 
consumer welfare in the long-term, for instance by decreasing the ability and incentive to 
compete and/or innovate in the future. The most difficult situation occurs where there are 
 
4 See Cave (2020). 
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clear short run efficiency benefits and a long-term competitive harm that is more uncertain 
but potentially very serious. This is even more difficult is when there are short-run benefits 
to one type of competition, to be traded off against a long-term risk to another type of 
competition. For example, self-preferencing can sometimes make it easier for one large 
gatekeeper platform to enter or grow in a market to compete against other large gatekeeper 
platforms (e.g. in untipped markets, competition between large gatekeeper platforms could 
be especially important and potentially a more sustainable type of competition)6. 
- Competition and innovation: a type of conduct may increase the development and/or 
propagation of innovation (at least in the short run), but at the expense of competition. To 
make matters more complex, there can be trade-offs between different types of innovation. 
Indeed, Ofcom (2019, para.5.29) notes that: “Consumers can benefit from different types 
of innovation, realised by different types of competitors. The ideal would be for regulatory 
intervention to preserve incentives for all types of beneficial innovation. However, 
intervention aimed at promoting one type of innovation may have a detrimental effect on 
another. As such, regulators may have to trade off different types of innovation. This may 
occur where requiring an incumbent to give access to its data provides opportunities for 
innovation by smaller players and entrants, but weakens incentives for innovation by the 
incumbent.” 
- Sustaining and disruptive innovation: a type of conduct may stimulate sustaining 
innovation, for instance big tech acquisition may stimulate entry for buy out, but at the 
expense of disruptive innovation which takes place outside the value network of the existing 
firms. 
Arbitrating trade-offs is one of the main roles of regulatory agencies and the judiciary (hence, Themis 
is often represented with a balance in her hands), but such arbitration is particularly difficult 
in the digital economy because the trade-offs are amplified and have to be decided in a 
highly uncertain environment. 
Given those difficulties, the risks of regulatory failures and errors, of type I and type II, may 
also be amplified in the digital economy.7 Those risks can be decreased by reducing the 
information asymmetry between the digital firms and the public authorities and by increasing the 
learning curve of the authorities. This can be achieved with better understanding of the digital 
economy through studies, sector enquiries and market investigation and individual cases, as well as 
with information disclosure through appropriate rules and presumptions. Also, the costs of type I 
and type II errors may also be amplified in the digital economy. Those costs should also be 
decreased, in particular through timely intervention when necessary. 
Some commentators8 point to the amplified difficulties in assessing the competitive effects of 
conduct and the higher costs of type II errors in the digital economy compared to the other sectors 
of the economy to call for more structural analysis. They do not call for a return to the Structure-
Conduct-Performance paradigm of the sixties and pure structural analysis but to complement 
conduct analysis with structural analysis.  
Moreover, the assessment of firms’ conduct in the digital economy involves two additional difficulties 
that will be dealt in the forthcoming Issue Papers: 
- First, a conduct may be welfare-detrimental, even though the firm does not enjoy 
a dominant position. In this case, the market failure is due to a structural problem, which 
is often situated on the demand-side of the market. This could be solved with the imposition 
of remedies on all the firms or at least on the most important firms in the market, even 
 
6 See Petit (2020). 
7 On the difficulties in regulating the digital economy and the risks of regulatory failures, see Ofcom (2019: Section 5). 
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when they are below the dominant threshold. This issue will be discussed in the second Issue 
Paper on remedies. 
- Second, the same welfare-detrimental conduct may violate different legal rules such 
as competition law, consumer protection or data protection rules. This is not specific to 
digital but seems to be more common in the digital economy. Remedying such conduct 
requires an efficient allocation of tasks between different regulatory agencies. This issue will 
be discussed in the third Issue Paper on institutional design.  
3 Unilateral conduct with potential exclusionary effects 
3.1 Disincentives to switching and multi-homing 
Next to conduct which may have an exclusionary effect on the supply-side of the market, other 
conduct may have exclusionary effects on the demand-side of the market by increasing, for users, 
the costs of switching and/or multi-homing. They can cover a series of practices: 
-  Vertical restraints such as exclusivity, MFNs or anti-steering clauses 
One way to increase switching costs is with vertical restraints contractual practices. This can be in 
the cases of: 
• Long duration or exclusivity clauses9 or cases of requiring default/pre-installation status on 
entry points such as handsets or browsers, which is not strictly exclusivity but can have very 
similar effects given consumer default bias. Examples are the Google Android decision as 
well as concerns about Google paying Apple for default position on the iPhone/iPad;  
• Retail price Most Favoured Nations (MFNs) Clauses which may disincentivise consumers from 
searching around, and thus create more single homing; 
• Steering behaviour which may keep consumers within ecosystems. One example could be 
Amazon's steering of its customers towards taking Amazon Prime 
As explained in the economic literature, those practices may have positive and negative competitive 
and welfare effects. On the positive side, exclusivity clauses may alleviate free-riding, for instance 
on distributor investment and ensure quality in distribution; alleviate hold-up of client-specific 
investment made by the supplier or the distributor or solve double marginalisation when supplier 
and distributor take a margin. On the negative side, exclusivity clauses may raise rival costs and 
foreclose suppliers or buyers; may reduce inter-brand competition (between suppliers of competing 
brands) and soften competition and/or facilitate collusion between suppliers and may reduce of intra-
brand competition (between distributors of the same brand): soften competition and/or facilitate 
collusion between buyers. 
- Data portability 
Another way to increase the costs of switching and multi-homing is by limiting the portability of data 
between platforms. Indeed, data represent a key asset, not only for the platforms as explained 
above, but also for users of social networks (e.g. posts on Facebook), music streaming (e.g. the 
playlist) or booking sites (e.g. the customer’s reviews and evaluations). In those cases, users may 
be reluctant to switch or multi-home if they cannot bring ‘their’ data with them.  
Recent EU legislations, in particular the GDPR,10 provide the right to data portability and should 
contribute to make the markets work better. However, Krämer, Senellart and de Streel (2020) show 
 
9 See Commission Decision of 20 March 2019, Case AT.40411 Google Search (AdSense). 
10 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data 
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that the scope of those portability rights is still legally uncertain and is, in any case, too limited to 
facilitate switching or multi-homing across several attention intermediaries. 
3.2 Leverage and envelopment 
According to Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne (2001:1271), “envelopment entails entry by one 
platform provider into another’s market by bundling its own platform’s functionality with that of the 
target’s so as to leverage shared user relationships and common components”. This is common 
practice on the digital markets and allows entry in new markets without Schumpeterian innovation. 
The authors give the examples of Microsoft having enveloped Netscape’s Web browser by bundling 
for free Explorer with Windows OS;11 or Google entering many platform markets by linking new 
products to its search platform such as online payment services (Google Checkout), productivity 
software (Google Docs), Web browser software (Chrome), and mobile phone operating systems 
(Android). 
Such envelopment strategy requires two main ingredients: (i) First, the dominant platform should 
be able to leverage its customer and attention base from its core market to new markets, and thus 
benefit from significant network effects when it enters the new markets; these network effects can 
be of much larger magnitude than those enjoyed by the entrant. (ii) Second, operating the two 
attention services together may entail significant economies of scope because of shared components 
or modules between them. The potential exclusionary effects from envelopment are mitigated when 
consumers can multi-home: in this case, even if the dominant platform bundles its core service with 
the new services, there might still be room for a rival platform. 
In the digital economy, one specific method for envelopment can be based on consumer privacy 
consents where consumers have to sign up for one platform but in doing so click to accept privacy 
T&Cs that allow their data to be used across platforms.12 
As already indicated, envelopment may at the same time have pro and anti-competitive effects. On 
the positive side, it enables the large platform to enjoy economies of scope in product development 
and the customers to enjoy synergies within the platform’s ecosystem. It may also contribute to 
increased competition between platforms in markets which have not yet tipped.13 On the negative 
side, envelopment allows the large platform to exclude competitors which may be as-efficient but 
have a smaller user base and/or are active on less different markets. Thus, envelopment may 
generate efficiencies in the short-term but at the expense of effective competition, hence efficiencies 
and innovation, in the longer term.  
3.3 Self-preferencing and internal discrimination 
When a digital platform has a dual role and offers an intermediation service but also the 
intermediated services, there is a risk that the platform will rely on its first service (intermediation) 
to favour its second service (intermediated) to the detriment of others. For instance, some have 
accused Amazon of relying on its role as a platform for third party sellers to favour its own selling 
operations to the detriment of some third party sellers. This may create a competitive harm when 
the platform has the ability and the incentive to favour its own services at the expense of 
the others which requires a series of conditions, in particular that the intermediation platform is 
not typically by-passed by the majority of the users (i.e. has a gatekeeper function) and that the 
benefits of self-preferencing are higher than the costs. 
 
11 This envelopment practice led to antitrust actions in the US and in the EU: United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 
(D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Decision of the Commission of 16 December 2009, Case 
39.530 Microsoft (tying) and Decision of the Commission of 6 March 2013 condemning Microsoft for ne respecting the first 
(commitments) decision. The European Commission also condemned another Microsoft envelopment practice involving Media 
Player: Decision of the Commission of 24 March 2004, Case 37.792-Microsoft, paras. 792-989 which was confirmed by the 
General Court in Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, EU:T:2007:289, paras.839-1193. 
12 See Condorelli and Padilla (2020). 
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Self-preferencing can take place with different methods. It can take place via pricing, for example 
Spotify's concerns regarding Apple Music's commissions, which are currently being reviewed. It can 
also take place via steering which relies on consumer behavioural biases. Examples may include 
an array of vertical search allegations against Google, based on the Shopping precedent, as well as 
self-preferencing through ranking in the Apple app store and Amazon's marketplace. 
In other sectors when firms are vertically integrated, such as telecommunications, competition law 
(with price squeeze cases)14 and regulation prohibit internal discrimination under some strict 
conditions. It should be determined whether the same conditions should be applied in the digital 
economy and for non-price behaviours. 
3.4 Refusal to give access to key innovation capabilities 
Next to extending its position from one market to another, a digital firm may also want to protect 
its position in a core market by limiting market contestability on the supply-side and may refuse to 
give access to key tangible or intangible components of their platforms, such as data or service 
interoperability. 
- Data access 
The key issue in deciding whether compulsory data sharing may be imposed is to 
determine whether the benefits of data sharing outweigh the costs. Such analysis should be 
applied in light of the data’s features. On the one hand, the benefits of sharing data are higher than 
for other facilities because data are general-purpose input that can be used for many different 
attention services. On the other hand, the costs (in incentives) of sharing data are lower than for 
other facilities because data are non-rival and its holder can continue to use them while sharing 
them with others. Costs are also lower when data are collected as by-products of another service, 
and therefore, would continue to be collected even if they have to be shared. Therefore, applying 
the same cost-benefit analysis which is at the core of the duty to deal in light of the different 
characteristics of data and competitive dynamics of the attention economy implies that the threshold 
for imposing data sharing should be lower than the threshold to impose access to other products or 
inputs. However, antitrust authorities should be mindful that there are costs to imposing such data 
sharing, as it may reduce the incentives to collect and store data.  
In another CERRE report on data sharing, three cases studies are analysed, including the need to 
give access to the click and query data on the main search engines.15 Also, two US antitrust cases 
are interesting. In both cases, a digital start-up relied on the data of a larger attention platform to 
provide data analytics services and then, at some point, was cut off from the access to that data. In 
the first case, PeopleBrowsr analysed Twitter data to sell information about customer reactions to 
products or about Twitter influencers in certain communities. At some point, Twitter decided that its 
data would no longer be accessible directly, but should be bought from certified data resellers. 
Following a complaint by PeopleBrowsr, a Californian Court ordered, with interim measures, that 
Twitter had to continue to provide its data directly. Then the parties settled the case deciding that 
after a transition period, PeopleBrowser will get the data from the certified data resellers.16 In the 
second case, hiQ analysed LinkedIn publicly available data to provide information to business about 
their workforces. At some point, LinkedIn limited access to this data by legal and technical means, 
because it wanted to provide similar services itself. Following a complaint by hiQ, a US federal district 
judge ordered LinkedIn to resume the supply of its data.17 Those two cases illustrate a theory of 
 
14 Case C-208/08P Deutsche Telekom, ECLI:EU:C:2010:603; Case C-52/09 Telia Sonera, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83; Case C-295/12P 
Telefonica, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062. 
15 Krämer J., D. Schnurr D. and S. Broughton-Micova (2020). 
16 http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2012/11/peoplebrowsr-wins-temporary-restraining-order-compelling-twitter-to-provide-
firehose-access/ and http://blog.peoplebrowsr.com/2013/04/peoplebrowsr-and-twitter-settle-firehose-dispute/ 




Digital Markets Act: Making economic regulation of platforms fit for the digital age 
15/108 
harm based on the free-riding by large attention platforms on the experimentation costs - which 
may constitute an important part of the innovation costs - incurred by start-ups. 18 
The possible harmful conduct may also cover issues relating to data access between trading parties. 
These relate to the platform requiring data from its business users, without reciprocating by 
providing data on the trades it makes on behalf of those business users. Examples include the 
concerns around app stores and also Amazon Marketplace. Essentially, the platform intermediation 
process may deprive business users of valuable customer data that they would have in a non-
intermediated environment, and then puts the platform in a strong position to compete against them 
or exploit them. 
- Interoperability 
To reduce market contestability, a dominant attention intermediary may also refuse or degrade 
(including continually changing APIs) interoperability with a smaller platform or with app 
developers.19 For instance, one question which is now reviewed by the Commission is whether Apple 
should allow other payment providers than Apple Pay to access its contactless payment technology. 
Another question is whether Facebook should be required to be more interoperable with other social 
networks not owned by Facebook, for example by allowing cross-posting.  
The welfare effects of interoperability obligations are complex to determine as, on the 
positive side, it may facilitate entry and help to internalise network externalities while allowing 
multiple firms but, on the negative side, it may limit the development of new and superior standards. 
4 Unilateral conduct with potential exploitative effects 
4.1 What constitutes an unfair/exploitative practice? 
In addition to the conduct which can exclude as-efficient existing or potential competitors, other 
types of conduct may directly exploit the consumers or the users of the digital firm. What 
constitutes an ‘exploitation’ is not always clear in law and in economics and often mixes 
efficiency and distribution rationale. Some clarification may be found in the legal instruments 
prohibiting exploitations. 
When exploitation is detrimental to a consumer (i.e. someone acting outside her professional 
activities), the conduct is regulated by consumer protection rules. Those rules prohibit unfair 
practices generally defined as being contrary to professional diligence and materially distorting the 
economic behaviour of the average consumer.20  
When exploitation is detrimental to a professional user (i.e. someone acting within her 
professional activities), the conduct is regulated by B2B-specific rules at the EU level (which is 
rare) or at the national level (which is more frequent). In the digital economy, the Platform-to-
Business Regulation aims to ensure more transparency in B2B relationships when an online 
intermediation platform is involved and refer to business users’ practices which grossly deviate from 
good commercial conduct, or are contrary to good faith and fair dealing.21  
 
18 Newman (2016:106-107) mentions two other cases where US Courts refused to impose data access where no prior voluntary 
access to data had been granted: LiveUniverse v. MySpace , No. CV 06−6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 Fed. App’x. 554 (9th Cir. 2008) and Facebook v. Power Ventures No. C 08−05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750 
(N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). 
19 If the four conditions of the essential facility doctrine are met, such refusal could be sanctioned by an antitrust authority: 
Decision of the Commission of 24 March 2004, Case 37.792-Microsoft, paras.546-791 which was confirmed by the General Court 
in Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission, paras.291-712. 
20 Directive 2005/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
commercial practices in the internal market, OJ [2005] L 149/22, as amended by Directive 2019/2161, art.5. The Directive 
identifies in particular misleading and aggressive commercial practices. 
21 Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency 
for business users of online intermediation services, OJ [2019] L 186/55, recital 2. See also art.1(1) of Directive 2019/633 of 
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Those conducts are also regulated by competition law which prohibits conduct of a dominant firm 
which directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions. Although competition authorities have been reluctant in the last twenty years to 
investigate and condemn exploitative abuses, there seems to be a resurgence of those cases, in 
particular in the digital economy. However, the authorities and the Courts have not yet defined clear 
normative criteria for what constitutes an unfair practice under competition law. Some criteria have 
been given in the context of excessive price cases.22 Other criteria have been given for other types 
of unfair practices such as imposing obligations which are not absolutely necessary.23 
4.2 Unfair practices in the retail supply chain and in the digital economy 
In its 2013 Green Paper on unfair B2B practices in the retail supply chain,24 the Commission 
identified, on the basis of several surveys and enquiries done at both EU and national levels, seven 
categories of unfair B2B terms and practices: 
- Lack of written contracts such that the parties have no lasting proof of the terms agreed 
upon; 
- Ambiguous contract terms allowing the stronger contractual party to impose additional 
obligations during the execution of the contract; 
- Unfair transfer of commercial risk such as the transfer of risks to the weaker party which is 
not the best placed to avoid them, the financing of proprietary business activities of the 
stronger party or the abusive use of reverse margin practices; 
- Unfair use of information, in particular confidential information by the stronger party for 
instance to develop competing products which would deprive the weaker party of the results 
of its innovation; 
- Retroactive contract changes which have not been agreed in a sufficiently precise manner, 
such as deductions from the invoiced amount to cover promotion fees, unilateral discounts 
based on quantities sold, listing fees; 
- Unfair termination of commercial relationship, such termination or disruption which is sudden 
and unjustified or without a reasonable period of notice; 
- Territorial supply constraints which may be imposed by some multi-national suppliers to 
impede retailers from sourcing identical goods cross-border in a central location and 
distributing them to other Member States. 
As a follow-up to the Green Paper, Renda et al. (2014) did a very comprehensive study on the EU 
and national legal frameworks covering the B2B unfair trading practices in the retail supply chain. 
Out of a list of 30 terms and practices surveyed, the study identified 11 considered as representative 
of the core of the unfairness problem in B2B relationships. These are mapped to the seven categories 
of the Green Paper as elaborated in Table 2 below. 
  
 
the agricultural and food supply chain, OJ [2019] L111/59, referring to “practices that grossly deviate from good commercial 
conduct, that are contrary to good faith and fair dealing and that are unilaterally imposed by one trading partner on another.” 
22 Case United Brands: Price should be unfair in itself or compared to other products, but ‘other ways may be devised, and 
economic theorists have not failed to think up of several, of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a product is 
unfair. 
23 Case BRT/Sabam: imposes on its members obligations which are not absolutely necessary for the attainment of [the collecting 
society’s] object … encroach unfairly upon a member’s freedom to exercise his copyright. 
24 Commission Green Paper of 31 January 2013 on unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food and non-food supply 
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Table 2: Main B2B unfair terms and practices in the retail supply chain 
Commission  
Green Paper 
Main unfair B2B terms and practices 
identified by the CEPS study 
Lack of written 
contracts 
- Lack of written contract 
Ambiguous contract 
terms 
- Lack of clarity in contract offer 
Unfair transfer of 
commercial risk 
- Liability disclaimers 
- Unilateral modification clauses 
- Terms unreasonably imposing or shifting risks 
Unfair use of 
information 
- Unfair use of confidential information 
- Unfair use of confidential information after contract expiry 
Retroactive contract 
changes 
- Abuse of economic dependence 
Unfair termination of a 
commercial relationship 
- Unfair breaking off of negotiation 
- Unfair contract termination 
- Refusal to negotiate 
Source: Renda et al. 2014, p. 11 
Online intermediation in a business to consumer environment is a form of retail supply. 
To be sure, Martens (2016:13-18) explains that online intermediation, and the more general 
concepts of platforms and multi-sided markets, may be defined more or less broadly. Depending on 
this choice, online intermediation platforms can either be considered as retailers or not, but in any 
case, online intermediation shares many characteristics of the retail supply.25  
In 2016-2017, the Commission undertook an extensive fact-finding exercise on B2B practices in the 
online platforms environment.26 In this context, Ecorys (2017) observed that: ‘a total of 46% of 
business users responded that they have experienced problems and disagreements with the 
platforms in the course of their business relationship. Among the business users with more than half 
of turnover generated via online platforms (heavy users), the share of those that experienced 
problems is significantly higher (75%). Out of those who have experienced problems 21% indicated 
that they occurred often over the course of the business relationship. For heavy users of online 
platforms, significantly higher shares (32%) have experienced problems often.’27 The study has then 
identified the six most important unfair terms and practices. Most of them relate to conduct taking 
place before or during the execution of the contract while one group of practices relates to dispute 
resolution possibilities. 
 
25 Interestingly, in a case regarding the interpretation of the concept of ‘intermediaries’ of Article 11 of the Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48, the Court of Justice of the EU judged that online and offline intermediaries should be treated in 
the same way and that the Directive covers both types of intermediaries. The Court decided that: ‘The fact that the provision of 
sales points concerns an online marketplace or a physical marketplace such as market halls is irrelevant in that connection. It is 
not apparent from Directive 2004/48 that the scope of the directive is limited to electronic commerce. Moreover, the objective 
stated in recital 10 of that directive of ensuring a high, equivalent and homogeneous level of protection of intellectual property 
in the internal market would be substantially weakened if an operator which provides third parties with access to a physical 
marketplace such as that at issue in the main proceedings, on which those third parties offer in that marketplace the sale of 
counterfeit branded products, could not be the subject of the injunctions referred to in the third sentence of Article 11 of that 
directive’: Case C-494/15 Hilfinger et al. v Delta Center, ECLI:EU:C:2016:528, para 29. 
26 The results are summarised in the Impact Assessment for the Proposal for a Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency 
in P2B, SWD (2018)138 and its Annexes. See also EY (2018). 
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Table 3 below presents the main unfair P2B practices according to the categories of the 
Commission Green Paper on B2B unfair practices. 
Table 3: Main unfair terms and practices in the online intermediation chain 
Commission 
Green Paper 
Main unfair P2B terms and practices 
identified by the Ecorys Study 





- Search and ranking: practices related to search and ranking (lack of 
transparency, rules and means for users to control the results). 
Unfair transfer of 
commercial risk 
- Terms and conditions: lack of or very short-term prior notice about 
changes and continuation of use as a presumption of acceptance of 
changes 
- Data access and portability: Lack of transparency of the platforms' 
terms and conditions and/or their practice on data and limitation of 
the extent to which users can access, use and transfer data relating 
to or generated based on the transactions carried out through 
platforms 
- Liability disclaimers 
- Lack of penalties for platforms. 
Unfair use of 
information 
- Platforms competing with business users or limiting options: 





Unfair termination of a 
commercial relationship 
- Access to the platform: content or product removal / delisting / 
termination of an account or product. 
Source: Author on the basis of Ecorys (2017) 
Regarding dispute resolution, business users surveyed voiced concerns on the choice of applicable 
law or jurisdiction, which is often made outside the EU. They also complained about the restrictions 
on access to redress possibilities. Ecorys (2017: xvii) analysed the reasons for not taking steps to 
resolve a problem. For the heavy users, the three main reasons are: (1) uncertainty about the 
outcome, (2) fear of damaging the relationship with the platform and (3) procedural difficulties. For 
the non-heavy users, the three main reasons are: (1) marginal importance of the problem, (2) 
uncertainty about the results and (3) procedural difficulties. 
One important unfair practice in the digital economy which is at the heart of the German Facebook 
case may be related to the exploitation of consumers through data extraction.  
Exploitative practices can also cover excessive prices conduct. An interesting aspect in a digital 
environment is that these are sometimes being achieved through bundling additional high-cost 
services. For example, there are concerns about the Apple app store requiring app sellers to use the 
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Some of those practices have also exclusionary effects and have been analysed in Section 3. More 
importantly, the welfare assessment of such practices is complex for the following reasons: 
- As indicated in Section 2, some of those practices may have exploitative and/or exclusionary 
effects, but they may also be justified by efficiency or other objective reasons (for 
instance, the protection of security or privacy); in this case, the negative and the positive 
effects of the conduct should be balanced; 
- As indicated at the beginning of this section, the normative criteria, in particular the 
efficiency or the distribution rationale, is not always clear when assessing exploitative 
conduct; prohibiting a conduct for its distributional effect is much more politically sensitive 
than prohibition for efficiency reasons and, for this reason, may not be left to an independent 
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DISCUSSION SUMMARY | Conduct and theories of harm 
The purpose of this section is to list the questions and discussion points that arose from the overview 
presented in the Issue Paper on ‘conduct and theories of harm’ and the exclusive workshop organised 
in July 2020. The non-attributable summary of the discussion was prepared by Claire-Marie Healy, 
project manager at CERRE. 
Assessing effects in the digital economy: dealing with amplified trade-offs in a highly 
uncertain environment 
How should regulators approach efficiency benefits/objective justification? The most difficult situation 
occurs where there are clear short-run efficiency benefits and a long-term competitive harm that is 
more uncertain but potentially very serious. 
RESPONSES  
The rapid change in technologies requires a more flexible regulatory approach that can adapt in time 
and target the specific harms arising which may change very rapidly.   
In that regard, the current approach and burden of proof may be unsatisfactory because it makes the 
question binary and legalistic (has the standard of proof been met or not?) when the debate should 
be economic and commercial. Do you agree? Do you have some suggestions for improving this? 
RESPONSES  
The legal and economic importance of maintaining a binary approach and the legal duty of the burden 
of proof on the person alleging a market failure or a wrong-doing was underlined by some participants 
during the discussion. 
How should the different trade-offs in assessing the effects of the conduct in the digital economy be 
arbitrated? How should one consider the trade-offs between: short and long-term consumer welfare; 
efficiency and diversity; competition and innovation, and between sustaining versus disrupting 
innovation? 
RESPONSES  
The characteristics of some online services can generate market failures which harm consumers and 
society in several ways. The links that may exist between different harms can create overlaps and 
tensions between policy aims. Interventions to address harms should be carefully designed to 
overcome these challenges and avoid undesirable unintended consequences. Interventions will need 
to be flexible to deal with fast evolving services and markets, and regulators can use new techniques 
to understand the complexity of online business models and consumers’ decisions. 
The adjudication of those trade-offs is made even more difficult by the high uncertainty of the 
evolution of many digital technologies and markets. Because of this complexity, should the analysis 
of the conduct be complemented with structural analysis, for instance by creating presumption in case 
of market concentration? 
RESPONSES  
Structural features are recognised by some participants as necessary to ensure a quick intervention 
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Structural and conduct features can also be looked at in parallel, as is already done by some regulators 
in their market analysis.  
RESPONSES  
While the need for rapid actions to fix online market failures/harms was highlighted several times 
throughout the discussion, some participants also raised the importance of looking at the effects of 
regulatory failures and the profound and substantial unintended consequences (good or bad) that 
interventions can have for the nature of the concern elsewhere. Because of the close connections 
within the online world, introducing measures such as interoperability could profoundly change 
competition. 
  
Unilateral conduct with potential exclusionary effects 
What are the main types of welfare-detrimental unilateral conduct which public authorities (regulatory 
and/or antitrust) should prioritise?  
Should the authorities focus on supply-side issues (leverage, self-preferencing, and access to key 
capabilities) or demand-side issues (costs of switching and multi-homing, consumer bias and inertia)? 
RESPONSES 
Most participants support the idea of a regulatory focus on supply and demand-side issues as they 
are strongly interlinked and less easy to disentangle in the digital sector than in any other sectors. 
However, in case priorities needed to be made, some participants were in favour of the supply-side 
issues to be prioritised as it is where most of the problems are and where solutions should be found.  
Some participants consider the demand-side issues as equally important, especially when it comes to 
transparency measures for consumers for instance. Before deciding on which side should be 
prioritised, the effects of the P2B Regulation that is mainly addressing demand-side considerations 
should also be considered.  
In addition to looking at the welfare-detrimental conducts, it is equally important to look at the 
different business models of the platforms as well, and not only look at the supply and demand side.  
Some participants supported the idea to go beyond the simple distinction between supply and demand 
(as it is not particularly useful in the context of online platforms where those two sides interact 
continuously together). In the case of the recently published market study from the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA), the CMA’s far-reaching remedies proposals, and its decision to propose a 
new regulatory system, rather than make a market investigation reference is one alternative approach 
to be considered. In its study, the CMA propose that within the new regime a ‘Digital Markets Unit’ 
should have the ability to enforce a code of conduct to ensure that platforms with a position of market 
power do not engage in exploitative or exclusionary practices, or practices likely to reduce trust and 
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What has the paper missed in terms of types of unilateral conduct that might create consumer harm? 
RESPONSES 
The description of the conducts in the paper is comprehensive as they are relatively broad. A 
participant suggested considering data harvesting as a new area of conduct to be added into this 
paper as it refers to a conduct that is specific to the digital sector. 
As part of the trade-off issue to be looked into in terms of market intervention, some participants 
suggested covering also in this paper the opportunity cost of platforms, especially when it comes to 
opportunity cost for SMEs for instance, compared with the opportunity cost of using more traditional 
and established tools. 
Regarding leveraging, a recommendation was made to distinguish ‘tight leveraging’ within the same 
vertical value chain and ‘loose leveraging’ of related markets and eco-system.  In general, it is agreed 
that the usual analytical tools can be applied but that some level of adaption will probably be required 
to adapt to some of the specificities of the digital market as well.  
To help with assessing type I and type II errors from intervention, are there major costs and benefits 
of this conduct that the paper has not included? Which are the most likely to be on balance harmful 
or is this impossible to say on the basis of form of conduct without more evidence? 
RESPONSES 
To avoid strong network effects, multi-homing and interoperability can be efficient tools to help 
markets from tipping.  Market tipping per say can also bring a lot of economic efficiencies and should 
not be prevented by all means. Access to assets (innovation capabilities) is key to prevent abuse of 
conducts in the more narrow sense of those that have a tipped market or own a tipped market. 
Some participants suggested that the incentives as well as the ability to influence single homing may 
have actually increased substantially relative to other markets, due to the cost structure and the 
assets involved in the digital markets. On the other side, while it is rather easy to capture the 
incentives and ability for single/multi-homing, it is rather difficult to understand in this specific market 
what the legitimate competitive conducts are that drive consumers from choosing one platform in 
particular (quality, nudging etc.). 
Are the new challenges in digital largely focused on (non-price) self-preferencing, access to data and 
interoperability, or do you think that there are other new types of abuse or harm in the digital 
economy? For the more ‘traditional’ form of abuses, such as bundling or contractual exclusion, is 
there some ‘special’ aspect in the digital economy? 
RESPONSES 
Some participants agreed that dominant firms are in a position to strongly influence where innovation 
happens or don’t happen.  
According to some participants, having more data and information is part of the solution but that is 
not where most of the problem lies. It is possible indeed to identify harm but the fear factor of 
retaliation from large platforms represents a strong disincentive to smaller platforms. 
Besides innovation, a general problem identified is the lack of non-price competition parameters that 
are more relevant to the digital market (level of quality of services; privacy levels, etc.) which makes 
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Do you think that one of the specific features of the digital economy is the difficulty to detect abuse 
and harm? If yes, is the solution having more data and information, which is not always easy to get, 
especially when user and potential complainant depends on some digital firms? 
RESPONSES 
Often, the harm is in the innovation that did not happen and it is very difficult to quantify harm 
empirically.  
Instead of using a data review, a historical review of all the cases in the industry for the last 20 years 
looking at how those cases have resolved themselves, and what innovation came out of them was 
suggested by one participant.  
 
Unilateral conduct with potential exploitative effects 
What are the main forms of unfair/exploitative conduct which public authorities (regulatory and/or 
antitrust) should prioritise? How the authorities should balance positive and negative effects? 
RESPONSES 
Some other aspects of exploitation that aren’t about unfair type of P2B conducts and that may also 
be relevant for public authorities to look into includes for instance pricing and its associated bundling 
behaviour effect.  
While some conducts are clearly exploitative and should be prioritised by public authorities to 
intervene, one participant suggested not only thinking in terms of exploitation but also in terms of 
other features such as market efficiency, as with the P2B Regulation. Using such a market design 
perspective should then include looking at the right package of measures to be put in place involving 
both symmetric and asymmetric regulations such as in telecoms where both already work well 
together.  
Introducing a flexible ex ante regulation with some asymmetric and personalised aspects seem to be 
a very suitable solution for some participants, to complement existing competition tools when 
addressing the more complex issues of online markets.  
An additional comment was made about the importance that the remedies are crafted by an 
organisation capable of maintaining a deep understanding of the problems and the sources of the 
detriments to users that may arise.   
How to determine which aspects of these rules should be horizontal (i.e. applied to all platforms as in 
the P2B Regulation) and which need only apply to the largest online platforms? 
RESPONSES 
One participant raised the necessity for authorities to carefully examine the question of market 
definition, and the level of market intervention that EU policy makers will feel comfortable setting as 
a standard for the burden of proof to intervene.  
Instead of applying horizontal rules to all platforms, a suggestion was made to create a regulatory 
sandbox or a threshold for intervention which should be proportionate to the size and scale of the 
data processing activities. This will help protecting smaller players with the extra burden of 
implementing horizontal rules, such as currently the case with the GDPR.  
While some participants are in favour of applying a threshold to intervention, some participants 
however are in favour of applying a common set of rules for all platforms to ensure consumers are 
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ISSUE PAPER | Threshold for intervention 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope of the issue paper 
In its 2020 Digital Strategy Communication of February,28 the Commission announced that the 
proposal of the Digital Services Act package would include one pillar aiming at achieving a fair 
and competitive economy through economic regulation. In their Inception Impact Assessment of 
June 2020, the Commission services indicate that they are considering the following three policy 
options: 
1. Revise the horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-Business Regulation;  
2. Adopt a horizontal framework empowering regulators to collect information from large online 
platforms acting as gatekeepers; 
3. Adopt a new and flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers. This option is divided into the following sub-options:  
3a. Prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices (“blacklisted” practices); 
3b. Adoption of tailor-made remedies addressed on a case-by-case basis where necessary 
and justified.29 
In contrast to the P2B Regulation which applies to all platforms irrespective of market power, the 
Commission suggests in option 3 that the ex ante regulation would only apply to large online 
platforms that benefit from significant network effects and act as gatekeepers. This option 
would involve the use of a threshold for intervention to determine the subset of large online platforms 
subject to the additional rules. Those platforms would be identified on the basis of a set of clear 
quantitative and qualitative criteria, such as significant network effects, the size of the user 
base and/or an ability to leverage data across markets. 
1.2 Proposals made so far: use of composite indicators 
To feed this reflection on the definition of the criteria, several recent reports and policy initiatives 
have proposed to define a stricter threshold that would trigger additional antitrust oversight and/or 
some form of ex ante regulation in the digital sector. Those thresholds are generally based on a 
complex set of quantitative and qualitative indicators.30 
In the UK, the Furman Report (2019, p.10 and 55) proposes the threshold of significant market 
status, defined as enduring market power enjoyed by a firm over strategic bottleneck market or a 
position to exercise market power over a gateway/bottleneck and control others’ market access. 
In Germany, the draft 10th amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition proposes to 
introduce the threshold of paramount significance determined on the basis of five criteria: 
- a dominant position on one or more markets, 
- financial strength or access to other resources, 
- vertical integration and activities on otherwise related markets, 
- access to data relevant for competition,  
 
28 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM(2020) 67. 
29 Inception Impact Assessment on Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with 
significant network effects acting as gate-keepers , available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-
gatekeepers 




Digital Markets Act: Making economic regulation of platforms fit for the digital age 
30/108 
- and importance of activities for third parties' access to supply and sales markets and related 
influence on third parties' business activities.31 
In France, the Autorité de la Concurrence proposes to introduce the threshold of structuring digital 
platforms defined as: 
- a company that provides online intermediation services for exchanging, buying or selling 
goods, content or services, 
- which holds structuring market power because of its size, financial capacity, user community 
and/or data,  
- enabling it to control access to or significantly affect the functioning of the market(s) in 
which it operates) with regard to its competitors, users and/or third-party companies that 
depend on access to the services it offers for their own economic activity.32 
The French telecommunications regulator ARCEP proposes the threshold of systemic digital 
platforms, defined on the basis of three main criteria: 
- the existence of bottleneck power, 
- a certain number of users in the EU - or as a proxy, sufficiently high EU turnover 
- and the existing of integration of that firm into an ecosystem enabling leverage effects 
which are complemented by four secondary criteria: 
- gatekeeper position, 
- access to many high-quality data 
- market shares for online advertising 
- and the market value of the platform.33 
1.3 Use of simple quantitative indicators 
Quantitative indicators are also used to trigger regulatory intervention in the digital economy and 
beyond. 
- In the digital economy 
The Commission Proposal for the digital service tax would only apply to online platforms with total 
annual worldwide revenues of €750 million and EU revenues of €50 million.34 
Several EU legislative instruments applicable to online platforms, in particular regarding moderation 
of online content use the number of users on a platform. For instance, the DSM Copyright 
Directive imposes additional stay-down obligations for content sharing platforms when the average 
number of monthly unique visitors exceeds 5 million, calculated on the basis of the previous calendar 
year.35 The proposal for a Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online 
imposes some duty of care on the hosting platforms which are established in the EU or which have 
significant number of users in one or more Member States.36 This is also the case at national level. 
 
31 Proposed new Section 19a(1), for an English version see https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GWB10-Engl-
Translation-2020-02-21.pdf  
32 Autorité de la concurrence’s contribution of 19 February 2020 to the debate on competition policy and digital challenges 
available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/2020-
03/2020.03.02_contribution_adlc_enjeux_numeriques_vf_en_0.pdf 
33 ARCEP, Systemic digital platforms, December 2019.  
34 Commission Proposal of 21 March 2018 for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues 
resulting from the provision of certain digital services, COM(2018) 148, art.4. 
35 Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital 
Single Market and amending Directives 96/9 and 2001/29, OJ [2019] L 130/92, art.17(6). 
36 Proposal of the Commission of 12 September 2018 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing 
the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM (2018) 640, art.2(3). See also Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament 
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In France, platforms with over 5 million unique visitors per month are subject to enhanced 
transparency obligations.37   
- Outside the digital economy 
The UTP Food Supply Directive applies to the B2B Unfair Trading Practices applies when 
there is an unbalanced relationship between suppliers (the weakest party) and buyers (the strongest 
party) which is measured by the gap between the annual turnover of the supplier and the buyer.38 
 
Suppliers Buyers 
< €2m > €2m 
€ 2m – 10m > € 10m 
€10m – €50m > €50m 
€50m – €150m > €150m 
€150m – € 350m > €350m 
 
The EU’s Financial Supervision Regulation provides for a significance/systemic power 
analysis based on the following criteria: 
- the size - total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion, 
- the economic importance for the specific Member State or the EU economy as a whole, 
- the size of the cross-border activities - the total value of its assets exceeds €5 billion and 
the ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating Member 
State to its total assets/liabilities is above 20%, 
- or the direct public financial assistance when the bank has requested or received funding 
from the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility. 
The banks meeting the “significance” threshold are regulated at the EU level by the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism while the other banks (namely, the “less significant” institutions) continue 
to be supervised by their national supervisory bodies.39  
However, these approaches may be unsuited to the problem at hand. A key problem is that firms 
on both sides of the transaction may be engaged in multiple activities in different sectors, and a 
threshold that is overly simplistic could risk both failing to capture “large” dependent firms (but 
which are seeking a digital route to market), and identify as gatekeepers large firms which operate 
a platform (perhaps within the context of a wider business), but do not wield gatekeeper power in 
relation to potential users of that platform.  It is also relevant to note that these solutions have been 
pursued in specific market segments i.e. food and farming, whereas the scope of the DSA may be 
considerably wider and apply across multiple sectors, each of which may have differing thresholds 
and drivers for gatekeeper power. 
 
action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ [2010] 
L 95/1, as amended by Directive 2018/1808, art.28b(3) which refers to the size of the video-sharing platforms to determine the 
appropriate content moderation measures that should be adopted. 
37 Article D 111-15, French Consumer Code. 
38 Directive 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-
business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, OJ [2019] L111/59, art.1(2). 
39 Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
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2 Market definition 
The designation of Large Gatekeeper Platform (LGP) may be a two-step process: first,  the 
determination of the scope of competition with the definition of a relevant market and, second, the 
determination a LGP position on the defined market. Alternatively, the designation may be  a one-
step process with direct designation without defining a market. The two-step process is used in 
competition law or in some competition law-based regulatory regimes (such as the 
telecommunications regulation). The one-step process is used, for instance, when the regulatory 
threshold is based on simple quantitative indicators as illustrated above. 
2.1 Relying on market definition/business areas  
Defining a relevant market in line with competition law requires an assessment of demand and short-
term supply-side substitution. This has traditionally been carried out with the SSNIP test – whereby 
consumers’ response to a “small but significant non-transitory increase in price” is viewed as 
indicating whether they would switch to an alternative service; while in parallel, a similar conception 
exercise is conducted to assess whether additional suppliers would enter the market if prices 
increased.40 However, this step should be adapted to take the characteristics of the digital economy 
into account.  
2.1.1 Adapting antitrust methodologies 
In case of multi-sided markets, the first question is whether the antitrust authority should define 
one single market covering all sides or different markets for each side. 41 Contrary to the US Supreme 
Court in Amex,42 the EU Courts went for the second option in Master Card43 and Cartes Bancaires;44 
they define a market for each side while noting that the relationship between both slides 
would be taken into account in assessing market power and theories of harm.  
After a detailed analysis of the pros- and cons of each option, Franck and Peitz (2019:22-39) support 
the multi-markets approach because it is more flexible and allows for different substitution 
possibilities by the user groups on each sides of the platform. Moreover, the scope of the markets 
on each side may be different as substitutability preferences may not be the same on each side of 
the market. For instance, Newman (2016:110) explains that: “advertisers may view search results 
and online email services as close substitutes to deliver ads to consumers; they may even view 
offline venues like billboards as fairly close substitutes for online platforms.45 However, viewers may 
not see social networks and email services as closely substitutable, and billboards are so distant as 
to be irrelevant.” 
 
40 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J. [1997] C 
372/5. 
41 Also OECD (2018). 
42 Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. (2018). 
43 Case T-11/08 MasterCard, para 176-177 : “It is indeed the case that there are certain forms of interaction 
between the “issuing” and “acquiring” sides, such as the complementary nature of issuing and acquiring services, 
and the presence of indirect network effects, since the extent of merchants’ acceptance of cards and the number 
of cards in circulation each affects the other. However, it must be pointed out that despite such complementarity, 
services provided to cardholders and those provided to merchants can be distinguished, and, moreover, 
cardholders and merchants exert separate competitive pressure on issuing and acquiring banks respectively.” 
44 Case C-67/13P Cartes bancaires, paras. 78-79: “It is necessary to take into consideration all relevant aspects 
– having regard, in particular, to the nature of the services at issue, as well as the real conditions of the 
functioning and structure of the markets – of the economic or legal context in which that coordination takes 
place, it being immaterial whether or not such an aspect relates to the relevant market. That must be the case, 
in particular, when that aspect is the taking into account of interactions between the relevant market and a 
different related market […] and, all the more so, when, as in the present case, there are interactions between 
the two facets of a two-sided system.” 
45 In Person v. Google,, No. C 06−7297 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1831111, at 3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2007), a US Court 
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The next question is how to run the SSNIP test in a multi-sided context where there are prices on 
different sides of the market (and where it is the structure of prices that matters and not the level 
of price on each individual side). It is important that the SSNIP test accounts for the cross-
group externalities. If this is not the case, there is a risk that the market will be defined too 
narrowly as explained in OECD (2018:46). Franck and Peitz (2019:63-64) propose to run the SSNIP 
test on each of the various prices while maintaining the other prices unchanged. They complement 
this analysis by applying the SSNIP test on each price separately but allowing the other prices to be 
adjusted optimally. 
In addition, in case of ‘free’ products, the General Court of the EU recognised in Topps that: “the 
SSNIP test may also prove unsuitable (…) where there are free goods or goods the cost of which is 
not borne by those determining the demand.” There is thus a need to adapt the substitutability logics 
of the SSNIP test to markets without monetary price.46 
With the same logic, Newman (2016:66) proposes the Small but Significant and Non-transitory 
Increase in Costs (SSNIC) test which is analogous to the SSNIP test, but with the costs for users 
in terms of attention and information, instead of the price. Thus the antitrust authority should assess 
whether a market-wide five percent increase in the amount (or length, duration, etc.) of 
advertisements would cause viewers to substitute away to a different attention service. However, 
the author points to several difficulties in the use of the SSNIC test: (i) the identification of the 
relevant cost unit: attention, information or a combination of both; (ii) the difficulty for customers 
in evaluating the costs in terms of attention and information, due, for example, to distorted 
perceptions of attention costs (and related information costs); and (iii) the heterogeneity of both 
attention and information costs. 
In the same vein, the OECD (2013:14) or Gal and Rubinfeld (2016:551) propose to use the Small 
but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Quality (SSNIQ) test which examines 
switching behaviours with reduction of quality, covering both increase in efficiency or decrease in 
non-monetary costs (such as privacy, exposure to ads …). In Qihoo 360 v. Tencent , the Chinese 
Supreme People’s Court relied on a variant of this test, the Small but Significant and Not-transitory 
Decline of Quality (SSNDQ) to define online instant messaging services.47 This is also the approach 
followed by the Commission in Google Android. 
Finally, Wu (2019) proposes an Attentional-SSNIP (A-SSNIP), a test that determine how 
consumers might react to a Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in undesired messages 
or advertising load for a given product. He explains the test as follows: “if one added a five-second 
advertising video that played before every usage of Google search, would some number of 
consumers switch to Bing? Presumably yes, meaning that Google search and Bing are substitutes 
and competitors. But what if the additional load was added to all search engines—would consumers 
spend less time on search and spend more time on Facebook or Twitter instead? If not—if consumers 
continue using search, even at the new, higher attentional price—then this would suggest that search 
is, in fact, the right market definition and that a hypothetical search engine monopolist is in a position 
to raise attentional prices.” 
It is therefore relevant to consider how an approach based on “business areas” or some equivalent 
term might be used as a first step in the approach of identifying potential LGP which might be 
susceptible to ex ante regulation.  
  
 
46 Case T-699/14 Topps, para.82. Similarly, Decision of the Commission of 27 June 2017, Case AT.39 740, Google Search 
(Shopping), para. 245. 
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2.1.2 Pros and cons of relying on market definition 
An advantage of maintaining an approach which is similar to that of market definition in 
relation to digital platforms is that the gatekeeping power is likely to be specific to, or to stem from 
control over a given market / business area. Moreover, because self-preferencing and tying and 
bundling may be harmful and in need to be addressed through ex ante legislation, it is necessary to 
identify the core market which should be isolated from conducts with aim to leverage power 
downstream or horizontally. Moreover, other potential obligations that might be imposed such as 
access to the platform, regulation of terms and conditions, and interoperability should in principle 
relate to the problem identified which stems from control over functionality, presentation and access 
in specific markets. 
A challenge with this approach is that the process of defining markets or business areas could in 
itself be a complex process, involving at least some of the questions and uncertainties that current 
arise in the application of competition law to market definition as just explained. For example, there 
are open questions around the degree to which a possible category of “social media” should be 
confined to platforms which offer a range of functions in this area such as Facebook, or should also 
include platforms which provide specific elements of social media functionality such as Twitter or 
unaffiliated messaging services. The potential for specific or niche services to replace the full-service 
functionality of Facebook from a consumer perspective, would need to be investigated. 
Additionally, in the area of “e-commerce” – there is a question as to whether this business area 
should be treated in a very wide sense (and if so whether it should just include e-commerce platforms 
offering a wide range of goods and services or should also include specialist platforms), or whether 
this business area may fragment into segments e.g. for the sale of books, groceries etc. 
The views on channels to market of business users may be particularly important in the case of e-
commerce, in terms of whether business users perceive the need to be present on a general platform 
as equivalent to participation in sector-specific platforms. Equally, it would be of interest to 
understand whether consumers could consider the use of multiple sectorally specific platforms as an 
appropriate substitute for a platform which offers a wide range of products, or at least – what would 
constitute the “cost” of replacing general platforms with multiple sectoral platforms, and whether 
this is sufficiently high that a specific business area for general e-commerce platforms would be 
found. 
Guidance might be needed in order to provide clarity on how the concept of a “business area” or 
similar test would be applied, and thus which companies would likely be captured. 
Overall, one advantage of an approach which involves business areas or concepts similar to markets, 
is that it should provide a flexible tool that could evolve alongside the nature of platforms and 
consumer tastes. However, it also necessitates a step in the process that may be time consuming 
and subject to challenge. 
2.2 Bypassing market definition 
An alternative might be to set out within the legislation, a number of clearly defined and generic 
features which are likely to indicate gatekeeper power, such as the fact that the platform is used by 
a high proportion of Internet users which do not multi-home or switch. Such an approach might help 
platforms concerned to self-identify and avoid some of the elements of debate and potential 
challenge relating to the definition of “business areas”. Similarly, the Furman report investigating 
the case for ex ante regulation of platforms in the UK avoided relying on existing dominance concepts 
and instead proposes the identification of a company with “Strategic Market Status”, which may 
have an “enduring market power over a strategic bottleneck or gateway market”. 48   
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However, at least in cases relating to self-preferencing and tying, there would still be a need to 
identify a core market for any prohibitions and/or obligations to be made operational. Moreover, 
potential prohibitions and/or obligations in other areas such as access obligations and any regulation 
of terms and conditions may  be restricted to areas in which the platform acts as a gatekeeper, in 
order not to avoid disincentives to innovation by the gatekeeper platform outside its core market. 
Thus, uncertainties and debate around the relevant scope of the remedy or obligation 
could replace uncertainty around the scope of the relevant market or business area 
concerned.  
3 Criteria to designate Large Gatekeeper Platforms 
Once markets/business areas have been defined, it is necessary to designate platforms which have 
the potential to impede fair trading and innovation in the business areas concerned. The four main 
criteria we consider are: (i) large gatekeeper intermediation platforms, (ii) the ability to act as a 
gatekeeper (thereby creating dependency and the conditions for unfair trading); (iii) the ability to 
maintain an enduring gatekeeper position through the control of innovation capabilities; and (iv) 
structural features that exacerbate these problems and facilitate the defence or the extension of 
such gatekeeper power.  
3.1 Criteria 1: Large Intermediation Platform 
3.1.1 Rationale 
Given the possible harmful practices identified in the previous issue papers, the new ex ante 
framework, if justified, should possibly focus mainly on digital platforms with an intermediation 
function.49  
The first designation criterion relates to the size of the intermediation platforms which can be 
determined relatively easily on the basis of relevant quantitative indicators. One issue is to determine 
whether this indicator should be absolute and independent of the size of the market or relative and 
reflect the market power of the platforms. To limit the risk of over-regulation (and catch small 
platforms which have market power on a small market) and because the market power issue will be 
taken into account in the second criterion, one option will be to base this first criterion on the 
absolute size of the platforms, as it is the case of some EU law applicable to digital platforms 
mentioned above.  
The size of the platform can be used as a substantive criteria to trigger the intervention of ex ante 
regulation, but also as a jurisdictional criterion to determine the scope of EU law versus national 
law, as it is the case in EU Merger control.50 Thus the DSA may provide that for the platforms have 
a certain size at the EU level, EU law (and EU enforcement system) will apply while for the other 
gatekeeper platform, national law will be applicable (see also the issue paper on institutional design). 
3.1.2 Indicators 
− Monetary revenues 
As for the Digital Service Tax proposal, the revenues of the online platforms, at the global or EU 
level, is a relevant indicator to measure the size of the platforms 
  
 
49 Article 2(2) of the P2B Regulation gives the following definition of online intermediation services: ‘services which meet all of 
the following requirements:  (a) they constitute information society services, (b) they allow business users to offer goods or 
services to consumers, with a view to facilitating the initiating of direct transactions between those business users and consumers, 
irrespective of where those transactions are ultimately concluded;  and (c) they are provided to business users on the basis of 
contractual relationships between the provider of those services and business users which offer goods or services to consumers 
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− Number of unique visitors and time on site 
As for some online content platform laws, the number of unique visitors is another relevant 
indicator to measure the size, this is the number of contacts by different devices identified by an IP 
address during a standard period of time, typically a month.  
This is also an indicator that is often used by competition agencies to measure market power, in 
particular for attention intermediaries.51 However, the number of users is an indicator which is 
simplistic and does not carry enough information on the market power in several circumstances. 
This is the case when viewers multi-home on different platforms but do not allocate their attention 
equally among them, which is often the case in practice. This is also the case when the usage of a 
platform is heterogeneous among users.52 In those cases, it is better to consider usage volumes 
rather than number of users. 
To do that, Wu (2019:26) suggests relying on Time on Site. For instance, he indicates that: “a 
2017 comScore report suggests that Facebook held roughly 1 000 monthly minutes of the average 
American’s time, as compared with about 250 for Instagram and Snap, respectively, and less than 
200 for Twitter, and 50 for Google+. Relying on these data for hypothetical purposes, and presuming 
that “online social networking” is an appropriate market definition, if consumers nationwide spent a 
total of some 2 000 minutes per week on all social networking apps, and overall spent 55 percent of 
those hours on Facebook and 12.5 % on Instagram, we would have some sense of the structural 
importance of a transaction like the Facebook-Instagram combination. In this hypothetical, it would 
leave the combined company with a 67.5 % market share in the presumed social networking 
market.” 
Alexa, an Amazon company, measures the daily time on site which estimates daily time on site per 
visitor to an Internet website (and is updated daily on the basis on the trailing 3 months). Alexa also 
collects the Daily Pageviews per Visitor which estimates the daily unique pageviews per visitor on a 
specific site (and is updated daily on the basis on the trailing 3 months).53  
Interestingly, a similar Time on Site criterion is used in the European Electronic Communications 
Code to designate the telecommunications operators subject to must carry obligations. The EECC 
provides that Member States may impose reasonable ‘must carry’ obligations for the transmission 
of specified radio and television broadcast channels on the providers of electronic communications 
networks if a significant number of end–users of such networks and services use them as their 
principal means to receive radio and television broadcast channels.54  
− Volume of transactions mediated by the platform 
For intermediation platforms, a specific indicator linked to the transactions mediated by the 
platform is also relevant. As explained by the Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online 
Platform Economy (2020), “the natural measurement unit for trade volume is its monetary value, 
but other measures, such as Internet traffic flows or advertising impressions could be also relevant 
in specific verticals”. 
  
 
51 Franck and Peitz (2019:71) give the following examples: Decision of the Bundeskartellamt of 22 October 2015, Case B6-57/15, 
Parship/Elitepartner, paras 132–133; Decision of the Bundeskartellamt of 6 February 2019, Case B6- 22/16, Facebook, paras 
390–413. Also Decision Bundeskartellamt of 8 September 2016, Case B6-126/14, Google/VG Media, paras 154–155: Google’s 
market shares calculated on the basis of search queries are clearly important in regard to Google’s position in the market for 
search advertising. In Google Shopping, the Commission notes that there are several methods to calculate market shares by 
volume, including “per number of queries, users, page views or per number of sessions.”51   
52 Franck and Peitz (2019:71) echoing the need to calculate market share in value when products are differentiated. 
53 Krämer, Schnurr and Broughton-Micova (2020) notes that the distribution of users’ attention is going to be highly skewed, 
following a long tail distribution and that an appropriate concentration measure may rather be more similar to a Gini coefficient 
than to a Herfindahl index. 
54 Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic 
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3.2 Criteria 2: Gatekeeper Power 
3.2.1 Rationale 
- Gatekeeper and bottleneck 
There is no clear definition of gatekeeper in EU law, although the European institutions have used 
the term in antitrust55 and regulatory contexts.56 The simplest definition of gatekeeper is an 
undertaking which determines who can pass through a gate. Lynskey (2017) defines gatekeeper as 
an undertaking which controls the flow and accessibility of information and structures the 
digital environment.57 With this perspective, she explains that gatekeeper power is distinct from 
market power in terms of how it is measured, and in terms of its potential impact on the rights and 
interests of individuals. She also claims that not all harms to individuals are captured by the ex post 
application of competition rules, or visible from a purely economic perspective. 
Leaving aside those broader and societal harms and adopting a narrower economic perspective, a 
loose definition of a gatekeeper would be that it is an undertaking that can control access by a 
group of users to some goods or another group of users. In this perspective, a digital platform 
is a gatekeeper if it manages to control the access to the customers. This level of control depends 
on the incentives and ability of those customers to multi-home and to switch and increases with the 
proportion of single homers. A possible market configuration is to have single-homing on one side 
of the market and multi-homing on the other side. This is what Armstrong (2006) calls a competitive 
bottleneck as the business users need to be on the platform if they want to reach the customers 
who single home on that platform.58  
A competitive bottleneck may lead to a narrow relevant market definition in competition law 
where each platform constitutes a relevant antitrust market on its own. For instance in Android, the 
Commission defines a market for app stores for the Android mobile operating system59 and a US 
plaintiff in an Apple case claims that there is a market for app stores for the iOS mobile operating 
system.60 As explained by Franck and Peitz (2019: 55), such market definition by mobile OS is based 
on the assumption that consumers are single-homers as they make a discrete choice of either using 
a device based on Apple’s or Android’s mobile operating system while app developers tend to be 
multi-homers. Parallels may be drawn with the definition of the wholesale termination market in 
telecommunications. In this case, the Commission recommends to define the market per operator 
because the called parties single-home (as they do not directly pay the wholesale termination fee in 
a Calling Party-Pays system) while the operators of the calling party have to multi-home on the 
different operators.61 
Franck and Peitz also recall that the relationship between the different sides of the market should 
be taken into account and that the monopoly power on one side of the market (such as the side of 
app stores for the Android/iOS mobile operating system) may be mitigated through interaction with 
 
55 For instance in Case M.2876 NewsCorp/Telepiu, para.198, the Commission considered the merging parties would have been 
“the gatekeeper of a tool (Videoguard CAS) that may facilitate entry for any alternative pay DTH operator and of an infrastructure 
(the platform) that may ease the conditions for the broadcasting of pay and free TV satellite channels.” 
56 Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal for a Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency 
for business users of online intermediation services, COM(2018) 238: “This growing intermediation of 
transactions through online platforms, combined with strong indirect network effects that can be fueled by data-
driven advantages by the online platforms, lead to an increased dependency of businesses on online platforms 
as quasi gatekeepers to markets and consumers.” 
57 Lynskey O. (2017). “Regulating ‘Platform Power’,” LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 1/2017, p.9-10. Laidlaw E. 
(2010) differentiates between two types of gatekeeper: ‘Internet gatekeepers’ who control information flows and ‘Internet 
information gatekeepers’ which as a result of this function of controlling information flows can have an impact on ‘participation 
and deliberation in democratic culture’. Helberger et al (2015) argue that much of the concern regarding the influence of 
gatekeepers lies in their control over access to individuals and the way in which the relationship between gatekeepers and users 
is shaped. . 
58 For more development, see Franck and Peitz (2019:54-57). 
59 Commission Decision of 18 July 2018, Case AT.40 099, Google Android, paras. 268-322. 
60 In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, 846 F.3d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 2017). 
61 Commission Recommendation 2014/710 of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
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the other user group, in particular if large parts of the revenues that are generated on the 
monopolised side are passed to the users on the other side.62 
- Gatekeeper and dependency 
A complementary conception of gatekeeper is related to economic dependency. As explained by the 
Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy (2020), dependence occurs “if 
and to the extent that the business faces a high cost from switching away from the 
platform to a substitute. Such switching costs can arise for instance if a business has made 
significant platform-specific investments, such as building its technology to be compatible with the 
platform’s specification; these investments would have to be written down (“sunk costs”) and new 
investments made if the business were to switch to a substitute. Switching costs can also arise from 
the fact that any substitutes are far inferior, such as when a single platform is a gatekeeper to a 
given market or market segment, and there are few other means of reaching that market or 
segment”.  
Ex ante regulation also deals with various types of dependency relationships in the digital markets. 
One example relates to access to technical services for digital TV which may constitute a 
key capability for media firms. Some Commission decisions in competition law have imposed 
compulsory access to those technical services as a condition to clear pay-TV merger.63 To 
complement competition law, ex ante rules were adopted in 1995 to force the providers of 
Conditional Access Systems (CAS) to offer to broadcasters, on a FRAND basis, technical services 
enabling the broadcasters' digitally-transmitted services to be received by viewers.64 This obligations 
has been carried forward in the EECC but is now limited to the providers of CAS from which 
broadcasters depend to reach any group of potential viewers.65  
Another example of dependency relates to interoperability. The EECC imposes on providers of 
number–independent interpersonal communications services, such as Skype, the obligations to 
render their services interoperable if those providers reach a significant level of coverage 
and user up-take.66 
Situation of economic dependency also triggers antitrust intervention in some Member States. 
The longstanding doctrine of economic dependency under German antitrust law,67 which has also 
been embraced by several Member States68 such as France69 and, more recently, Belgium,70 aims 
 
62 On the remedies side, a related debate took place several years ago when regulatory authorities were about to regulate the 
mobile termination tariffs and were warned to take into account the effects of their decisions on the other sides of the market 
(the so-called waterbed effects). See for instance, Valletti and Houpis (2005). 
63 Decision of the Commission of 2 April 2003, Case M.2876 NewsCorp/Telepiu, para 225. When those access commitments could 
not have been obtained, mergers have been prohibited: Decisions of the Commission of 27 May 1998, Case M.993 
Beterlsmann/Krich/Premiere and Case M.1027 Deutsche Telekom/BetaResearch. The merger was prohibited because it would 
have resulted in BetaDigital and BetaResearch having a dominant position on the German market for the supply of technical 
services for pay-TV, besides Premiere strengthening its dominance on the pay-TV market and Deutsche Telekom strengthening 
its dominance on the cable networks. 
64 Directive 95/47 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the use of standards for the transmission 
of television signals OJ [1995] L281/51, art.4(c). This article also reminded that the providers of CAS should comply with EU 
competition law, in particular if a dominant position appears. 
65 EECC, art.62(1) and Annex II, Part I. 
66 EECC, art.61(2c). 
67 Section 20(1) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition, available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.pdf, this section applies “to undertakings and associations of undertakings to the extent 
that small or medium-sized enterprises as suppliers or purchasers of a certain type of goods or commercial services depend on 
them in such a way that sufficient and reasonable possibilities of switching to other undertakings do not exist (relative market 
power). A supplier of a certain type of goods or commercial services is presumed to depend on a purchaser if this supplier 
regularly grants to this purchaser, in addition to discounts customary in the trade or other remuneration, special benefits which 
are not granted to similar purchasers”.  
68 For a comparative analysis of the legislations in the Member States, see Renda et al. (2012:42-68). 
69 Article L 420-2 of the Commercial Code, available at: http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/code_commerce_gb.pdf . 
The state of economic dependence requires that that it is impossible for the plaintiff to resort to another undertaking for the 
supply, or the sale, of a given product or service, due to technical or economic reasons. In essence, four types of economic 
dependence have been addressed by the French Competition Authority, namely: (i) scarcity-based dependence; (ii) dependence 
associated with long-lasting business relationships; (iii) assortment-based dependence; and (iv) demand-based buyer power 
dependence. 
70 Economic Law Code, art. I-6 (4) which defines economic dependency as: “the absence of reasonably equivalent alternatives 
available within a reasonable period of time, on reasonable terms and at reasonable costs, allowing it for each of them to impose 
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to prevent digital platforms from exercising unfettered commercial freedom in those situations where 
business users do not have realistic alternative solutions to connect with their target audience. 
3.2.2 Indicators 
- Control of a bottleneck – Low incentives and ability to switch or multi-home 
From the economic perspective explained above, a digital platform enjoys a gatekeeper position 
when its customers have no or little ability and incentive to switch or multi-home. As the 
economic theory has shown and the EU courts have decided, the size of the platforms needs to be 
balanced with the ability and the incentive of customers to multi-home.71 Indeed, if a digital platform 
counts many customers but most of them multi-home and can be reached across different platforms, 
the market power of each of the platform is limited. Note that in a data environment, the ability to 
multi-home among intermediaries offering the same type of digital services depends to a great 
extent on the capacity of the customers to move and port their data across digital platforms.  
- Economic dependency 
To measure economic dependency, the Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform 
Economy (2020) mentions the set of surveys conducted by Ecorys (2017) which indicated, for 
instance, that 42% of companies surveyed declare that platforms play a significant role for turnover 
and that they are important for the business and of these 42% of companies, almost a third obtained 
more than half of their revenues via platforms. The Expert Group also suggests measuring how large 
a share of the businesses’ revenues is coming through a platform or platforms, as opposed to the 
businesses’ own websites and brick-and-mortar sales channels. 
Alexa also calculates the dependency of a site on others, such as how much of the traffic 
originates from search which is the percentage of all referrals that came from Search engines over 
the trailing month. Finally, the statistics also include measures of relevancy, such as the number of 
total sites linking in on that website. 
3.3 Criteria 3: Lack of contestability 
3.3.1 Rationale 
- Entry barriers to existing services 
As digital markets are very dynamic, the analysis should also be dynamic and therefore, give the 
same importance to potential competition than to existing competition. Authorities have always 
recognised the importance of contestability of market power and potential competition. Already 
in the 1997 Market Definition Notice, the Commission observes that: “The third source of competitive 
constraint, potential competition, is not taken into account when defining markets, since the 
conditions under which potential competition will actually represent an effective competitive 
constraint depend on the analysis of specific factors and circumstances related to the conditions of 
entry. If required, this analysis is only carried out at a subsequent stage, in general once the position 
of the companies involved in the relevant market has already been ascertained, and when such 
position gives rise to concerns from a competition point of view.”72 
The potential competition is measured with the size of entry barriers. In its Article 102 Guidance 
Paper, the Commission lists the three main types of entry barriers (legal, economic and strategic). 
The Commission defines the economic barriers as forms of advantages specifically enjoyed by the 
 
71 Case T-79/12 Cisco and Messagenet v. Commission, para.79. 
72 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, O.J. [1997] C 
372/5, para.24. The Commission gives more indications on the criteria to take into account potential competition in the 2004 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines by noting that: “For a merger with a potential competitor to have significant anti-competitive 
effects, two basic conditions must be fulfilled. First, the potential competitor must already exert a significant constraining 
influence or there must be a significant likelihood that it would grow into an effective competitive force. Evidence that a potential 
competitor has plans to enter a market in a significant way could help the Commission to reach such a conclusion. Second, there 
must not be a sufficient number of other potential competitors, which could maintain sufficient competitive pressure after the 
merger: Commission Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
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dominant undertaking. Then, the Commission gives the following examples: “economies of scale 
and scope, privileged access to essential inputs or natural resources, important technologies or an 
established distribution and sales network; other costs and other impediments, for instance resulting 
from network effects, faced by customers in switching to a new supplier.”73 
Digital markets are characterised by the presence of important cross-groups externalities and 
network effects between the different sides of the markets as more users on one side the platform 
tends to lead to more users on the other side and vice-versa. Those network effects are often the 
most important entry barriers to the digital markets. As Shapiro and Varian (1999:185) have 
explained “precisely because various users find it so difficult to coordinate to switch to an 
incompatible technology, control over a large installed base of users can be the greatest asset (a 
platform) can have”.  
This was already the case in traditional media or communications markets, but the development of 
big data and AI have amplified those network effects. The collection and use of customers’ 
data exhibit important (users and monetisation) feedback loops which can entrench the market 
power of a digital platform.74 Moreover, data-driven network effects may encourage the expansion 
of dominant intermediary from their core markets to other (data-related) markets and diffuse their 
market power through the economy.75  
Another more specific possible entry barrier to digital markets is linked to the so-called “zero price 
effect”.76 Several studies in behavioural economics show that consumers treat a price at zero very 
differently than any other price; they appear to act as if zero pricing of a product not only decreases 
its cost but also adds to its value.77 This is well understood by the General Court in Cisco and 
Messagenet, which notes that: “In so far as users expect to receive consumer communications 
services free of charge, the potential for the new entity to set its pricing policy freely is significantly 
restricted. The Commission rightly observes that any attempt to make users pay would run the risk 
of reducing the attractiveness of those services and of encouraging users to switch to other providers 
continuing to offer their services free of charge. Likewise, if the new entity decided to stop innovating 
in terms of its communications services, it would also run the risk of reducing their attractiveness 
given the level of innovation on the market in question.”78 Thus with free products, entry strategies 
are more limited. They may focus on product and quality differentiation but not on price 
differentiation. 
Finally and more generally, barriers to entry tend to increase with the development and the 
maturation of a market. Franck and Peitz (2019:77) observe that entry barriers are lower in 
quickly growing markets in which many unattached users arrive and in markets with fast 
technological changes. Thus, it is not because a digital platform has displaced a previous incumbent 
when the market was nascent that this platform can easily been displaced when the market has 
matured. For instance, the fact that Friendster has been replaced by Myspace which, in turn, was 
replaced by Facebook - or that AltaVista has been displaced by Google - several years ago does not 
mean that Facebook or Google can easily be displaced today. 
  
 
73 Guidance of 3 December 2008 on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Articles [102 TFUE] to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, para.17. 
74 Lerner (2014). 
75 Bourreau and de Streel (2019). 
76 The zero price effect has also implications on market definition and, when not taken into account, may lead to 
a new fallacy similar to the old Cellophane fallacy. As Newman (2016:75) explains: “where two products are 
offered at zero prices, the fact that customers would switch away from one product and toward the other in the 
event of a price increase does not necessarily indicate that the two belong in the same product market. Such 
switching likely reflects nothing more than the zero price effect in action.” 
77 Shampanier et al. (2007). Some other behavioural studies on the zero price effect are summarised in Gal and Rubinfeld (2016: 
528-530). 
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- Entry barriers to future services 
The determination of the entry barriers to existing markets should be complemented with a 
determination of the entry barriers to future markets and the control of innovation. This 
complementary analysis is key in the digital economy because, as put by Teece (2009), “when 
innovation is high, capabilities are more stable than products.”  
Yet, this complementary analysis is challenging because the types of innovation capabilities and their 
role in product innovation are complex and uncertain, in particular in industries where the innovative 
process is not clearly structured. However, Teece (2009:255) also observes that: “the tools for 
assessing capabilities may not be well developed yet, but they are developed enough to allow 
tentative application. Clearly, product market analysis can be unhelpful and misleading in dynamic 
contexts. Using the right concepts imperfectly is better than a precise application of the wrong ones.”  
In this regard, the antitrust authorities have already developed several concepts to go up the 
innovation value chain and identify the state of competition at the input level.79 For instance, the 
European Commission has relied on the following concepts: 
- First, competition in innovation refers to R&D poles which may compete with each other 
depending on the “the nature, scope and size of any other R&D efforts, their access to 
financial and human resources, know-how/patents, or other specialised assets as well as 
their timing and their capability to exploit possible results.”80 Cautiously, the Commission 
notes that R&D poles may be identified when the process of innovation is well structured, 
like in the pharmaceutical industry, but that the concept will normally not be used when the 
process of innovation is not clearly structured; 
- Second, innovation space is “not a market on its own, but an input activity for both the 
upstream technology markets and the downstream products markets”,81 and corresponds to 
the discovery targets over which firms compete.82 
Thus, when assessing potential competition between digital platforms, the authorities should analyse 
which platforms control the innovation capabilities and what the entry barriers to innovation markets 
and spaces are. This approach may be more difficult to apply in the digital sector than in the 
pharmaceutical sector because the innovation process is less structured and shorter in the former 
than in the later. However, it is not impossible83 and  innovation markets may be defined for the 
main capabilities of the digital sector such as data, some type of engineering skills, high computing 
power and very risky capital. This assessment will also require extensive access to internal 




79 See Federico, Scott Morton, and Shapiro (2019) and Petit (2019). 
80 Commission Guidelines of 14 December 2010 on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, O.J. [2010] C 11/1, para 119-122 and Communication Guidelines of 21 March 
2014 on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements 
O.J. [2014] C 89/3, para 26. The Commission has also developed the concept of technology market which consists of “the 
licensed technology rights and its substitutes, that is to say, other technologies which are regarded by the licensees as 
interchangeable with or substitutable for the licensed technology rights, by reason of the technologies' characteristics, their 
royalties and their intended use.”: Commission Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, paras 116-118 and 
Communication Guidelines on technology transfer agreements, para 22. 
81 Commission Decision of 27 March 2017, Case M. 7932 Dow/DuPont, para. 348.  
82 para.2168. The R&D undertaken in innovation spaces “generate[s] early pipeline products.” Para.2159. 
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3.3.2 Indicators 
- High Entry barriers to existing areas of business 
The barriers to entry could be measured with the size of direct and indirect network effects and 
feedback loops. 
- High Entry barriers to future areas of business 
Control and barriers to entry to innovation capabilities, in particular data, risky and patient 
capital, computing infrastructures, digital skills. 
3.4 Criteria 4: Market features favouring conglomerate presence and creation  of 
ecosystem 
3.4.1 Rationale 
For the last group of indicators, we consider the market feature which lead to conglomerate presence 
and creation of ecosystem. Teece (2012) defines an ecosystem as “a group of interacting firms that 
depend on each other’s activities… reliant on the technological leadership of one or two firms that 
provide a platform around which other system members, providing inputs and complementary 
goods, align their investments and strategies”. Jacobides et al (2018) define ecosystems as “groups 
of firms that must deal with either unique or super modular complementarities that are non-generic, 
requiring the creation of a specific structure of relationships and alignment to create value.” Thus, 
an ecosystem often includes a core (digital) platform orchestrator and a select group of their 
complementors – for example, app developers, network operators and device manufacturers. 
A draft law to amend the Greek competition law defines an ecosystem as: 
a) “the web of interconnected and to a large degree interdependent economic activities carried 
out by different undertakings with the intention of supplying one or more products or services 
which impact the same set of users,  
b) the platform of economic activities which are supplied by different undertakings with the 
intention of supplying one or more products or services which impact the same set of users 
or different categories of users.” 
The explanatory Memorandum of this draft law explains that: 
“The undertakings which form an ecosystem and undergo such economic activities are 
usually independently owned, but are financially and technologically interconnected due to: 
(i) the highly complementary relationship of the resources (technological, financial and 
human) for carrying out the specific activities, and  
(ii) the existence of a unitary, from a financial perspective, competitive offer to the user, 
group of users or different categories of users, which are connected due to the relationship 
of positive or negative feedback loops which exist between the various users or various 
categories of users with regards to the specific economic activity and  
(iii) eventually, the significant sunk costs which must be made in this complementary 
relationship, which may, among other factors, lock the users in this particular choice. 
Complementors who participate in the ecosystem would be materially worse off if they were 
to choose not to participate in the ecosystem if the latter depends on the development of a 
key technological platform, which constitutes a central point for the harvesting of data, 
provision of specific economic activities and eventually source of incentives for the 
coordination of the ecosystem”. 
In practice, Bourreau and de Streel (2019) explain that two key characteristics, often present in 
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- First, digital products and services involve a modular design, which generates strong 
economies of scope in product development, and allows firms to create variants from basic 
products for relatively low development costs.  
- Second, the joint consumption of digital products from the same product ecosystem may 
generate consumption synergies for consumers. Firms thus have an incentive to expand to 
create product ecosystems and generate consumption synergies, which they can then 
capture through higher prices 
A conglomerate footprint or control of an ecosystem can be an important factor which increases the 
harm caused by a gatekeeper platform and its enduring nature, as it allows defensive leveraging to 
protect existing gatekeeper position or offensive leveraging to extend gatekeeper position. 
3.4.2 Indicators 
Relevant indicators associated with conglomerate presence include: 
- Presence in multiple (related) business areas, 
- Control of ecosystems as a web of interconnected and to a large degree interdependent 
economic activities carried out by different undertakings with the intention of supplying one 
or more products or services which impact the same set of users. 
- Modular design innovation 
- Consumer synergies within ecosystems 
3.5 Summary on indicators 
Summary potential criteria to designate a Large Gatekeeper Platform 
1. Large Intermediation Online Platform 
- Monetary revenue 
- Number of unique visitors and time on site 
- Volume of transactions mediated by the platform 
2. Gatekeeper Power 
- Control of a bottleneck – Low incentives and ability to switch or multi-home  
- Economic dependency 
3. Control of innovation capabilities – lack of contestability  
- High barriers to entry on existing areas of business: Direct and indirect network effects, Feedback 
loops, Zero price effects 
- Control and barriers to entry to data, risky and patient capital, computing infrastructures, digital 
skills 
4. Control of an Ecosystem – Conglomerate footprint 
- Presence in multiples (related) business areas 
- Control of ecosystems with core digital platform orchestrator 
- Modular design innovation 
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As shown in Table 1, the criteria proposed by the different policy initiatives presented above can be 
organised on the basis of our four proposed criteria  
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4 Competition law test as a trigger for regulatory 
intervention 
In electronic communications the legislator tried to divide the competences of the national regulatory 
authority and the competition authorities by the following technique: the national regulatory 
authority would apply the regulatory framework only when there is a finding of significant market 
power and the following criteria are met: 
a) high and non-transitory structural, legal or regulatory barriers to entry are present; 
b) there is a market structure which does not tend towards effective competition within the 
relevant time horizon, having regard to the state of infrastructure-based competition and 
other sources of competition behind the barriers to entry; 
c) competition law alone is insufficient to adequately address the identified market failure(s).84 
For present purposes the final requirement is of interest for it serves to create a distinct 
space for regulation. The philosophy informing the framework for the liberalisation of electronic 
communications foresees that nearly all markets will become open to competition so that the 
imposition of regulatory remedies is temporary and designed to facilitate entry. This vision may be 
contested, but for present purposes the relevant consideration is whether the application of the ex 
ante regulation should be made conditional on a finding that competition law is insufficient to address 
the market failures adequately, like in the field of electronic communications. 
Arguments in favour of applying a similar approach may be that the kinds of harm the regulator 
wishes to prevent are possibly competition law infringements (e.g. envelopment, refusals to deal, 
self-preferencing). It may be argued that the application of competition law leads to less severe 
remedies and is too slow and so this approach ensures that one applies the ex ante tool when no 
other less aggressive forms of regulation would do. In legal parlance, it serves to ensure that in 
applying the ex ante tool the principle of proportionality is respected. 
Arguments against using the inability of competition law to solve the market failure is that the ex 
ante regulatory framework on large gatekeeper platforms might prohibit conduct which competition 
law does not prohibit either because it is conduct that harms competition but there is no breach of 
Articles 101 or 102 (e.g. unilateral conduct by non-dominant undertakings) or because the 
regulatory framework is designed to protect an interest beyond those protected by competition law 
(e.g. fairness between two contracting parties) 
On the other hand, it may be prudent to use the competition law filter for some of the remedies. It 
is worth recalling that the Commission foresees the adoption of a black list and/or tailor-made 
remedies. Thus one may wish to have a competition law filter for tailor-made remedies (e.g. access 
to data or a structural remedy/line of business restriction).  
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DISCUSSION SUMMARY | Threshold for intervention 
The purpose of this section is to list the questions and discussion points that arose from the overview 
presented in the Issue Paper on ‘threshold for intervention’ and the exclusive workshop organised 
in September 2020. The non-attributable summary of the discussion was prepared by Claire-Marie 
Healy, project manager at CERRE. 
Market definition/ Business areas 
Should the designation of Large Gatekeeper Platform (LGP) be a two-step approach starting with 
the definition of the relevant market, or should it be a one-step approach by-passing some kind of 
market definition? 
RESPONSES 
Some views strongly stress the need for a detailed understanding of the market and how firms have 
a market power as well as the competitive constraints, incentives, and consumer’s attitudes. The 
current accepted and tested methods of market intervention which rely on the definition of markets, 
assessment of market power, and then the consideration of the appropriate remedy to resolve the 
market failure has proven to work. By-passing market definition could leave too much discretion to 
the regulators and undermine procedural fairness and regulatory certainty. 
Another view shared is that the traditional market definition is difficult to use in the case of digital 
platforms because large digital platforms have distinctive features, they are often present across 
diverse markets and they are integrated in an ecosystem linked through common inputs (data, 
customer base, technical modules, etc.).  
A smart arrangement was suggested, combining i) a case by case with a simpler threshold 
(quantitative) to identify platforms that are most likely to cause harm, leading to applicable remedies 
in an automatic way; and ii) a case-by-case assessment where an authority looks at a specific case 
and suggests tailor made remedies. Such an arrangement would address the EC idea on automatic 
applicable remedies, and would also allow a more efficient use of authorities and of market definition 
at this stage. 
Should new legal concepts, other than market definition, be developed to base regulatory 
intervention on LGPs, given the difficulties of adapting the antitrust concept of market definition? 
RESPONSES 
Some participants view the criteria to define markets of business areas described in the Issue Paper 
as not useful if there is no comparison with the overall size of the market. Some also underlined the 
need to look at what the alternatives are to switching, or single homing, even in the medium term for 
instance.  
To identify gatekeepers, some participants support a combination of a quantitative and a set of 
qualitative characteristics, based on the Commission’s glossary on large online platforms, and some 
support the reference to the platform’s share of active users and/or single-homing users at the 
Member State and/or EU level given that active users and single homing users are a universally shared 
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According to some participants, the scope of the DMA is much broader than the antitrust approach 
only and should therefore consider moving away from the formal approach to market definition. One 
of the alternatives proposed is a two-step approach using Area of Business (AoB), looking at sub 
divided markets and sub divided issues in order to have efficient remedies. The list of AoBs should be 
laid down in (an) EU-level legal act(s) and should be subject to regular revision. An AoB could be, for 
example, e-commerce, app stores, online search, OS, voice assistants etc., and would be 
characterised by features such as strong direct and indirect network effects, significant economies of 
scale and scope, significant barriers to entry and expansion relating to technical and/or legal aspects, 
high switching costs and/or consumer inertia. Reasonable and easily observable absolute thresholds 
(e.g. revenues, number of unique users, etc.) for each AoB, would then be defined in (an) EU-level 
legal act(s), in order to quickly identify the LGPs. 
 
Criteria to designate large gatekeeper platforms (LGP) 
Should a criterion based on the mere size of the platforms (independently of its market power and 
possible dominant position) be part of the LGP test? What specific quantitative indicators should be 
used for this criterion? 
RESPONSES 
While size or large user base is an important criterion, using broad models of assessment for these 
criteria might not be particularly relevant unless users are locked in. Indeed, gatekeepers in niche 
markets or even a gatekeeper operating in one or fewer member states can also cause potential harm 
to competition or consumer harm and should therefore be looked at too. There is also a strong view 
that too narrow an approach to gatekeepers could lead to ineffective remedies and could result in 
distorting competition. Therefore, there is a strong view that LGPs should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis rather than assessed on the basis of broad and vague criteria. 
Should the gatekeeper be defined according to the economic concept of bottleneck and economic 
dependency (which mainly relate to single homing customers) or be based on other criteria? 
What degree of market power should be required to determine that ex ante regulation should 
apply? How should entry barriers be assessed? 
RESPONSES 
For some participants, the notion of a gatekeeper is important to define and the question of whether 
entry barrier should be part of this definition remains to be answered. On the other hand, for some 
participants, the ability to enter new markets by using existing assets and advantages can hardly be 
a distinguishing factor as it is a common theme across industry and is pro-competitive and enhances 
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Should a criterion linked to the control of innovation capabilities be part of the LGP test? 
What specific indicators should be used for this criterion? 
RESPONSES 
Although most participants agree that this criterion could be part of the cumulative list of criteria to 
define LGPs, the loose definition of the term ‘capability’ in strategic management and in innovation 
economic literature makes this criterion more difficult to define and apply.  
There is also a strong view that capabilities such as knowledge and skills are very difficult to transfer 
and to treat with regulation and that not all LGPs have control of innovation capabilities.  
If we take a broader concept of innovation capabilities, however, some questions remain open: 
whether access to fundamental services (such as fundamental software, or fundamental API for 
instance) could be considered an enabler for innovation capabilities, and whether easily transferable 
elements could include data or control of key elements of platforms, such as API or software, that 
make transferability easier.  
Should a criterion linked to the control of ecosystems and/or the possibilities and incentive to 
leverage market power across conglomerate markets be part of the LGP test?  
What specific indicators should be used for this criterion? 
RESPONSES 
The leveraging power of LGPs to enter new markets or to leverage their assets in one area of their 
activity to improve or develop new services in adjacent areas is seen as a relevant criterion for some 
participants.  
What should the jurisdictional criterion be to determine the border between EU law and national law 
for regulating the LGP? 
RESPONSES 
For some participants, all the criteria mentioned in the Issue Paper are relevant but the questions of 
how to organise them, in which category, and whether to consider the criteria cumulative or not 
remain.  
While our understanding of digital markets and LGPs is still in its infancy, some participants are more 
in favour of leaving a high degree of discretion and not mentioning criteria for the legislation in order 
to keep the list more flexible/non-exclusive. The relevant criteria could then be adapted as we learn 
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Other criteria to define large gatekeeper platforms (LGP) 
Should the regulator only be allowed to intervene when it demonstrates that the application of 
competition law would be insufficient to remedy the market failure?  
Should this principle apply always, or only for certain kinds of regulatory concerns (e.g. yes for 
leveraging concerns but not for fairness concerns)? 
RESPONSES 
Some participants share the view that there is a need to incrementally strengthen in parallel the new 
NCT and the P2B Regulation, while keeping this new regulatory tool for the most problematic platforms 
as a priority for the moment. The relationship between the NCT and the DMA also needs to be carefully 
considered, especially to ensure compliance with the remedies. An assessment of the extent to which 
the policy objectives and potential remedies are already being addressed by the existing regulatory 
framework needs to be considered before adoption of a new framework. This is crucial to avoid 
duplication, which would bring legal uncertainty for economic operators. 
Another suggestion was to use a more generalised definition of gatekeeper as a higher threshold for 
intervention than market dominance. This higher threshold could help identify companies that have 
the capacity to dictate conditions of the market without defining specific criteria in the legislation yet. 
Public authorities should therefore be left to assess the details over the coming years. 
Which other qualitative or quantitative criteria should be used to determine the LGPs that should be 
subject to ex ante regulation (if this regulation is justified and adopted)? 
RESPONSES 
Additional obligations that reflect other EU law principles and objectives, such as consumer protection, 
are also suggested to be applicable to all platforms, for example, to deal fairly with consumers 
(principle of fairness by design). 
Although the quantitative criteria seem easier to apply, some participants have doubts concerning the 
practicability of setting comparable indicators such as turnover, profits or user numbers which are 
difficult to compare between platforms. There is little evidence of a causal link between the potential 
characteristics of digital platforms and the risk of them creating consumer harm. This approach risks 
failing to consider the benefits for consumer and business users alike associated with these very 
characteristics. It also risks limiting the ability of regulators to capture and explore differences across 
digital platform business models. Using those criteria as the first steps may lead to a low level of 
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ISSUE PAPER | Remedies 
1 Scope and Aim of the paper 
In its February 2020 Digital Strategy Communication,85 the Commission announced the proposal of 
the Digital Markets Act package would include one pillar aiming at achieving a fair and competitive 
economy through economic regulation in their Inception Impact Assessment of June 2020, the 
Commission services indicate that they are considering three policy options: 
1. Revise the horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-Business Regulation;  
2. Adopt a horizontal framework empowering regulators to collect information from large online 
platforms acting as gatekeepers; 
3. Adopt a new and flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers, which is divided into the following sub-options:  
3a. Prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices (“blacklisted” practices); or 
3b.Adoption of tailor-made remedies addressed on a case-by-case basis where necessary 
and justified.86 
This Issue Paper deals with the application of remedies to competition concerns in digital platform 
markets, whether by competition authorities (as would be the case if the Commission’s proposal for 
a New Competition Tool were to be adopted) or by a new ex ante regulatory regime (on which the 
Commission is currently consulting in relation to the contents of a new Digital Services Act).  It is 
not intended to provide a taxonomy of all the potential remedies for specific theories of harm, but 
to promote discussion of how remedies might in future be devised and applied to address competition 
concerns arising in digital platform markets (having regard to the Commission’s proposals). 
After this introduction, Section 2 discusses how public authorities have applied remedies in relation 
to competition concerns, distinguishing between the approaches adopted by competition authorities 
and those adopted by regulatory bodies (with particular reference to the telecommunications 
regulatory regime on which some of the options of the Commission’s inception impact assessment 
for an ex ante regulatory regime for digital platforms appear to be based). Then Section 3 considers 
some remedies that feature heavily in discussions about digital platforms. 
2 Remedies in antitrust and regulation markets 
2.1 Types of remedies 
Public authorities have a large palette of remedies at their disposal. Approaches differ in terms of 
how they are selected and applied. In most cases public authorities will be seeking to identify 
measures which effectively remedy the competition concerns that have been identified, but which 
are otherwise proportionate with the objective. That objective is to re-establish compliance with the 
law in Article 102 cases (by bringing the abuse to an end and, perhaps, restoring the market to its 
pre-abuse state) and to remove a significant impediment to effective competition arising from a 
merger. Regulators may go further and adopt measures intended to improve the functioning of the 
market and promote competition, relative to the current position. Competition authorities in 
possession of the ‘new competition tool’ might also adopt this approach. 
 
85 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM (2020) 67. 
86 Inception Impact Assessment on Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with 
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Competition authorities have tended, to date, to exhibit a preference for ‘structural’ remedies 
which involve the one-time divestiture of assets to resolve competition concerns in mergers or 
outright prohibitions of particular arrangements whereas regulatory authorities have often 
implemented behavioural remedies which may either involve prohibiting certain forms of conduct 
or requiring that actions be taken, such as the provision of access to or sharing of assets. In practice, 
these distinctions are less clear than they first appear and ‘access obligations’ which address the 
source of market power are sometimes referred to as structural remedies. 
A further distinction can be drawn between remedies which seek to ensure fair competition between 
firms on the ‘supply side’ of the market, remedies which are intended to protect consumers from 
exploitative conduct on the ‘demand side’ of the market, and remedies which are intended to 
empower consumers, and thereby promote competition, through interventions on the ‘demand side’. 
The focus of competition authorities has generally been confined to the ‘supply side’ issues, either 
in relation to exclusionary practices by dominant firms or in relation to the accretion of unilateral or 
co-ordinated market power by firms as a result of a merger. Competition authorities have taken 
measures, but less frequently, to protect consumers from exploitative conduct, although a relevant 
example for our purposes is the recent Bundeskartellamt case against Facebook in relation to its 
‘excessive’ accumulation of data87 and the Competition and Market Authority’s (CMA) proposals 
(using the UK equivalent of the New Competition Tool) for measures giving consumers choices over 
whether to receive personalised advertising with ‘opt out’ as the default88.  
In contrast, regulatory authorities pursue both supply side interventions to promote competition 
between firms and measures, including price controls and quality of service obligations, to prevent 
exploitation of consumers. Regulators in some countries have recently begun to focus increasingly 
on ‘demand side’ measures to improve the functioning of markets in which competition appears to 
be impeded despite promising supply side conditions89. A similar trend is observable in the 
application of the New Competition Tool by the Competition and Markets Authority, where ‘demand 
side’ remedies have featured quite significantly in many of the recent market investigations it has 
undertaken and feature prominently in its latest Digital Advertising Market Study90. 
2.2 Application of remedies by competition authorities 
In cases where a number of potential remedies might remedy a particular competition concern, the 
European Commission may leave it to the parties themselves to decide the steps to be taken 
in order to do so. In the Google Shopping case, for example, the decision devoted just two of over 
700 paragraphs to the question of how the abuse – a form of self-preferencing by Google - is to be 
brought to an end91. A heated debate has ensued as to whether the remedies which Google 
subsequently chose to adopt, and which included the introduction of an auction format to allow 
Google and its rivals to bid to be displayed in the Shopping Unit, represent an effective remedy92. 
Leaving aside the substantive aspects of the remedy that has been adopted by Google, this raises 
the questions, which participants in the seminar may wish to explore, about whether the Commission 
 
87 ‘Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing, Case Summary  B6-
22/16, at https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.html 
88 CMA (2020), Online platforms and digital Advertising Market study final report, para 6.93-, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5efc57ed3a6f4023d242ed56/Final_report_1_July_2020_.pdf 
89 Centre for Competition Policy, The Role of Demand-Side Remedies in Driving Effective Competition A Review for Which?, 
available at https://www.regulation.org.uk/library/2016-CCP-Demand_Side_Remedies.pdf 
90 For example, the CMA Retail Banking Review included demand side remedies (Open Banking to enable multi-homing and 
facilitate comparison and switching, provision and publication of service quality data, sending of prompts to customers and other 
measures to promote switching), as did the Energy Review (creation of a data base of ‘inert customers’ to be accessed by 
competing firms, provision of information to enable switching), although the latter also adopted a wide range of other remedies. 
The Investment Management Review also adopted remedies to improve decision-making by trustees, including mandatory 
wording for marketing materials, disclosure of fees and provision of information on past performance. The Digital Advertising 
Market study incudes proposals (to be implemented by a regulator) to alter the ‘choice architecture’ used by Facebook and 
Google to obtain customer consents, to require ‘opt ins’ for personalised advertising and to enable the porting of data between 
platforms. 
91 Google Search (Shopping), Case  AT/39740, paras 699-700 
92 Concerns were first expressed in 2018, but Commissioner Vestager indicated in November 2019 that she remained concerned 
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ought not to assume the responsibility for specifying the remedy to be adopted, even in cases where 
a number of competing options may be available to it.  
The theory of harm in the Google Shopping case was self-preferencing by a vertically integrated 
firm. For reasons explained in other CERRE Reports, self-preferencing or ‘intermediation bias’ is a 
particularly difficult concern for public authorities to remedy and one we discuss in more detail in 
the next section93. An alternative remedy, advocated by some complainants, would have involved 
the removal of the Shopping Unit from the general search results page and a return to the position 
which prevailed prior to its introduction. However, rather than require the withdrawal of services or 
products, the Commission has tended to adopt remedies which allow consumers to continue 
to access the benefits arising from innovation whilst at the same time seeking to create 
greater opportunities for rivalry. As we explain below, in the Microsoft I case the Commission 
did not prohibit the bundling of Microsoft Windows and Media Player but instead required Microsoft 
to offer an unbundled version of Windows alongside its existing products. 
In the Google Shopping case the Commission also imposed a fine on Google of €2.4 billion. Financial 
penalties and damages could be considered remedies as they are intended to deter firms from 
engaging in abusive conduct from which they might otherwise expect to gain before being required 
to cease, although they may also serve other purposes as well94. We do not consider the role of 
financial sanctions (or follow-on damages) in this paper. However, we note that it has been argued 
that the level of fines imposed by the European Commission to date (or indeed any level of fines 
which they may impose under Regulation 1/2003) would be insufficient to deter further abusive 
conduct by digital platforms if the potential gains from such conduct were to be the acquisition of a 
gatekeeper or otherwise dominant position in a global market for many years to come95. The conduct 
which is sanctioned with a fine may also be highly context specific and may not deter firms in other 
markets who may consider their circumstances to be very different96. In addition, fines may not be 
sufficient deter non-compliance with measures that are intended to stop previous abuses97 and they 
are often appealed by parties to the General Court. The European Commission does not currently 
propose to revisit its fining powers, either for digital platforms or more generally but participants in 
the seminar may wish to discuss this further. 
In other competition cases, the Commission will specify in some detail what it requires firms 
to do. This is straightforward if the remedy involves the withdrawal of contractual obligations that 
have been imposed on third parties. In the Google Android case, for example, the Commission found 
that Google’s licensing arrangements for the use of the Android operating system included 
contractual provisions which required that device manufacturers pre-install the Google Search and 
Chrome apps in order to obtain a licence for the Google Play Store. The remedy was that these 
provisions be withdrawn and that Google refrain from other practices which might have the same 
effects98.  Similar requirements related to licensing of arrangements which required manufacturers 
to enter into anti-fragmentation agreements99 and arrangements with both manufacturers and 
mobile operators which excluded other general search services in return for revenue-sharing 
arrangements100. Implementation of these remedies appears to have been less controversial than in 
the Google Shopping case although Google’s decision to implement a ‘choice screen’ (from March 
 
93 CERRE (2019) Implementing effective remedies for anti-competitive intermediation bias on vertically integrated platforms’, 
available at https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/cerre_intermediationbiasremedies_report.pdf 
94 Such as compensating victims. 
95 Bloomberg, ‘Facebook’s US fine may be great investment, EU economist warns’, 26 April 2019, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-26/facebook-s-u-s-fine-may-be-great-investment-eu-economist-warns 
96 Furman Report (2019), Unlocking Digital Competition: report of the digital competition expert panel, para 2.20, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_
competition_furman_review_web.pdf 
97 Valletti’s comments cited in footnote 11 were promoted by a $3 billion provision made by Facebook in respect of fines by the 
Federal Trade Commission for non-compliance with 2011 commitments to the regulator. Facebook settled with the FTC and paid 
$5 billion in July 2019 see https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-
new-privacy-restrictions .  
98 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf, para 1394-6 
99 Google Android, case AT/40099, para 1393  
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2020) to allow users to select their default search provider whilst requiring rival search engine 
providers to bid for one of the three non-Google slots has attracted some criticism101.  
In other cases, such as Microsoft I, which concerned both tying and refusal to interoperate, the 
specification of remedies has been more complex. The remedy to concerns about bundling was  
straightforward to specify: Microsoft was required to offer a version of its Windows operating system 
for PCs without including Windows Media Player (whilst still being able to offer a bundled version of 
the product) and not to do anything to discourage its adoption or hinder the performance of rival 
media players102. It is less clear that it was effective103.  
The obligations to enable work group servers to interoperate with Windows PCs were more 
complex and included requirements that interoperability be provided on terms that were 
‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’104. Aspects of this remedy raised issues that have become 
familiar in debates about the regulation of digital platforms since then, including requirements that 
Microsoft not restrict the activities of these interoperating with its software, that any remuneration 
‘should not reflect the strategic value stemming from Microsoft’s market power’ and that terms of 
access should be predictable and stable so as to allow third parties to invest in complementary 
services105. Other aspects of the case may also provide a foretaste of things to come for regulators 
seeking to apply complex remedies to gatekeeper digital platforms. 
The Commission required Microsoft to submit proposals for a monitoring trustee to oversee the 
implement of the remedies. Microsoft appealed the decision to the General Court on, amongst other 
things, the proportionality of remedies and that the Commission was not entitled to require a 
monitoring trustee (or require Microsoft to fund it)106. The Court found for the Commission in relation 
to proportionality of the remedies, but against the Commission in relation to the delegation of 
oversight to a monitoring trustee. Ensuring effective implementation of the remedies in Microsoft I 
proved very challenging for the European Commission (as it proved to be in the United States)107, 
with protracted disputes about the nature of the technical documentation provided by Microsoft, as 
well as the level of royalties which Microsoft proposed to charge for licences for the source code. 
This involved subsequent Commissions and fines before Microsoft was deemed to be in compliance, 
at least 3 years after the original decision. The case page on the European Commission’s website 
makes for sobering reading108: the Commission commenced its enquiries in 2000, and issued a 
decision in 2004. In late 2005 it issued a penalty decision for non-compliance, a statement of 
objections a month later, and imposed a fine of €280 million in mid-2006. In late 2007 the General 
Court ruled an appeal to the condemnation. The Commission issued a further penalty for non-
compliance (of €899 million) in February 2008. In 2012 the General Court ruled an appeal to the 
penalties and reduced them slightly.  
In Microsoft II, which again concerned tying of web browsers to the Windows Operating System, the 
Commission again engaged in extensive discussions of commitments, which it accepted. In addition 
to the (by now relatively standard) commitments not to restrict OEMs from pre-installing rival web 
browsers in PCs running the Windows OS or users from switching from Explorer to other browsers, 
Microsoft also proposed ‘choice screens’ to enable the large installed base of existing Windows 
users to easily access and choose between a range of alternative browsers109. Many of the issues 
which we encounter today in terms of choice architectures (the ways in which choices are presented 
to users) featured in these debates and the resulting commitments involved detailed specifications 
 
101 The winning bidders were announced in January, see ‘Privacy focused search engine DuckduckGo is the big winner of Google’s 
Europe Android Auction’, at https://qz.com/1781609/google-shares-results-of-european-android-choice-screen-auction/  
102 Microsoft (2004), AT/37792, para 1011-13 
103 Economides and Lianos conclude ‘The Commission’s hope of widespread adoption of Windows XP N and the emergence of 
new powerful competitors did not materialize’, ‘Microsoft on trial’, p.430, available at 
http://neconomides.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Lianos_Microsoft_Remedies.pdf 
104 Microsoft, para 1006-8 
105 Ibid para 1008 
106 CFI, case T-201/4, para 1194 et seq 
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as to how the user interface would work, the number of browsers to be displayed (12) and the format 
of the display (horizontal, with the 5 most popular browsers displayed in random order). The 
commitments were adopted in 2009 but Microsoft was again found to be non-compliant in 2013 for 
failing to display the choice screen on PCs using the Windows 7 OS for 14 months and fined €561 
million110. As noted earlier, Google has also adopted choice screens as a remedy in the Android case 
It is reasonable to conclude that remedies which involve the imposition of obligations to supply 
‘essential inputs’ or to address demand side concerns tend to be more difficult to specify 
than remedies which involve the straightforward prohibition of a particular mode of 
conduct or contractual arrangement. Remedies which are specified by the defendant 
themselves are likely to be easier to implement, but their effectiveness may be in greater 
doubt. Whether such matters are weighed by the Commission when deciding which cases to pursue 
is unclear.  
We would note that the Commission’s current investigations into Amazon’s use of seller data111 and 
Apple’s terms for the use and promotion of payment systems for apps in the Apple app store112 
would seem to be cases for which, if a finding of abuse were to be made, remedies might be easier 
to specify and implement than was the case in Microsoft I. In contrast, the CMA’s current digital 
advertising findings include a range of remedies, some of which would be simple prohibitions (such 
a prohibition on Google paying for default positions on devices113) and others of which would require 
access to data sets (such as access to Google’s click and query data)114 or new interoperability 
arrangements (between Facebook and third parties)115 which are likely to be much more challenging.  
Another important feature of the application of remedies in antitrust cases is that parties will often 
have and take the opportunity to seek a commitment decision of the Commission by 
volunteering remedies during the enquiry. In the Google Shopping case, Google offered three 
sets of commitments between April 2013 and January 2014116 which were intended to address the 
Commission’s concerns without accepting a breach of the law, the last of which the Commission 
informed complainants that it was minded to adopt. In the light of the responses it then received, 
the Commission changed its mind and issued a Statement of Objections in April 2015 and a decision 
in June 2017. It is common for the Commission to ‘market test’ proposed measures with third parties 
in this way before deciding whether to accept them. The same procedure was adopted in Microsoft 
II, with the Commission deciding to accept the commitments in that case. Similarly, in merger cases, 
it is relatively common for parties to volunteer remedies during the proceedings (either towards the 
end of the Phase 1 inquiry or during Phase 2) in an effort to persuade the Commission that any SIEC 
arising from the merger will be effectively remedied by the commitments being proposed and that 
the merger should be approved on that basis. 
Discussion of remedies could also extend beyond the measures that are adopted upon completion 
of a competition case. One of the recurring concerns in debates about the application of competition 
tools to digital platform markets is that abusive conduct may persist whilst the Commission conducts 
its investigation. This may be a concern in relation to exploitative abuses but is a particular concern 
in relation to exclusionary cases if the length of time taken to arrive at a remedy results in a further 
diminution of competition in the meantime. In such circumstances, the Commission may use 
‘interim measures’ when there is prima facie evidence of an infringement and a danger of serious 
and irreparable harm to competition. These powers have been used very sparingly in the past, 
although some regard their use in the Broadcom case in 2019 (to require the removal of certain 
exclusive purchasing rebates) as an indication that they may be employed more often by the 
 
110 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39530/39530_3162_3.pdf 
111 ‘Commission opens investigation into possible anti-competitive conduct by Amazon’, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4291 
112 ‘Commission opens investigation into Apple’s App Store rules’ 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1073 
113 CMA (2020), para 6.70 
114 CMA (2020) para 6.65 
115 CMA (2020) para 6.80 




Digital Markets Act: Making economic regulation of platforms fit for the digital age 
59/108 
Commission in future117. Executive Vice-President Vestager has suggested in the past that the 
evidential hurdle which the Commission must meet to impose interim measures is higher than that 
adopted in some Member States and may require revision118.  
Any concerns about the inability to halt exclusionary conduct during the investigation will be 
compounded if the remedies that are adopted in the Commission’s final decision were to take years 
to implement or to prove to be ineffective. The Commission’s proposals for an ex ante regulatory 
regime, to the extent that it is targeted at exclusionary conduct, may be viewed as an attempt to 
address such concerns by another means. Participants in the seminar may wish to discuss the extent 
to which interim measures and some forms of ex ante regulation are seeking to address similar 
concerns, at least in relation to exclusionary practices, and which would prove the more effective. 
2.3 Application of remedies by regulatory bodies 
The Commission‘s proposal for an ex ante regulatory regime is presented in two forms, each of 
which involves a different approach to remedies. The first – option 3a - involves requiring large 
platforms with a gatekeeping role to comply with a list of practices which would be 
prohibited or restricted, such as certain forms of self-preferencing and tying of contractual 
obligations ‘which have no connection with the underlying contractual relationship’119. The 
Commission indicates that some of these prohibitions would have general applicability regardless of 
the specific characteristics of the markets in which the platform performs a gatekeeper role, but 
others might apply only to certain firms, referring to operating systems, algorithmic transparency 
and issues relating to online advertising. 
This approach echoes the proposal in the Furman Report120 that platforms with ‘strategic market 
status’ that perform a gatekeeper role should be subject to a code of conduct. The details of the 
code were to be developed, but were expected to include obligations to ensure users could obtain 
both access to the platform and prominence, rankings and reviews on the platform on a ‘fair, 
consistent and transparent’ basis, and prohibitions on restrictions or penalties for using other 
channels to market. Specific provisions may be required for particular markets or for a sub-set of 
platforms. The CMA has taken up this proposal in its final report into digital advertising markets121 
with principles of ‘fair trading’ intended to address exploitative abuses, ‘open choices’ to 
prevent exclusion (including requiring interoperability of core services), and ‘trust and 
transparency’. The CMA envisage that a regulator would enforce the code, with powers to issue 
interim measures in cases of suspected non-compliance and the power to appoint a monitoring 
trustee to oversee subsequent compliance if a breach has been found.  
The advantages of this approach are considered to be several-fold: first, the rules that are 
envisaged would provide firms with greater predictability than is available under competition law 
(particularly in relation to matters on which there is little or no precedent) and may also prohibit 
practices which might otherwise be legal, absent the code. Participants may wish to discuss whether 
it is in fact possible to develop rules which would be both sufficiently broad to encompass the 
diversity of digital platforms whilst at the same time providing the predictability for market 
participants that is sought. 
Second, it is argued that a regulatory body would be expected to act much more quickly to remedy 
breaches of the code than would be possible under existing competition law arrangements. This may 
include co-operative outcomes rather than requiring formal decisions. Again participants wish to 
consider how much weight to give to such claims. Enforcing principles rather than detailed rules is 
 
117 ‘Commission imposes interim measures on Broadcom in YV and modem chipset markets’, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6109 
118 ‘Brussels seeks stronger interim measures powers’, available at https://eaccny.com/news/member-news/brussels-seeks-
stronger-interim-measures-competition-powers/. The Furman Report makes a similar proposal, para 3.127 
119 Inception paper, p.4 
120 Furman report, paras 2.34- 
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still likely to give rise to arguments as to interpretation and application in a particular set of 
circumstances.  
Third, it is envisaged that application of the Code would be less concerned with establishing 
culpability or imposing fines, and more concerned with ensuring pro-competitive conduct. The 
relationship between regulator and regulated firm would be more of an ongoing dialogue, with 
guidelines which would adapt to changes over time and perhaps the trialling of different actions or 
measures to assess their effectiveness before they were implemented. 
The second approach – option 3b – is said to be ‘inspired’ by the existing regulatory regime for 
telecommunications services. The key difference between this approach and the first is that 
remedies would be tailored to the competition concerns that had been identified in a 
particular market or in relation to a particular gatekeeper platform, rather than being applied 
indiscriminately to all platforms performing a gatekeeper role. Such a regime, if modelled on 
telecommunications, would represent a hybrid between the approach adopted by competition 
authorities, in which every case may involve a different set of remedies and the parties 
themselves may be left to decide which to adopt, and a code of conduct approach under 
which all designated firms are subject to the same prohibitions or requirements.  
In the telecommunications regime, national regulatory bodies are given a menu of remedies from 
which they can choose but the choice is limited in various ways. First, the menu of remedies available 
is itself defined in legislation to ensure consistency of approach across the European Union and fulfil 
harmonisation objectives. A complex set of institutional arrangements (which will be considered in 
the last seminar in this series) have been introduced to ensure that the remedy selected by the 
national regulatory body is subject to review by the Commission and by peers before it is 
implemented. The menu has been subject to periodic revision (and extension) when the legislative 
framework has been reviewed, and currently includes transparency and disclosure, accounting 
separation and non-discrimination obligations to address concerns about exclusionary conduct,  
obligations to provide access to a wide range of inputs,  price control and cost accounting measures 
to address concerns about exploitative (or exclusionary, if wholesale inputs) conduct,  and the 
‘functional’ separation of activities. The framework does not accord telecommunications regulator 
powers to require the divestiture of assets or businesses. 
Second, the remedies are conceived as a hierarchy, whereby regulators are required to prioritise 
interventions in upstream markets before they can consider the application of remedies 
downstream122. Third, and an important new feature of the latest revisions to the 
telecommunications regulatory regime in Europe, any consideration of remedies by the regulator 
has to take into account any commercial arrangements which may either be in place or in 
contemplation and provision is made for a commitment procedure in which firms can propose 
undertakings in lieu which a regulator will then market test123. This provides an opportunity for firms 
to offer commitments during the regulatory proceeding in a similar manner to parties in competition 
or merger proceedings, although its application remains largely untested at present. 
Although the menu is limited, telecommunications regulators are still required to make and to justify 
their choice of remedies, which can be subject to appeal. This is generally undertaken as part of the 
overall review of the market and designation of firms with ‘significant market power’, although some 
national regulatory bodies have on occasion undertaken the designation of firms and the selection 
of remedies as distinct administrative processes.  
The key point is that the tailored application of remedies, even if drawn from a limited menu that 
has been predefined, will require a lengthy administrative process and potentially raise concerns 
about the continuation of exclusionary conduct in the meantime. There would appear to be an 
unavoidable trade-off between flexibility and the capacity to tailor remedies to individual 
 
122 European Electronic Communications Code, 2018/1972, Article 73(2)  
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circumstances on the one hand, and the speed at which remedies might be applied on the 
other. 
It is also important to note that the Commission does not present Options 3a and 3b as being 
mutually exclusive. The CMA, as noted earlier, has proposed that a future regulatory body be 
given powers both to apply a Code and to implement tailored remedies to promote competition on 
a case by case basis. The CMA envisages that application of the Code would be done quickly to 
ensure compliance with its underlying principles, whereas the development and application of more 
intrusive ‘market opening’ remedies, such as obligations to share essential inputs or to interoperate 
with other platforms, would likely require a more onerous and time consuming set of procedures. 
3 Issues arising in digital platform markets 
In this section, we make some observations about the application of remedies in digital platform 
markets. We noted earlier that dominant digital platforms may engage in practices, such as bundling 
services or imposing exclusive agreements, which are no different from those employed by firms in 
the non-digital arena. Conventional remedies, such as simple prohibition, are likely to be as 
appropriate in these cases as in others but participants may wish to consider whether they would be 
better pursued by competition authorities or by the application of a Code (of conduct) which would 
be overseen and enforced by a specialist regulator124. 
Digital platforms also present new challenges for public authorities when it comes to remedies in a 
number of areas. Some of these relate to exclusionary abuses, such as self-preferencing or refusal 
to provide access to data, and others to (arguably) exploitative abuses, such the use of inappropriate 
choice architectures or personalised pricing. Many have been or are currently the subject of other 
research at CERRE. Some of these remedies are highlighted in the Commission’s Inception paper, 
although ‘demand side’ concerns about personalised pricing or choice architectures are not. 
3.1 Self-preferencing 
Accusations of unfair self-preferencing by digital platforms have been a recurring theme in recent 
years. Digital platforms often compete with each other for the attention of the user and, having done 
so, seeks to monetise it by serving content that enables transactions. This is done by ranking, rating 
or otherwise presenting content in an attempt to offer a good match to the needs of the user on the 
one side, and to require firms to pay for to obtain a better ranking or rating on the other. Unfair 
self-preferencing could arise if the digital platform competes against those firms and is 
able to obtain a better ranking or rating by virtue of its affiliation, rather than on merit. 
Such practices are likely to harm consumers by excluding rival content which may better fulfil their 
needs. This was the basis of the Google Shopping case, in which Google was found by the 
Commission to have introduced a new general search algorithm which penalised rival comparison 
shopping search services but which did not impact its own Shopping service. Google has been subject 
to similar accusations in relation to travel services125 and Amazon has been accused of unfairly 
preferring its own brand products, including in the Best Buy box, when returning results to 
searches126.  
 
124 We do not discuss mergers involving digital platforms with a gatekeeper role in this section, since we would 
expect the main remedy in cases where a significant impediment to competition were to arise would be likely to 
involve prohibition of the transaction. Other potential merger remedies include commitments to share data, which 
are discussed below. However, the focus of the debate on mergers involving gatekeeper digital platforms is in 
relation to the thresholds for and evidential approach to the merger review, not to the remedies. 
125 ‘Google under fire for allegedly promoting own travel service over others’, available at 
https://www.pymnts.com/antitrust/2020/google-under-fire-allegedly-promoting-own-travel-service-over-others/ 
126 The Capitol Forum (2016), ‘Amazon: By Prioritizing its Own Fashion Label Brands in Product Placement on its Increasingly 
Dominant Platform, Amazon Risks Antitrust Enforcement by a Trump Administration’, available at  (2018) 
https://thecapitolforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Amazon-2016.12.13.pdf ; and  Creswell, ‘How Amazon steers 
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Discriminatory conduct on the part of vertically integrated firms that provide essential inputs is not 
unfamiliar to either competition authorities or regulators. Much of the recent history of 
telecommunications regulation has been concerned with efforts on the part of the Commission and 
national regulatory bodies to police and prohibit discriminatory conduct as to both price and quality 
by firms, but there are good reasons to expect that remedying unfair self-preferencing by digital 
platforms will prove to be at least, and likely, even more challenging. 
One effective remedy would involve removing the incentive to self-preference by requiring the 
divestiture of the affiliated business and prohibiting further participation by the 
gatekeeper platform. Full structural separation is not available to telecommunications regulators 
and Executive Vice President Vestager has repeatedly referred to it as being a ‘last resort’127. The 
Commission’s current proposal for an ex ante regulatory regime would appear consistent with the 
assumption that other approaches are to be pursued in the meantime. It is worth noting, however, 
that in at least one case the application of the British equivalent of the New Competition Tool did 
result in the break-up of the British Airports Authority128 and we note that Option 3 of the NCT is 
presented in the Inception Impact Assessment as allowing the Commission to impose ‘where 
appropriate, structural remedies’. 
In the absence of a structural remedy of this kind, a public authority will be left with the task of 
determining whether the rankings and ratings that are served up by a digital platform reflect the 
results of competition on the merits and the best match to the users’ enquiry, or whether they 
represent the exercise of ‘biased intermediation’ by the platform. The key point, discussed at greater 
length in a CERRE report129, is that the preferencing or ranking of content in this way will often be 
an intrinsic function of the platform, without which it could not serve its core purpose of matching 
users to the content or services they seek. Generic rules or codes that prohibit ‘discrimination’, as 
might be applied by regulators in other circumstances, are of little utility when it comes to digital 
platforms that perform such intermediation functions. Instead, public authorities must seek 
remedies which allow preferencing in order to produce ‘good’ matches on the platform 
but which prohibit ‘bias’. Since the distinction between the two may be very subtle, and arise 
from the cumulative effect of incremental changes to very complex algorithms, the task of detection 
can itself be very difficult (as regards the Google Shopping case, the impact of the introduction of 
the Panda algorithm during 2011 appears clear in retrospect130, but it is less clear whether or how 
a regulator could have detected it at the time). Remedying such concerns is likely to involve changes 
to the algorithms, the consequences of which for competition will be difficult for any public authority 
to predict. It is unlikely to be possible to restore the market to the position that obtained prior to 
the abuse since the relative quality of content or services – and hence their predicted ranking - is 
also likely to have changed in the meantime. An intense, but potentially prolonged, period of 
interaction between the public authority and the digital platform is likely to be required in order for 
the former to satisfy itself that concerns about unfair self-preferencing have been adequately 
remedied. This might involve the use of experiments to assess the impact of proposed 
changes on the results obtained by users. Such tasks may be much better undertaken by a 
regulatory body, or by an appointed independent technical expert, than by a competition authority. 
3.2 Data sharing 
The other set of remedies commonly associated with digital platforms and explicitly referred to by 
the Commission in its proposals for an ex ante regulatory body, relate to obligations to share data 
which the digital platform has acquired. This is viewed as a remedy to concerns that digital platforms 
performing a gatekeeper role may have acquired an unassailable position within their core market 
by virtue of the scale and scope of the data which they hold, given network and feedback effects, 
 
127 ‘Breaking up tech giants ins last resort, Vestager tells MEPs’, available at https://euobserver.com/economic/146208 
128 Competition Commission (2009), ‘BAA airports market investigation’. A market study with a view to structural separation was 
also allegedly threatened in negotiations between the UK telecoms regulator and BT which led to the ‘legal separation’ of its 
network and retail businesses.  
129 CERRE (2019), op cit 
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and that they may also come to leverage that data into other markets and so dominate them. A 
significant body of literature has developed on ‘data related’ theories of harm in platform markets, 
to which a forthcoming report by CERRE will further contribute.131  
The authors of the Furman Report were strong advocates of data sharing remedies to ‘open up’ 
competition in digital markets. They found it helpful to distinguish between ‘personal data mobility’, 
which would involve the ongoing transfer of data about a specific individual from one platform to 
another with that users’ consent (as occurs with Open Banking), and ‘data openness’, which refers 
to the bulk transfer of non-personal data between entities132. The Commission’s own advisers on 
digital competition also devoted considerable attention to data sharing remedies, distinguishing 
between (individual) data portability (which unlike Furman’s mobility would not be continuous), 
protocol interoperability (which allows complementary services to interwork with the core services 
of the platform, as in the Microsoft case referred to earlier), data interoperability (involving the 
continuous transfer of data, but on an individual rather than bulk basis) and ‘full protocol 
interoperability’ (involving full interworking between platforms that are substitutes to each other, 
such as two messaging systems)133. Other topologies can also be proposed, but seminar participants 
may find it useful to distinguish between two broad categories of data sharing: 
1. Data sharing remedies which are intended to address switching costs which a user otherwise 
faces in seeking to replicate data that has been accumulated by one platform when switching 
to another. Such remedies would generally involve the transfer of data about a specific 
individual user at their request and for their benefit, 
Data sharing remedies which are intended to address leveraging concerns from one market to 
another (whether in a vertical relationship or otherwise). These remedies would generally involve 
the bulk transfer of large volumes of data at the request of another firm for the benefit of 
users in general. 
Data sharing remedies have been adopted in only a small number of national competition 
cases to date, generally involving the sharing of customer lists to enable rivals to promote new 
services134. However, data sharing has also been a feature of the remedies emerging from 
market investigations conducted by the British competition authority (CMA), applying the 
equivalent of the ‘new competition tool’ being proposed by the Commission. This was most notable 
in the Retail Banking review, where the CMA established a new entity (the Open Banking 
Implementation Entity) to oversee the implementation of arrangements which required the nine 
largest UK retail banks to share current account information with third parties via approved APIs135. 
In the Energy review, the CMA required firms to disclose to the energy regulator details of all 
customers who had remained on a standard tariff for three or more years, with such information 
then being made available to rivals136. In both cases, ongoing oversight of these arrangements was 
undertaken by a regulatory body and not by the CMA. The CMA’s latest Digital Advertising report 
also includes data sharing proposals in relation to Google search query data. 
Data sharing has also been required by European law in some sectors, including the sharing 
of vehicle data with independent garages137 and the sharing of smart meter data in the electricity 
 
131 REF 
132 Furman Report para 2.51-2.93 
133 Cremer et al (2019), Competition Policy in the digital era, p.84-5 
134 The cases involved a French energy company and the Belgian lottery, see XXX 
135 CMA (2016), Retail banking market investigation 
136 CMA (2016), Energy Market investigation, Summary of AECs and remedies, Para 20.24 (c)-(d) 
137 Regulation 2018/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the approval and market surveillance 
of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, OJ 
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and gas sectors.138 Telecommunications operators are required to share customer data with third 
parties for the purposes of providing telephone directory services139.   
It will be apparent from this that ‘data sharing’ describes a large number of different potential 
interventions and requirements, each of which may be relevant to a particular set of 
circumstances and a particular theory of harm. Such remedies may therefore be particularly suited 
to the Commission’s proposal that an ex ante regulator adopted tailored remedies on a case by case 
basis. Recent research by CERRE has led us to the view that competition authorities, whilst being 
able to tailor remedies to the theory of harm, may adopt an overly restrictive view of data as an 
‘essential input’ when a more expansive approach may be required if the aim is to ensure that a 
gatekeeper platform cannot leverage its data and envelope new markets140. 
Importantly, any European public authority will find their capacity to implement data sharing 
remedies constrained by the requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR).141 The Regulation includes provisions, at Article 20, which allow individuals to require that 
personal data (being data which has been ‘volunteered’ by them to the platform and data which the 
platform has ‘observed’ through their interactions with the platform) be ported to another platform, 
without intermediation by the user themselves provided this is ‘technically feasible’. This obligation 
applies to all firms, and not simply to digital platform or to platforms performing a gatekeeper role 
and is unlikely to address the competition concerns which the Commission’s latest proposals are 
intended to address (although it may reduce switching costs for individual users). More expansive 
forms of data sharing, such as the sharing of large aggregated data sets containing personal data, 
may be inhibited by requirements under the Regulation to obtain individual user consents. Changes 
to the GDPR may be required to enable other approaches, such as the bulk transfer of personal data 
with users being allowed to ‘opt out’ rather than ‘opt in’, reflecting a tension between the European 
Union’s objectives of preserving privacy on the one hand and promoting competition on the other. 
Other arrangements, such as requiring that access be given to data sets that remain under the 
control of the gatekeeper, perhaps via intermediaries or ‘sandboxes’, could also be considered. 
Data sharing remedies – whether for the sharing of an individual’s data under Furman’s ‘personal 
mobility’ concept or the bulk transfer of large data sets such as Google’s search query data, as 
suggested by the CMA - are all likely to raise a significant number of issues. For example, 
having determined that a particular gatekeeper platform is obliged to share data, the public authority 
must determine who can obtain access to the data and under what conditions. In view of the risks 
to privacy and other potential harms that might arise from the mismanagement of data, it is likely 
that potential recipients will themselves need to be subject to some form of supervisory regime to 
ensure that the integrity of the system and trust in the regime is retained. Personal Information 
Management Systems and other intermediaries which allow individual users to better control (and 
potentially monetise) their personal data may play an important role in future, but may need to be 
promoted and supported in order to do so, for example through the development of common 
technical standards which regulators may be required to develop or to oversee. 
Demand for data is also likely to be very heterogeneous, in comparison to other assets which are 
shared under regulatory arrangements. The type, volume and other characteristics of the data will 
need to be specified, and common technical standards will be required to enable its transfer and 
manipulation. Many proposals for data sharing assume that sharing would be undertaken on a ‘no 
charge’ basis. There may be a case for this if sharing involves personal data on a user by user basis, 
but the bulk sharing of aggregated data for which acquisition the gatekeeper platform has made 
significant investments would seem likely to require the setting of charges in order to retain 
 
138 Directive 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market 
for electricity [2019] OJ L 158/125, art.23. 
139 EECC, art.112(1). 
140 Note, however, that Cremer et al consider that data sharing can be required under competition law to enable competition in 
either the core market or a complementary market,  p.106  
141 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data 
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appropriate incentives to invest and innovate. It is not clear requiring charges to be set on a ‘FRAND 
basis’ will provide sufficient clarity, given the history of the application of that concept in other fields 
such as essential patents. On the other hand, it is not clear to us that there currently exists a well-
developed methodology for establishing charges for data sharing arrangements142.That being so, it 
could represent a significant challenge to the implementation of such arrangements. 
If data sharing proves challenging to implement, an alternative remedy may involve restrictions 
on the internal sharing of data by large platforms and the creation of data silos. This was the 
remedy adopted by the Bundeskartellamt in the Facebook case referred to earlier. That case 
concerned exploitative rather than exclusionary abuse but others have argued that data silos may 
be required to prevent large digital platforms leveraging data acquired from users in one market to 
another143. This might be the case, for example, if data protection regulation were to prevent the 
effective sharing of data with third parties, but to allow a large digital platform to do so amongst its 
own constituent businesses (an outcome which sometimes presented as being an unintended 
consequence of the GDPR). Given the potential economies of scope which large platforms might 
generate from using data for multiple purposes, such ‘lines of business’ restrictions might be 
considered to be remedies of last resort in the event that data sharing remedies prove to be 
incapable of being implemented effectively. Participants may wish to consider the relative merits of 
‘data sharing’ and ‘data silos’. 
3.3 Interoperability  
‘Interoperability’ can also refer to a number of different arrangements. For example, APIs 
may enable complementary services that have been developed by third parties to interwork with 
the core functions of the gatekeeper platform – what the Commission’s advisers refer to as ‘protocol 
interoperability’. Many digital platforms voluntarily expose some functionality in this way in order to 
support complementary innovation, as when mobile operating systems Android and Apple provide 
software developer kits and interfaces to support the creation of new applications. However, the 
gatekeeper platform may withdraw interoperability, or may alter the commercial or other terms on 
which it is granted. Such a case arose in the United States, where PeopleBrowsr analysed Twitter 
data to sell information about customer reactions to products or about Twitter influencers in certain 
communities. Twitter then decided that its data would no longer be accessible directly but should be 
purchased from certified data resellers. Following a complaint from PeopleBrowsr, a Californian Court 
ordered, with interim measures, that Twitter should continue to provide its data directly, although 
the parties subsequently settled the case.144  Dominant firms may also refuse to provide interfaces 
to rivals or enable interoperability with their core services whilst at the same time ensuring 
interoperability between their own products, in a technical form of bundling or tying. We noted 
earlier, for example, that Microsoft was required by the European Commission to expose APIs so 
that third party work servers could interoperate with Windows. Although such remedies may not 
raise some of the issues associated with data sharing (for example, concerns about privacy and the 
constraints of the GDPR may not arise), they are likely to involve complex technical questions about 
the precise functionality to be exposed, how changes will be managed, security and other risks, and 
the terms under which access may be provided. 
Another form of interoperability, and a long-standing feature of the telecommunications regulatory 
regime, involves the interworking between platforms that are substitutes to each other, or 
what the Commission’s advisers refer to as ‘full protocol interoperability’. A remedy of this kind might 
be considered appropriate in markets that exhibited strong direct network effects and in which users 
tended to subscribe to a single platform rather than multi-home, leading to concerns about ‘tipping’. 
Social media and messaging markets are sometimes thought to have these characteristics, although 
 
142 We note , for example, that the CMA’s recent proposals on the sharing of Google’s search query data leave the issue of pricing 
as a matter for a future regulator to address, CMA (2020), para 8.43 
143 Condorelli, Daniele and Padilla, Jorge, Data-Driven Predatory Entry with Privacy-Policy Tying (May 13, 2020). Available at 
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there is also evidence of multi-homing145. Again, the recent CMA report on Digital Advertising 
proposes what might be described as ‘partial interoperability’ under which Facebook would be 
required to allow access to certain functions, such as allowing users on rival platforms to invite their 
Facebook contacts to join them on the other platform or allowing users to post content to multiple 
platforms from Facebook (and vice versa). We understand that Facebook enables or has in the past 
enabled such functionality, which may suggest that incentives for platforms to interoperate can be 
quite dynamic and that ongoing regulatory engagement, rather than one-off intervention by a 
competition authority, may be more appropriate. 
In 2018, provisions were introduced into the European Electronic Communications Code146 which 
enable the European Commission to adopt implementing measures to require interoperability 
between ‘interpersonal communications’ or messaging services provided it has found an ‘appreciable 
threat’ to ‘end to end connectivity’ in at least three Member States. We interpret this as addressing 
a concern that the migration of users from conventional (interoperable) voice telephony services to 
(non-interoperable) messaging services such as WhatsApp might lead to a loss of interconnectivity 
in Europe. The remedy in the EECC does not, therefore, appear primarily intended to address 
concerns about competition between messaging platforms, although it may have this effect. It has 
yet to apply. The Inception report accompanying the latest Commission proposals for ex ante 
regulation make no reference to these provisions. The institutional arrangements for applying 
remedies are to be discussed in the fourth seminar in this series. 
3.4 Exploitative conduct remedies 
Digital platforms may also create new opportunities for different forms of exploitative conduct which 
would need to be remedied, some of which may be appropriate for consideration on the kind of Code 
envisaged by the Commission in Option 3a, other of which may require more tailored interventions. 
One such concern is that large digital platforms may be well placed to engage in personalised price 
discrimination, as a result of which they would capture most or the entire economic surplus created 
by a transaction, rather than it being divided more equitably between consumers and producers. 
These concerns are long-standing (Amazon was accused of conducting trials in 2000147) but have 
not received much attention from competition authorities to date, perhaps because what research 
there is has tended to suggest that the practice is not currently widespread148. Popular attitudes to 
price discrimination are also complex: some forms are regarded as socially acceptable, but others 
not. Some regulators, including the Financial Conduct Authority and utilities regulators in the UK 
have been increasingly engaged with the consequences of price discrimination, particularly as it 
relates to outcomes for ‘vulnerable customers’149. But these kinds of concerns have yet to extend to 
digital markets, so far as we are aware. Designing remedies which address concerns about price 
discrimination is likely to prove challenging when the welfare consequences of the conduct itself 
(personalised pricing can mean lower prices for some consumers as well as higher prices for others) 
are often ambiguous. 
Another form of exploitative conduct highlighted by the CMA in its recent Digital Advertising Report 
concerns the use of defaults and ‘nudges’ to guide users into making decisions which may not in 
fact be in their best interests. In the context of the CMA study, this may involve the disclosure of 
more personal data than the user might otherwise wish, but it could involve the purchasing of 
products which do not best meet their needs or budget. The use of different ‘choice architectures’ to 
guide consumers is not restricted to large digital platforms, but their capacity to analyse user 
 
145  See CMA Digital Market Interim Report, p. 94 for evidence of ‘cross visiting’ between social media sites,  
146 EECC, Art 61(2) (c) 
147 https://www.computerworld.com/article/2588337/amazon-apologizes-for-price-testing-program-that-angered-
customers.html. See also Ezrachi and Stucke, Virtual Competition: the promise perils of the algorthim-driven economy, 2016; 
M. Bourreau and A. de Streel (2018), The regulation of personalised pricing in the digital era, Note for the OECD, 
DAF/COMP/WD(2018)150. 
148 UK authorities have undertaken various studies and the European Commission undertook a study in 2018, see ‘Consumer 
market study on online market segmentation through personalised pricing/offers in the European Union’, June 2018 
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interactions with the platform at scale allow them to undertake trials and continuously test the 
impact of small changes to user interfaces on consumer behaviour. This is another area (along with 
remedies for self-preferencing) where the specification of remedies is likely to require an ongoing 
period of interaction between a specialist regulator and the platform, including the use of 
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DISCUSSION SUMMARY | Remedies 
The purpose of this section is to list the questions and discussion points that arose from the overview 
presented in the Issue Paper on ‘the remedies’ and the exclusive workshop organised in July 2020. 
The non-attributable summary of the discussion was prepared by Claire-Marie Healy, project 
manager at CERRE. 
Types of remedies 
Have competition law remedies been effective in prohibiting abuses in European digital platform 
markets to date? If not, why not?  
Are Commission’s fining powers adequate in relation to digital platform markets? If not, how should 
they change? 
RESPONSES 
The mission of rules is actually to prohibit abuses. Remedies are just one of the means available to 
resolve abuses identified in the past in order to bring markets to a competitive state. The question 
that remains open is whether remedies used in the past to address competition issues in relation to 
digital platform markets (such as in the cases against Google, Expedia, Booking.com, Microsoft) have 
succeeded in creating a more competitive state or avoiding future anti-competitive conducts.  
One way to respond to this question would be to carry out a systematic research of all the 
interventions that took place in the digital platform markets in the last 10-15 years for instance, 
looking at 1) what did the authority try to address; and 2) did the remedies achieve the intended 
objective five years later?  
In the assumption that certain remedies did not lead to specific objectives and that change is required, 
another question arises of whether other remedies (structural remedies, behavioural remedies, fines) 
would have achieved better outcomes in the first place such as promoting innovation, privacy, 
equality, and more integration of the European Single Digital Market.    
Which are the most effective remedies in the digital sector? Behavioural, structural, fines, restorative?  
RESPONSES 
In general, five approaches for remedies are acknowledged: 
1) structural separation that eliminates the common ownership incentives, and eliminates the 
incentives to engage in anti-competitive conduct in the first place;  
2) functional separation within a company which maintains separate division of the businesses 
but no physical separation; 
3) behavioural restriction, which relates to the future behaviour of the merged entity and tends 
to be applied in most of the cases so far; 
4) procedural remedies within a company, which includes record keeping, document retention, 
board oversight requirements and incentives for individual executives, and which seem to be more 
effective than corporate fines; 
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Regarding monetary fines, the more personalised regime (already practiced in the finance industry), 
where companies decide to hit on executives’ bonuses in response to an anti-trust fine, could be 
explored for online platforms with large margins where corporate fines might be less effective. 
When looking back at the remedies imposed by the EU on Microsoft which required Microsoft to sell a 
version of Windows without Windows Media Player (“Windows-N”) and to publish and license 
interoperability information, the remedies seem to have had no noticeable effect on the company or 
the marketplace. Indeed, Windows-N was a commercial failure, and there has been only limited cross-
platform server entry as the emergence of new powerful competitors did not materialise.  
What seems to have had an impact is the clear identification of the competition law problem that the 
antitrust remedy is attempting to address, the speed with which the issues and future conducts are 
addressed, and the setting of a precedent on what a company or market can and cannot do that the 
court decision established for the EU executive in ongoing and future anti-trust cases.  
Are remedies likely to vary by Member State? 
RESPONSES 
Future market intervention must be grounded in clear, consistent governance that avoids 
fragmentation across member states. Unified remedies decided at EU level would be welcome and 
would provide more consistency for consumers and companies. The proposed ex ante instrument will 
require either an EU-wide regulator or a tightly coordinated approach across member states. For 
remedies, such as interoperability, that involve common agreements on standards and specification, 
however, setting up a global remedy would be preferable. 
 
Remedy design and monitoring 
Given the characteristics of the digital sector, is it better that the Digital Services Act prohibits a series 
of blacklisted conducts (option 3a) or provides for tailored-made remedies (option 3b)? Or should it 
do both? 
RESPONSES  
Blacklisted or principle-based prohibition conducts can take many forms (including general or specific 
issues) and should include robust and targeted definitions for platforms to distinguish the different 
forbidden practices. Given the very drastic nature of prohibiting commercial conduct, careful thought 
will need to be given to what practices merit prohibition.  
For very specific cases, tailored made remedies would be more practical but will require time and 
resources to develop, which might hinder the development of innovation and competition. New means 
will also be required and developed to accelerate the resolution process.  
Overall, a more flexible combination of Option 3a in parallel to Option 3b might be preferable to 
efficiently tackle the structural competition problems raised by large digital platforms and to impose 
tailor-made remedies where necessary and justified.  
Another option would be to look at the market failures and the regulatory failures to allow adaptation 
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Can a Code of Conduct for gatekeeper digital platforms be specified with sufficient precision to be 
effective? How should this be done?  
Should the content of Codes be platform-specific, be the same for all gatekeeper platforms, the same 
for all platforms, or a combination. Which parts? 
RESPONSES 
An enforceable code of conduct could be established to govern the behaviour of those large 
gatekeeper platforms whose conduct raises the most significant competition concerns.  
Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of the markets, a CMA report recommends that the 
code of conduct would take the form of high-level principles rather than detailed and prescriptive 
rules which might fail to anticipate new market developments. The three high-level objectives are fair 
trading, open choices, trust and transparency, with principles within each objective providing 
specificity as to the behaviour required by the code. Each gatekeeper platform would then have its 
own tailored code. 
Can competition concerns in digital platform markets, excluding mergers, be effectively addressed if 
the parties themselves are left to specify the remedy? How should this process work? 
RESPONSES 
Companies should be involved in the process and the discussion of the design and implementation of 
the remedy to facilitate its rapid and smooth implementation.  
Should an ex ante regulatory regime allow parties to offer commitments in lieu of remedies? 
RESPONSES 
One of the recommendations of the Furman report suggests the notion of “participative regulation”, 
where the industry proposes possible regulations and the regulatory bodies/authorities issue opinions. 
Some questions remain, however, on the practical implementation of this notion (who gets to 
participate, and how?) and how efficient this will be to manage markets. A more regular open 
discussion amongst regulators and companies might be useful to exchange guidance and ideas, and 
such discussions are happening in most cases already between regulators and companies, especially 
when discussing longer-term innovations, such as infrastructure developments. Such a participative 
approach might, however, not be necessary for all types of platforms depending on their products 
and services.  
Following past experiences in the finance sector with some aspects of the participative model, there 
is a risk of regulatory capture that could emerge when regulators and companies spend too much 
time together, eliminating the adversarial process and limiting discussion with other stakeholders 
such as consumers and other competitors. A combination of both participative and adversarial models 
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Specific remedies in the digital economy 
How should uncompetitive self-preferencing be policed and remedied? 
RESPONSES 
Self-preferencing has been at the centre of several cases in the digital markets and is fundamental 
to the way gatekeepers maintain their position or exclude certain players or products.    
As stressed by the Platform Observatory in their preliminary findings released in July 2020, evidence 
of self-preferencing by a dominant vertically integrated platform is difficult to identify for authorities. 
The number of ongoing leveraging/self-preferencing investigations and the B2P Regulation that is 
entering into force across the EU mid-July 2020 should hopefully bring more information from 
incumbents that demonstrates the pro-competitiveness of their actions.  
How would charges for access to data be determined?  
Are data silos a last resort? 
RESPONSES 
Data silos are seen as a less efficient remedy, especially as a lot of the power of data comes from 
combining different data together. Data silos would therefore most likely limit the ability to innovate.  
Instead, ‘data access’ or ‘data sharing’ remedies could resolve potential data bottlenecks and barriers 
to entry created by data. These sets of remedies are also generally more desirable from an efficiency 
point of view, because they are aimed at increasing the efficiency of third-parties, rather than limiting 
the efficiency of the incumbent. There are, however, also caveats and limits to data sharing as a 
remedy in a competition context. Trade-offs occur particularly due to privacy concerns and conflict of 
laws with regard to privacy regulation. Economic trade-offs also occur, because data sharing can not 
only increase the potential to create value (through re-purposing and innovation), but also diminish 
the incentives to collect data in the first place, which would then deprive the potential for value 
creation from data. There is, hence, a broad consensus on the fact that data access and data sharing 
remedies in the digital economy, if they are pursued at all, should focus on raw user input data 
(volunteered and observed data).  Moreover, only data that was created as a by-product of 
consumers’ usage of a dominant service should be within the scope of mandated data sharing (e.g., 
search queries or location data); but not (volunteered) user data that represents the essence of the 
service itself (e.g., posts on a social media site).  
It is not obvious what the pricing of data should be and there is also some concerns around the liability 
issues for data sharing. Regarding data that has been acquired through anti-competitive means, such 
data might have to be considered free. If such data is acquired through an acceptable conduct, a price 
might then have to be defined by authorities. However, in practice, such data might not be relevant 
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Is personalised pricing a concern? 
RESPONSES 
While some degree of personalised pricing is quite commonplace, personalised pricing does not seem 
to be a major concern for consumers or regulators. Also, the ability to price discriminate would 
increase the competitiveness of the market and might not be a good strategy for platforms to follow 
in the first place.   
Regulatory authorities are mainly concerned about the risk of personalised pricing when higher prices 
are given for some customers, particularly if in vulnerable circumstances. These include the 
vulnerability of those whose circumstances appear to put them in need of special protection, the 
needs of people with disabilities, the needs of the elderly and the needs of those on low incomes. 
Should regulators be involved in designing the choice architecture? 
RESPONSES 
Designing the choice architecture would involve thinking carefully about how consumers really 
behave.  
The ‘fairness by design’ remedy could be a conceivable participatory approach for designing the choice 
architecture, involving both platform and regulator in the development, testing and monitoring of 
compliance. Such participatory remedies usually involve a trade-off for companies but they can also 
lead to more certainty and be potentially beneficial to companies and consumers.  
Although a large amount of academic literature on fairness already exists, the concept of fairness 
under EU Law remains an ill-defined and would require more precisions.   
A clear framework on how such a participatory approach work would also need to be defined to ensure 
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ISSUE PAPER | Institutional considerations  
1 Introduction 
In its 2020 Digital Strategy Communication of February,150 the Commission announced that the 
proposal of the Digital Services Act package would include one pillar aiming at achieving a fair 
and competitive economy through economic regulation. This pillar has now become known as the 
Digital Markets Act (DMA). In their Inception Impact Assessment of June 2020, the Commission 
services indicated that they were considering the following three policy options: 
1. Revise the horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-Business Regulation;  
2. Adopt a horizontal framework empowering regulators to collect information from large online 
platforms acting as gatekeepers; 
3. Adopt a new and flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers. This option is divided into the following sub-options:  
3a. Prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices (“blacklisted” practices); 
3b. Adoption of tailor-made remedies addressed on a case-by-case basis where necessary 
and justified.151 
The challenge in discussing institutional design is the vagueness of the proposal at this stage. For 
the purposes of this discussion we assume that the new ex ante Regulation will have the following 
features (it is not clear if all this will be presented so this outline is more for the purposes of 
facilitating discussion): 
1. Objectives, which include stimulating innovation and competition as well as promoting 
fairness in P2B transactions (in other words, a list that includes competition and non-
competition considerations). 
2. Criteria to identify platforms with bottleneck power and the determination of which platforms 
hold such market power. 
3. A list of prohibited conduct applicable to all such platforms and/or a case-by-case 
assessment of what forms of conduct should be prescribed. 
4. Provisions affording the platform the opportunity to justify conduct which is prohibited. 
5. Provisions imposing penalties for undertakings who infringe the Regulation and providing for 
remedies to implement the proscriptive obligations. 
Assuming the proposed ex ante regulation has these attributes, then from a regulatory design 
perspective the questions are the following: (i) who should determine which platforms hold 
bottleneck power? (ii) who decides whether to carry out a case-by-case analysis and who is tasked 
with that analysis? (iii) who assesses the justifications proffered by platforms? (iv) who is in charge 
of imposing remedies and ensuring compliance and how are these tasks best discharged? 
Taking this framework as a guide, this paper is structured as follows: After this introduction, Section 
2 explains the institutional architecture found in the current Platform to Business Regulation and 
considers whether this would be sufficient if the proposed ex ante regulation being considered is 
implemented. As we show, the existing Regulation does not require the establishment of a regulatory 
authority. Section 3 considers the options available for the establishment of a regulatory authority, 
 
150 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM(2020) 67. 
151 Inception Impact Assessment on Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with 
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which appear necessary in light of the possible remedies which were discussed in the second issues 
paper. We consider different models found in other spheres of regulation in the EU. Section 4 
discusses the relationship between EU competition law and the proposed ex ante regulation.  
2 Enforcement of the P2B Regulation 
In terms of enforcement, the current P2B Regulation provides a wide range of methods to secure 
compliance, but it does not require the establishment of a dedicated regulator. 
Online intermediation service providers shall provide an internal system for handling complaints, 
and it is expected that the majority of cases are resolved with this procedure.152 Failing this, the 
terms and conditions should specify a mediation procedure.153 Enforcement may also be by 
representative organizations or public bodies which may take action in national courts.154 More softly, 
the Regulation encourages the development of codes of conduct.155   
In addition, the Regulation requires amendments or additions to national laws. Member States shall 
‘lay down the rules setting out the measures applicable to infringements of this Regulation and shall 
ensure that they are implemented.’156 However, it seems that the obligation will vary across Member 
States: there is no expectation that new enforcement bodies are established, nor that states are 
required to provide for public enforcement and fines.157 Some Member States may opt for public 
enforcement, but it suffices that courts are empowered to impose ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’ remedies.158 
One of the longstanding enforcement problems in B2B relations is that the two contracting parties 
are often reluctant to use formal rules to enforce contracts.159 In some instances businesses prefer 
informal methods to solve disputes to keep good relations between each other, while in others one 
of the two sides might have a weaker bargaining position and be concerned of reprisals if it 
complains. This has been observed in other contexts (e.g. farmers – supermarkets) and the 
Commission also notes that in the P2B context a large number of businesses are probably afraid of 
retaliation if they complain.160 If this is so then reliance on internal procedures may be overly 
optimistic. In the Impact Assessment, it seems that the Commission favours monitoring over 
enforcement and here it remains to be seen if co-regulation works absent the risk of sanction but 
with the fairly explicit possibility that the results of co-regulation may inform subsequent legislative 
action by the Commission.161 In other words, already at the time of preparing the current legislative 
initiative the Commission appeared to view it as a first step towards a more intrusive framework. It 
is of course puzzling that discussion about an upgraded ex ante regulation should take place before 
any experience has been obtained: the current Regulation began to apply only on 12 July 2020.162 
If the legislator opts for option 3a (i.e. the prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices 
(“blacklisted” practices)), then the above regulatory framework may suffice. Arguments in favour of 
relying on private enforcement are that the platforms are best placed to internalise the blacklist and 
adjust their commercial practices to secure compliance, while their clients are in the best position to 
see if there is non-compliance. Private law remedies would serve to deter such conduct (by the 
award of damages) and would also facilitate compliance (by the issuance of injunctive relief). In 
 
152 Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency 
for business users of online intermediation services [2019] OJ L186/57, Article 11, recital 37 
153 Articles 12 and 13 
154 Article 14 
155 Article 17 
156 Article 15 
157 Recital 46 
158 Article 15(2). 
159 See CEPS (2014), Legal framework covering business-to-business unfair trading practices in the retail supply chain, Study for 
the European Commission 
160 Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, SWD(2018) 138 final (PART ½) p.26. 
161 Impact Assessment  Annexes SWD(2018) 138 final, PART 2/2 page 21 
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many spheres of EU Law, enforcement is left to private actors who serve as private attorneys-
general. The success of private enforcement depends on national private law procedures on access 
to justice, but even in the most favourable scenario this is likely to lead to less than optimal 
enforcement. On the one hand, the Court of Justice of the EU has issued numerous rulings supporting 
private enforcement: in cases where individuals sue Member States for infringements of EU Law the 
Court  has said that ‘the full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection 
of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when 
their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held 
responsible.’163 Courage v Crehan replicated this approach when the rights are infringed by 
undertakings: ‘the existence of such a right [to damages] strengthens the working of the Community 
competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are frequently covert, which are 
liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before the 
national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in 
the Community.’164  Such reasoning supports the use of private enforcement: it serves to safeguard 
both the subjective rights of the victim and the general interest pursued by EU Law. However, as 
noted earlier, plaintiffs with a long-running commercial relationship with platforms may not be keen 
to enforce their rights. 
Moreover, leaving it to private enforcement means that the ex ante regulatory framework would 
have to generate criteria about the material scope of application that are at a high level of generality, 
such that national courts can determine this. In other words, the legislator would need to provide a 
definition of dominance similar to that found in antitrust and electronic communications regulation. 
The disadvantage of this is that national courts may differ on whether a given platform has bottleneck 
power. Thus, it may be preferable to institute regulators who would have greater experience and 
afford the EU with better capacity to coordinate enforcement, as we discuss in section 3 below. 
An alternative might be that the designation of large gatekeeper platforms that are subjected to ex 
ante regulation is carried out by a central agency (EU or national) and that enforcement is carried 
out by private parties. This would reduce somewhat the risk of divergence among national courts. 
On the other hand, it may lead to appeals against the finding of market power which may be time-
consuming and erode the effectiveness of this initiative. 
Reliance on private enforcement will be insufficient if option 3b is followed: the adoption of tailor-
made remedies addressed on a case-by-case basis where necessary and justified.  This can only be 
achieved by a regulator. This should be self-evident by the menu of remedies considered in the 
second issues paper. The regulator may well prefer to engage in a process of co-regulation whereby 
the parties themselves are asked to contribute to designing the regulatory framework, but it will 
require a regulatory authority to approve and supervise this. It follows that some institutional 
innovation is required. 
While private enforcement appears insufficient, it may be worth discussing to what extent the ex 
ante regulatory framework should include both public and private enforcement. In competition law 
for example, we see that many cartel decisions are the used by claimants in follow-on actions. This 
can serve to increase the deterrent effect, since monetary fines are unlikely to really hurt major 
platforms. 
3 DMA: Options for public enforcement 
In this section we canvass a range of options for the creation of a dedicated regulator and consider 
advantages and disadvantages. The options draw on what existing models of enforcement we find 
in other fields of EU Law. At a high level, a variety of models may be found. These are summarised 
in the table and discussed further below. 
 
163 Francovich and others v Italy, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428 para 33. 
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As we show below, EU agencies with enforcement powers exist, but are limited in number. National 
regulatory authorities are found in many fields and networks serve different functions (some are just 
information networks, while some facilitate policy-making).167  It is not always clear why a 
particular institutional architecture is chosen.168 Some suggest that an EU agency is chosen when 
there is a commitment problem at national level. This clearly explains Banking Union where the 
concern has been that weak national supervision led to the global financial crisis. On the other hand, 
networks can also serve to monitor weak national regulators. National regulators may work better 
than EU agencies when targeting local infringements as they are closer to the actors, while EU 
agencies would be preferable when addressing cross-country externalities: in competition law thus 
the Commission addresses EU-wide infringements, national competition authorities’ local 
infringements. However, as we show below national data protection regulators can impose EU-wide 
remedies. Networks may be selected when information sharing is important. These functional 
rationales seem to offer little help in understanding why certain choices are made. At the political 
level, setting up national agencies is costly for Member States; on the other hand, imposing 
regulation by an outside agency might not be politically palatable. Member States may therefore 
prefer an independent EU agency for budget issues or to signal their commitment to the aims of the 
regulation but a national regulator which they can control for domestic policy reasons. The EU 
legislator might prefer more EU-level agencies but must also be wary about constitutional challenges 
and the risk of over-centralisation which may make the EU an unpopular actor. Thus, it seems futile 
to say that the institutional architecture selected is only a function of what makes for the most 
effective regulatory scheme: ultimately this will be a delicate political choice. However, the focus of 
our discussion here is to consider which institutional framework is optimal. 
 
165 Very exceptionally, an NCA has issued a decision about conduct overseas. 
166 Article 56 GDPR but a number of cooperative pathways are found see Articles 60 to 62 
167 On the evolution of transnational networks generally, see A-M Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), showing that these are 
dynamic and what may start as a network with modest aims becomes a major global actor. 
168 In this paragraph we summarise the main points made by L Van Kreij, Towards a Comprehensive Framework for 
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3.1 Centralised enforcement 
The simplest model would be to confer all these tasks to a single, EU-wide regulator. This is the 
model based on the EU Merger Regulation and the Single Supervisory Mechanism for 
banking supervision. The Commission has exclusive competence for concentrations having an EU 
dimension (subject to some exceptions).169 The European Central Bank has exclusive competence 
to supervise systemically significant banks.170 There are clear Treaty legal bases for these two 
domains.171 The Code of Conduct on Computerised Reservation systems also operates in this way, 
with the Commission auditing compliance.172 
From a legal perspective, the logic behind these systems is the same: the EU regulator should look 
after market actors when their conduct may affect the EU market in a significant manner, while 
national regulators are better placed to supervise conduct whose effects are largely national in scope. 
There is a certain economic logic to this as well, as the EU-wide regulator is better placed to carry 
out a holistic welfare assessment for the EU as a whole than a national regulator. Procedurally, 
provided the dividing line between EU and state regulation is clear, the system can allocate 
businesses and transactions in an effective way.  
This obviously requires criteria to delimit competences. An option here could be the size of the digital 
platform based on the undertaking’s turnover in the EU (like in merger control) or on the number of 
unique users in the EU. 
From a political perspective, however, assigning the EU exclusive competence proved controversial. 
It is widely acknowledged for example that the thresholds to determine whether a concentration has 
an EU dimension are too high and that many more mergers should be assessed by the Commission. 
Likewise, the criteria for determining systemically significant banks is under-inclusive. However, 
Member States have resisted conferring more powers to the EU. 
Centralising the enforcement of the ex ante tool under discussion here raises an additional challenge: 
the extent to which EU agencies other than the Commission may regulate markets directly. 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) however provides a precedent.173 ESMA is 
tasked with direct supervision and enforcement against specific financial entities.174 In particular 
ESMA has powers to supervise and fine credit rating agencies.175  This suggests that the EU legislator 
is relatively more free to create EU-wide agencies with robust regulatory powers than some of the 
early case-law suggested. At the same time, this is criticised because a lack of proper procedures in 
the creation of agencies undermines the legitimacy – basically, agencies tend to score high on output 
legitimacy (it’s a good idea to regulate highly complex matters via experts), but low on input 
legitimacy (the procedures by which agencies are created and their accountability mechanisms).176 
The leading judgment relates to ESMA and considered the legality of Regulation 236/2012 which 
regulates short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps. Article 28 of that Regulation gives 
the ESMA the power to intervene through legally binding acts in the financial markets of Member 
States if there is a ‘threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the 
 
169 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ 
L24/1. 
170 Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63. 
171 Articles 103 and 127(6) TFEU respectively. 
172 Regulation (EC) No 80/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on a Code of Conduct for 
computerised reservation systems OJ L 35, 4.2.2009, p. 47 Articles 13-16 
173 See also ACER in the energy sector. Regulation 2019/942 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 22, Article 2(c). 
174 Regulation 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) [2010] OJ 
L331/84. 
175 Consolidated text: Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
credit rating agencies ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1060/2015-06-21. some recent decisions are summarized here:  
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma20-95-1264_2019_annual_report_0.pdf  
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stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union’.177  The Court explained that these 
powers were conferred lawfully because the EU rules establishing ESMA provide for this and the 
circumstances by which ESMA could issue generally binding norms were set out clearly in the EU 
legislation, and there were a series of procedural controls requiring it to consult widely before 
adopting any such measure.178 Whether this judgment is enough to allow the creation of a regulator 
for platform remains to be debated. 
It is submitted that to avoid legal challenge, the Commission is the best-placed institution to 
enforce the ex ante tool under consideration. It may be expedient to divide the work between 
DG COMP and DG CONNECT as one study has suggested: this would allow for the pooling of 
experience within the Commission.179  
There are a number of arguments in favour of opting for a centralised model. 
First, a number of the platforms that have gatekeeper power are likely to operate globally, making 
the EU the most effective level of governance. It is not easy to see how the principle of subsidiarity 
could lead to a different approach. 
Second, the big platforms operate broadly the same systems across all Member States (and indeed 
globally), due to the huge economies of scale involved in designing and operating these systems. 
Therefore, if different National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) were to require different tailor-made 
remedies, this risks leading to a big reduction in efficiency and may be impossible to justify on the 
basis of proportionality - even if any one of the remedies would be cost-justified if applied across 
the EU. 
Third, monitoring compliance is likely to be costly and may require careful large-scale data analysis 
or direct review of algorithm design. It is highly unlikely that individual national regulators will be 
well set up to do this, and even if they were it would highly duplicative to do it more than once. This 
seems to be reflected in the weakness of some national authorities that apply the GDPR.180 
Finally, the largest platforms have deep pockets and securing compliance is more likely if they face 
a single, well-resourced regulator than multitude of small agencies who might even disagree among 
each other on the appropriate course of action. 
3.2 Full decentralisation 
At the other extreme, national regulatory agencies would be tasked to apply the Regulation to 
undertakings whose place of business is their Member State. Two legal instruments may be 
compared to explore how this might be designed. 
The most basic approach is found in the General Data Protection Regulation. Here a ‘lead 
authority’ is designated by reference to the ‘main establishment’ of the firm whose conduct 
is under review. The lead authority is required to cooperate with other data protection authorities 
and its decision then affects the firm’s conduct across the EU.181 This scheme assumes that each 
lead authority is as capable as any other. The lead authority is expected to work in close collaboration 
with other authorities and to consult them before taking decisions; in some instances the European 
Data Protection Board may arbitrate differences of opinion.182  Considering this at a high level, it 
presents a paradox: on the one hand the Member States express mutual trust in each other’s Data 
Protection Agencies (DPAs) by allowing one of them to have exclusive competence to regulate firms 
 
177 Regulation 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of 
credit default swaps [2012] OJ L86/1. 
178 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:18 and Scholten and van Rijbergen (above). 
179 P. Marsden and R. Podszun, Restoring Balance to Digital Competition – Sensible Rules, Effective Enforcement (Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2020) ch.4. 
180 Accessnow, Two Years Under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report (2020). 
181 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [2016] OJ L119/1, Articles 56 and 62 to 65. 
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situated in its territory. On the other hand, each DPA retains the right to oversee how the competent 
DPA proposes to resolve the issue. At the time of writing this complex framework has not yet been 
applied and some have criticized it for being unnecessarily complex.183 The Commission has called 
for more cooperation in cross-border cases.184 There is also one instance where one DPA has taken 
action in a matter which at first blush appeared to be the competence of another DPA.185 
An alternative framework is found in EU consumer law: if there is concern about a widespread 
infringement that affects consumers in more than one Member State or has an EU-wide dimension 
(i.e. it affects two thirds of the Member States), then the competent consumer protection 
authorities have an obligation to coordinate enforcement by appointing a coordinator 
among them to ensure coherent investigation. The firms whose practices are under review may 
offer commitments that resolve the consumer law concern in all relevant jurisdictions and absent 
this each authority is obliged to take enforcement action in case an infringement has been found. 
The coordinator and the Commission play a role in ensuring that the national authorities act 
consistently.186 The upshot is that a firm operating across the EU is de facto afforded a single 
regulator and may propose EU-wide commitments. This procedure has developed incrementally 
since 2007 and a number of decisions have been taken.187 For instance Booking.com made a number 
of commitments to modify the information consumers see so that it complies with consumer law, for 
instance offering explanations on how results are ranked and if hotels pay for higher ranking, as well 
as clarifying the total price of the rooms.188  
Comparing the two, we can suggest that in data protection law case allocation is based on a criterion 
that is easy to apply but at the time of writing lead authorities seem to be under-resourced so that 
they are unable to address the majority of complaints they receive, leading to under-enforcement.189  
In consumer law there is no protocol for assigning cases to any coordinator, but coordination is 
expected and EU-wide remedies are imposed de facto. However, this only occurs in some cases 
without any systematic approach. In spite of it being the one with the thinnest legal framework, the 
consumer protection cooperation system is the one that has worked the best to date if one 
considers the number of instances where firms have made EU-wide commitments to comply with EU 
consumer law.190 The concern remains nevertheless that the largest platforms are probably 
regulated more effectively by a well-resourced central authority than by a national regulator with 
assistance from its fellow regulators. 
A further consideration worth noting in this model is whether the legislation requires minimum or 
maximum harmonisation. The latter prevents stricter national laws and is preferred as a means 
of guaranteeing legal certainty of cross-border business as well as avoiding over-regulation. 
Conversely it may be that in a fast-moving market minimum harmonisation allows Member States 
to develop innovative regulatory tools which may then be uploaded in a revision of the EU Law. 
  
 
183 Accessnow, Two Years Under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report (May 2020) 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2020/05/Two-Years-Under-GDPR.pdf.  
184 Data protection as a pillar of citizens’ empowerment and the EU’s approach to the digital transition - two years of application 
of the General Data Protection Regulation COM/2020/264 final; Staff Working Document, SWD/2020/115 final 
185 The French DPA acted against Google when the competent regulator would have been the Irish DPA. However the Conseil 
d’Etat affirmed the French DPA’s competence to atc finding that the conduct originated in the United States and not Ireland. Case 
N. N° 430810, Société Google (19 July 2020). A quick summary in English is at: https://www.cnil.fr/en/council-state-confirms-
sanction-imposed-google-llc.  
186 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer 
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3.3 A mixed model 
For the application of EU competition law, we have both centralised enforcement (by the 
Commission) and decentralised enforcement (by National Competition Authorities). All enforcers are 
required to apply the same rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU): NCAs apply these in parallel with 
national competition law but the application of national competition law may not be stricter than 
what is provided for under Articles 101 and 102 save for a limited set of instances: where national 
competition law addresses unilateral conduct which may include abuse of economic dependency or 
when national law pursues non-competition objectives.191 
Such a model requires criteria to assign cases to the best-placed authority. In the so-called European 
Competition Network Notice the Commission suggests that when the conduct of undertakings affects 
three or more Member States, then the Commission is likely to be the best-placed authority to assess 
the conduct in question. For cases with less extensive cross-border effects authorities are best-
placed depending on the territory where the agreement is implemented, an NCA’s capacity to remedy 
the infringement and the NCA’s capacity to gather evidence.192 A cartel of widgets by Italian 
manufacturers where they sell locally and export to France is best addressed by the Italian NCA.  It 
is important to note that NCAs take the view that they are unable to impose remedies for effects 
that occur outside their borders. It follows that the Italian NCA’s fines in the example here will only 
relate to the effects on the Italian market. In practice there has been little re-allocation of cases: 
normally the NCA that starts a case keeps it, so it is not easy to assess how well this framework 
performs. 
In practice the system has led to NCAs taking cases which are largely national in scope. There are 
well-known examples of cross-border cases which would have merited better coordination. For 
example, a flour cartel affecting Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands was addressed by 
all four NCAs with some ex-post recalibration of fines.  This approach follows directly from the 
territorial nature of the fines that these authorities can impose. As a result, cross-border cartel 
enforcement is normally best left to the Commission.  
In digital markets, the Booking.com saga saw three NCAs cooperating on crafting a theory of harm 
for price party clauses and agreeing on an acceptable remedy. Many other NCAs then applied similar 
commitment decisions. This is the closest NCAs have come to issuing an EU-wide remedy, but it has 
required individual decisions by all NCAs. It is worth noting that the German NCA disagreed with the 
approach taken by the others. In other digital markets we are seeing some NCAs applying EU or 
national competition law to conduct which has EU-wide effects. A notable example is the German 
competition authority pursuing Facebook for excessive data collection using national law and the 
French NCA’s recent actions against Google.193 These developments may be assessed in two ways: 
a pessimistic reading is that they reveal a failure in the system of decentralised enforcement with 
the Commission unwilling or unable to regulate digital markets comprehensively. An optimistic 
reading is that competition authorities are experimenting different approaches and their individual 
enforcement actions may be expected to see the firm comply with a national decision by altering its 
practice EU-wide.  This however, entails that the strictest authority could set the rules for the EU 
market as a whole.  In markets which are evolving rapidly and where the best regulatory approach 
is not known there is merit in opting for experimentalist governance: the legislation can set high 
level objectives, leaving the national regulators the option to achieve this objective as they see fit. 
The quid pro quo is then that the regulators report back on the outcomes of their approaches and 
the superior regulatory approach can then be selected. 
 
191 Regulation 1/2003, Article 3. For a comparative study, see CEPS (2012), The impact of national rules on unilateral conduct 
that diverge from Article 102 TFUE, Study for the European Commission. 
192 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJC101/43. The three countries rule 
is also used in Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation for a concentration that does not have a Community dimension to be reviewed 
by the Commission. 
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An alternative use of the mixed model could also be explored. NRAs could not just be tasked to 
address gatekeeper platforms whose scope is purely national. In addition, NRAs could be the point 
of contact for complainants and would collect information about the platforms’ relations with 
businesses. This information would then inform the Commission’s regulatory response. In carrying 
out this information gathering function, Member States may choose to empower one or more existing 
regulator. For instance Data Protection, Consumer Protection, Telecom regulators or the NCA could 
all be tasked with identifying market failures for which the ex ante Regulation would be the best 
solution. After all, platform markets already fall under the regulatory scrutiny of each of these 
regulators. 
3.4 Optimizing the operation of regulators 
- (a) Independence and resources 
One of the major challenges in establishing regulators in network industries has been to secure their 
independence. Only recently, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(‘BEREC’) has seen it necessary to issue a statement where it notes that certain Member States are 
taking steps that undermine the independence of the NRAs, calling for the Commission to monitor 
this and issue infringement proceedings if necessary.194 The Commission also undertakes to monitor 
the independence of national authorities entrusted to apply the GDPR.195 The concept of 
independence in EU Laws relating to network regulation has expanded over the years: when 
liberalisation began many utilities were regulated by national ministries and the legislation facilitated 
a gradual shift to independence. Today we have sufficient knowledge of the main attributes of 
independence and it would be helpful if the Commission established some sort of best-practice for 
the design of independent agencies.  Independence means that the regulator is free from undue 
pressure from the firms it regulates and from the government. Attributes of independence include: 
(i) criteria about the appointment of the head and board members (terms of office, security of 
tenure, openness of the selection procedure); (ii) minimum regulatory capacity and autonomy in 
managing resources; (iii) independence from the political process.196 Safeguarding this broad notion 
of independence is important for the Commission since it relies on NRAs as its national agents. 
Independence is nothing without a sizeable budget (which should also not be allocated in ways 
that hamper the agency’s independence) and capable staff. These matters however are more 
difficult for the Commission to oversee.197 
One of the ways to counter the absence of independence is to establish networked governance: by 
subjecting NRAs to peer review one can try and control agencies that would be likely to issue 
decisions contrary to the EU interest.  
It may be useful to discuss what other attributes platform regulators should have in order to ensure 
their capacity to discharge their tasks effectively, for example the power to carryout inspections or 
he power to impose interim measures. 
- (b) Due Process 
It is vital that the regulator respects the fundamental rights of the undertakings. These rights 
have been developed incrementally by the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and many are codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. These include the rights 
 
194 BEREC statement on the independence of the national regulatory authorities BoR (20) 141 
195 Data protection as a pillar of citizens’ empowerment and the EU’s approach to the digital transition - two years of application 
of the General Data Protection Regulation COM (2020) 264 final, section 3. This is based on a finding that some agencies are not 
independent, see SWD(2020) 115, p.15 
196 Directive 2018/1972 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (Recast) [2018] OJ L321/36, Recitals 37-38, 
Articles 6-9 (hereinafter ECC). 
197 However in the ECN Plus Directive, designed to strengthen NCAs the legislator inserted requirements relating to independence 
and resources,  Directive (EU) 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
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of defence, the right to be heard, the right to access the file, and the right to challenge a decision 
of a regulator in front of a court that will be empowered to review the decision thoroughly. Rather 
than just stating these principles in Recitals, the legislation should elaborate on what these 
procedural rights are.  
- (c) Networks 
The EU normally supplements decentralised enforcement with the establishment of agencies or 
networks to aid the work of national regulators – a clear example is BEREC, which is expected 
to work in close cooperation with the Commission to adopt guidelines, issue opinions and gather 
information.198 Its work does not in principle bind the national regulator, but provides a soft law 
framework that is generally applied by regulators and ensures uniformity. 
Likewise, there is an expectation that national regulators cooperate – at times cooperation is 
institutionalised (e.g. the European Competition Network). The Network has facilitated the 
development of best practices and the sharing of ideas among agency officials. 
In addition to such ‘soft’ coordination, we can also see an instance of ‘hard’ coordination in the 
field of electronic communications. National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are empowered to 
regulate markets where the incumbent(s) hold significant market power. There are two stages to 
this: first the NRA identifies a relevant market and determines whether there is significant market 
power, second if this is so, the NRA picks among the remedies provided in the Directive. However, 
in carrying out these two steps it is closely monitored by the Commission, BEREC and other NRAs, 
as outlined below: 
• Determining significant market power: the NRA is expected to analyse markets defined by 
the Commission in its Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets.199 Its draft 
findings on whether there is or is no market power are circulated to other NRAs, BEREC and 
the Commission who have a month to reply. If the NRA has defined a market outside those 
recommended by the Commission or identified undertakings holding SMP, but the 
Commission believes these  measures may create a ‘barrier to the internal market or if it 
has serious doubts as to its compatibility with Union law and in particular the objectives’ of 
the EECC then a more extensive assessment is carried out: BEREC issues an opinion on the 
Commission’s concerns and the Commission may then veto the decision of the NRA.200  
• Imposing remedies: if the Commission agrees that there is a market in need of regulation 
then the NRA’s draft measures (whether to impose a remedy or remove an existing remedy) 
are also reviewed by the Commission. BEREC, the Commission and the NRA are expected to 
collaborate if here are differences of opinion. However, this time the Commission may not 
veto the NRA decision, save in certain specific circumstances.201 The focus here is more on 
securing an approach where the NRA takes into consideration the views of the EU bodies 
which may be better placed to evaluate the remedy given their knowledge of other regulatory 
efforts. 
This approach raises the following issues: first, it appears that networks are a pervasive 
governance mode. Would they be useful in the framework of the ex ante Regulation under discussion 
here? In other fields the regulators are quite busy, it is not clear whether the workload of national 
regulators in platforms would be so onerous as to warrant the setting up of a network of comparable 
size and scope to BEREC, while a less formal grouping like the ECN might serve one well to facilitate 
sharing of good practices. 
 
198 Regulation 2018/1971 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Agency 
for Support for BEREC (BEREC Office) [2018] OJ L321/1. 
199 ECC, Article 64 
200 ECC Article 32 
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The second point for discussion is whether any such network (or the Commission, without a 
network structure) should have powers to control the work of NRAs like we have seen in the 
example of electronic communications above. One obvious disadvantage is that it would slow down 
the capacity of regulators to implement remedies if there is no strict timetable. A second oddity 
would be that if we operate a mixed system (i.e. local platforms are regulated by national authorities, 
global platforms by the Commission) then the Commission’s own assessments would not be reviewed 
in the same way. This is a concern that has also been raised in competition law, where NCA draft 
decisions are checked by the Commission but no similar check is made of Commission decisions.202 
A further discussion point might be whether the two-phase approach applied in electronic 
communications could be replicated here: (i) identification of gatekeeper power; (ii) 
specification of remedies. Arguably the Commission could issue soft-law notices on both points which 
could be reviewed regularly as experience accumulates about the attributes of market power and 
the workability of remedies. As in electronic communication, one might consider a stricter review of 
the first phase and a less strict, more cooperative approach to the second.  Alternatively, the 
Commission could designate those platforms that hold gatekeeper powers, leaving regulators to just 
specify remedies (if a case-by-case assessment is required) or enforce the prohibitions (if black 
listed clauses are included). Regulators here might either be empowered to implement remedies for 
the EU as a whole (as in the GDPR) or each national regulator may have powers for its jurisdiction 
(as in competition law). 
- (d) Remedies 
As discussed above, regulators must have sufficient powers to secure compliance. When it comes 
to compliance with black-listed conduct, fines are a necessary remedy. Fines can be imposed 
for procedural infringements (providing the regulator inaccurate information) or for substantive 
breaches of the obligations set out in the Regulation. Fines should be high enough to secure general 
deterrence. 
However, reliance solely on fines is unhelpful. Generally, fines should be seen as a last resort remedy 
when firms reveal their unwillingness to comply. A preferable approach is to persuade firms to 
comply. More specifically, for some of the possible obligations to be imposed on platforms, the 
regulated firm will require guidance on how to comply. A helpful model that has emerged is co-
regulation. Under this scheme the regulator and the firm cooperate in determining how to comply 
effectively with the obligations imposed. Suppose the remedy required by the regulator is to facilitate 
interoperability with the services of rivals. Such a remedy is not self-executing. The remedy requires 
an understanding of the technology used by the regulated firm which reveals the limits of what kind 
of interoperability regime is possible and how it can best be designed. On the other hand, the 
regulator is best placed to understand which technological fix proposed by the firm is best suited to 
resolve the market failure that has been identified.   
A model where we see this co-creation is in commitment decisions in antitrust law.203 The 
framework here is that the parties propose a course of conduct designed to ensure compliance which 
is then examined both by the Commission and by interested third parties who may comment via a 
so-called market testing procedure. In competition law this approach has been criticised for two 
reasons. The first is that the commitment procedure can be triggered on the basis of matters that 
are not real competition concerns. As a result, the Commission is able to secure a remedy it would 
not have managed to obtain under a formal procedure. This risk is absent in the setting under 
discussion because the obligations will be imposed following a formal procedure. The second criticism 
is that the Court of Justice has not played a sufficiently robust role in constraining the Commission’s 
discretion when accepting commitments.204 To a certain extent we can understand the Court’s 
 
202 Regulation 1/2003, Article 11.  This too contains a sort of veto power whereby the Commission can take over a case from an 
NCA. 
203 Regulation 1/2003, Article 9. G. Monti ‘Commitment Decisions in Perspective’ (2014) Fordham Competition Law Institute 461. 
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attitude: if commitments are agreed as between market actors and the Commission, then so long 
as the procedures relating to design and consultation are not marred by procedural improprieties 
the Court may not wish to second-guess the agreement reached by the parties. 
A further advantage of using an approach based on co-creation is its flexibility: one can build in 
review clauses: typically, commitment decisions have an expiry date; parties may also request that 
the commitment expires earlier if market conditions change. Nothing prevents the insertion of a 
clause that prolongs a commitment if more time is required to fix the market failure. This can serve 
to generate a model of compliance which is more fluid than merely issuing prohibitions. Given the 
fast-moving nature of digital markets, the capacity to adjust remedies in this manner makes for 
more effective enforcement.  While monitoring and review raise costs, they serve to avoid over and 
under enforcement. They also build in a method to test the effectiveness of the regulator’s 
intervention and can be used to review the regulatory framework in the long-term. 
4 Relationship between competition law and regulation 
4.1 Addressing overlaps 
Conduct may be an infringement of competition law and of the ex ante tool – e.g. an exploitative 
term in a contract between a dominant platform and an advertiser. Nothing prevents the parallel 
application of competition law and ex ante regulation. 
When the conduct of one undertaking may be the subject of two distinct criminal procedures (e.g. 
two national competition authorities pursuing the same undertaking for a cartel infringement for 
which fines are foreseen) then the principle of ne bis in idem would apply. This prevents the 
application of both competition rules. According to the Court, for the ne bis in idem principle to apply 
and forbid two actions, ‘the facts must be the same, the offender the same and the legal interest 
protected the same.’205 In competition law this allows the Commission to act against a cartel across 
the whole of the EU and forbids an NCA from pursuing that cartel. However, there are instances 
where some collusion by certain undertakings was analysed by the Commission and some by an 
NCA. Provided both cover different aspects of collusion, the facts of the two cases are not the 
same.206 
If the regulator charged with applying the ex ante tool is empowered to impose fines that are deemed 
to be of a criminal nature for the purposes of EU Law as informed by the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, then a risk of ne bis in idem arises and the question at play would be whether 
the two rules protect the same legal interest. This would be a matter for the ECJ to explore. Arguably 
there is some similarity since both competition law and ex ante regulation would seek to promote 
competition, but at times the ex ante framework may be applied merely to ensure fairness between 
contracting parties. The answer may thus depend upon the activity being challenged. The 
Commission has taken the view that the application of national telecommunications law (which is 
based on the transposition of EU directives) by the NRA protect a different legal interest than the 
competition rules but has at the same time reduced the fine taking into account the penalties 
imposed by the NRA for infringements which partially overlapped with those in the decision.207 
4.2 Addressing conflicts 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are primary laws which cannot be rendered inapplicable by 
secondary legislation.208 For instance, concentrations falling within the scope of the EU Merger 
Regulation may also be reviewed by the Commission in applying Articles 101 and 102. In practice 
this is most unlikely to ever occur since the Commission has been conferred sufficient powers to 
monitor such transactions under the EU Merger Regulation. It goes without saying that the merged 
 
205 Toshiba, para 97, discussed in Monti, Managing decentralized antitrust enforcement: Toshiba, Common Market Law Review 
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entity that results from the decision to clear the merger remains subject to competition law post-
merger. 
Conduct which a national regulator authorises may still be found to infringe EU 
competition law, as we have seen from the case-law in the telecommunications sector (e.g. 
Deutsche Telekom)209. In applying the ex ante tool, a regulator might choose not to impose a duty 
to share data on a dominant platform, but a competition authority might later consider that this 
remedy is necessary: may competition law apply notwithstanding regulatory clearance? 
From a policy perspective, there are good arguments against the application of competition law: the 
regulator may be assumed to have a comparative institutional advantage (e.g. better knowledge of 
the sector, a more refined set of remedies) than the competition authority or a national judge. 
Moreover, the design of the competition law tool is likely to consider a wide range of interests, 
including keeping markets competitive. This leads to two arguments: first that it is likely that the 
regulator will have considered the importance of setting remedies to enhance competition, so from 
this perspective the application of competition law to consider the same interest is wasteful. Second, 
the regulator might have elected to sacrifice competition for another public policy goal that it is 
empowered to pursue. For instance, in electronic communications the regulator pursues the 
promotion of competition but also the facilitation of investment and might trade off a reduction of 
competition if this improves investment in better quality networks.210 
From a legal perspective, the discussion depends on how the regulator is set up, and this takes us 
back to the options canvassed in section 3: whether the regulator is the Commission/an EU agency 
applying EU Law or a national regulatory authority applying EU Law (on the assumption that the ex 
ante tool is a Regulation). However, as we show the solution of the conflict between the ex ante 
Regulation and competition law is probably the same in both scenarios. 
4.2.1 Conflicts between two EU laws applied by two EU bodies 
If the ex ante tool is placed in the hands of an EU agency, it may be helpful to consider briefly the 
legal position in the United States to discern some organising principles. In the US a Federal statute 
may (a) preclude the application of antitrust law; (b) explicitly provide that antitrust law may apply 
in parallel; (c) remain silent on the parallel application of antitrust law. In the latter case it is for the 
courts to determine whether antitrust law may apply to the regulated sector or whether they are 
implicitly repealed. The following criteria have been considered by the Supreme court as relevant to 
address this question in its most recent judgment: 
(1) an area of conduct squarely within the heartland of securities regulations; (2) clear and 
adequate SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] authority to regulate; (3) active and 
ongoing agency regulation; and (4) a serious conflict between the antitrust and regulatory 
regimes.211 
In the EU context it is impossible to replicate this model because of a different constitutional setup: 
EU competition law cannot be repealed whether explicitly by secondary legislation, or implicitly by 
judicial interpretation. However, in this context the US case-law which is of more relevance is that 
which considers statutes which allow the parallel application of regulation and antitrust, as was the 
case in Verizon v Trinko. The case concerned an allegation of refusals to deal and one of the issues 
the Supreme Court was asked to consider is how far the existence of a dedicated access regime in 
telecommunications law affected the application of the Sherman Act. According to the court, in 
making this assessment: 
One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to 
deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional 
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benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be 
less plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.212 
Conversely, if the regulatory scheme makes no reference to competition issues (e.g. it is an 
environmental statute) then the argument for applying competition law is stronger.  This policy 
position appears valid even in the EU even if this particular issue has not to my knowledge been 
litigated.  
The issue is this: suppose that the regulator using the ex ante tool has decided that there 
is no need to share data, would it be possible for a claimant (or a competition authority) 
to raise an Article 102 TFEU claim for refusals to deal in data? Arguably this is a legal question 
for the courts to assess, but it may be helpful to consider policy arguments one way and the other. 
4.2.2 Conflict between EU competition law and national regulation 
If, however, the Regulation tasks national regulatory authorities with the application of the ex ante 
tool, then nothing prevents the parallel application of EU competition law. This is the lesson from 
Deutsche Telekom and related case-law. In brief, the regulatory choice is seen as an act of the 
Member State, in which case: 
- If the state merely authorises conduct which turns out to violate EU competition law (e.g. 
by stating that no ex ante rules are needed), then the undertaking may be found to have 
infringed competition law nevertheless. For example, the terms maybe fair for the purposes 
of the ex ante tool, but unfair for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU. 
- If the state requires conduct by an undertaking which is anticompetitive then the Member 
State is in breach of EU Law. In this context a national court must disapply the regulatory 
choice, the Member State may well be found to be in breach of EU Law and sanctioned. 
Technically, this breach is found by a combined reading of Article 3(4) TEU (imposing a duty 
of loyalty on Member States) and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: states must not require or 
facilitate the infringement of EU competition law when applying national law, even if this is 
derived from EU Law. For example, the regulator may require a platform to share information 
that facilitates collusion. 
Critics take the view that this approach is overly restrictive and hampers the effective application of 
regulatory tools.213 It appears that it would be for the Court of Justice to qualify its approach, 
however it may be possible to draft the ex ante tool in such a way to steer the court to give a more 
flexible interpretation. For example, the ex ante tool could empower the regulator to consider the 
possible conflict between its regulatory choice and competition law and to make an explicit trade-
off. In this instance, the Court may be willing to accept an infringement of EU law if it is objectively 
justified. There is no case-law on this point, however it follows from the general case law on the 
internal market that a Member State may impose national laws that infringe internal market law if 
this is necessary to pursue a national public interest which is well articulated.214 The point would 
become even more compelling if the regulator may show that its choice is designed to take into 
consideration two conflicting interests that may be traced to EU Law, for instance protecting 
consumers and promoting competition.  
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5 Conclusions  
Having reviewed the institutional options that could be used to enforce the ex ante tool for 
systemically significant platforms, the following recommendations emerge from a comparative study 
of institutional models. 
In terms of who the enforcer should be, it is preferable if the Commission is in charge of 
applying the new ex ante tool, whether on its own or with the assistance of national 
regulators. The need for Commission intervention is that the likely targets of the Regulation are 
firms operating across the EU with a single business model: unitary enforcement by a well-resourced 
actor with experience in the sector would optimise enforcement. National regulators can be entrusted 
with the application of the new ex ante tool to conduct that affects a national market and are also 
well-placed to identify market failures. 
This recommendation is based on the following considerations: relying on businesses to complain to 
platforms and expecting that internal dispute resolution systems will suffice is too optimistic given 
the imbalance of power. Second, other models for enforcement based on entrusting a national 
regulator to address EU-wide concerns very much depend upon the capacity and resources of the 
regulator, which are likely to remain uneven. Third, while an EU agency could be created to enforce 
these rules, the case-law is still in flux and there may be legal challenges if this path is chosen. It is 
thus more prudent to entrust the Commission with enforcing the Regulation. 
To ensure that enforcement is effective, the Commission and the national regulators should 
have appropriate resources and independence to discharge their duties.  The fundamental 
rights of the parties must be recognised and inform the design of procedures, including due 
process and judicial review. Moreover, the remedial powers that the Commission and NRAs have 
should be sufficiently strong to deter and guide the firms that are regulated. The regulator should 
be empowered to facilitate the co-creating of compliant practices by platforms. Such an 
approach to remedy design secures input and output legitimacy: the former by including all affected 
stakeholders in commenting on proposed measures, the latter by allowing a fluid process of 
compliance by which remedies can be adjusted to ensure they remain relevant. In fast-moving 
markets this approach to securing compliance is particularly useful. 
Finally, while the drive behind the DMA is a concern that EU competition law is not sufficiently flexible 
to address all market failures in digital markets, there remains the possibility that competition 
law continues to apply even if the Commission or an NRA has applied the new ex ante tool 
or has chosen not to apply it considering that there is no infringement. Arguably, if the 
Commission and NRAs are well resourced and active the risk of frictions with EU competition law is 
likely to be reduced because the Commission or an NCA will not feel compelled to act. Nevertheless, 
as seen in the field of telecommunications, sometimes competition law serves to fill in gaps in the 
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DISCUSSION SUMMARY | Institutional considerations  
The purpose of this section is to list the questions and discussion points that arose from the overview 
presented in the Issue Paper on ‘institutional considerations’ and the exclusive workshop organised 
in September 2020. The non-attributable summary of the discussion was prepared by Claire-Marie 
Healy, project manager at CERRE. 
Institutional set-up 
Can we rely on private enforcement exclusively?  Should enforcement be both public and private? 
Should a platform regulator be established? 
RESPONSES 
The issue around institutional framework is highly political. It is interesting to note that in the platform 
to business (P2B) Regulation, there is no obligation to create a regulatory authority, although Member 
States may choose to. Some believe that this significantly weakens enforcement and thus the 
effectiveness of the Regulation. The dynamism of online platforms markets however is such that as 
much flexibility as possible would be desirable, for instance online platforms being part of determining 
the solution wherever possible and offering commitments where needed. 
While there was some agreement that private law enforcement - such as in the form of a toolkit that 
national courts could use when requested – could work in certain situations and lead to swifter 
outcomes, self-regulation and co-regulation may not work in addressing the issue around balance of 
power when certain platforms play a dominant gatekeeper role. It is important that provisions are 
clear and that no ‘fear’ factors exist. Indeed, a number of studies show that where one company is 
dependent on another, they often fear lodging a legal complaint through fear of retaliation – 
something that can happen more rapidly than any judicial action. This implies that when there is a 
dependency issue, private enforcement can be ineffective, because it excludes the possibility of 
confidential complaints or ex-officio procedures. Such a form of assessment would have to fall under 
a regulator. 
It was pointed out that such an obligation to mediate already exists in the B2B regulation. However, 
it does not address the issue of what happens if mediation fails, or if a customer is unwilling to 
complain because of their dependency on the platform. There need to be mechanisms in place to deal 
with this when mediation fails.  
Another suggestion was to start from the perspective of practices where the remedy is prohibition. 
That provides a framework, with other items on a more case-by-case basis. However, enforcement 
of remedies for other issues have to be effective; for example, fines are often seen as simply one of 
the costs of doing business for platforms, and they do not prevent markets from being destroyed. 
Arguably, behavioural remedies are superior. The question of sections – in order to enforce remedies 
– also needs to be considered. Otherwise any code of conduct risks being invalidated. If the only 
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Should the DMA require the establishment of national platform regulators or an EU regulator?  
Do we need both national and supra-national regulators, each with distinct competencies? For 
example, a global platform would be regulated by the EU platform regulator, while a national platform 
(e.g. price comparison website for car insurance) would be regulated locally. 
RESPONSES 
Some were not optimistic about the likely effectiveness of the ‘Country of Origin’ (CoO) principle. 
While it may work for illegal content hosting, for competition problems it can vary greatly between 
countries – both in approach and expertise. The example of GDPR and the Irish DPA – which was 
open about its limited resources and struggle to be effective – was mentioned.  
Where dominance was purely national, there is, however, still a need for national authorities to look 
at these cases.  
That said, there is a clear role for an EU level oversight. While most problems are pan-European in 
nature, having an EU level overarching perspective would be a clear advantage. A centralised 
European authority might provide greater harmonisation, and consistency in cross-border issues. 
Given the current fiscal circumstances, it may not be the best moment to create a new authority. A 
combination of national and EU level authorities is another option to be considered.  
The European Commission could play a role as long as it is suitably empowered and resourced. The 
preferred location within the European Commission will however have to be relatively unusual as it 
will likely require taking two aspects – competition and regulation – together. What is likely to emerge 
is a complex interrelationship between a) competition that interacts rarely and episodically with 
industry and b) regulation that has a much closer, continuous relationship. In the case where the 
regulatory body ends up as part of DG Competition, given its inevitable focus and competence on 
competition issues, how can the regulatory ethos be ensured effectively? The full independence of the 
Commission in this role would also have to be questioned. Given the various – potentially conflicting 
– strands that this centralised approach will raise, a standalone body or a panel of independent experts 
taking decisions would be preferable. 
What should the criteria to determine the competence of a national regulatory authority be?  
Should the NRA or EU Regulator be tasked (a) only with the task of designating large gatekeeper 
power, leaving enforcement to private parties; or (b) with the task of designating large gatekeeper 
power and enforcement powers? 
RESPONSES 
Having a clear list of very specific dos and don'ts and relying on a regulator to monitor the impact on 
markets would be welcome. More intrusive remedies will always demand much more regulatory 
oversight. The need for criteria to define platforms, identify behaviours, build effective remedies and 
propose solutions is also crucial. It would also be advisable for the regulator to have a broad scope in 
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How should national regulatory agencies be coordinated?  
Which existing models (competition law, data protection law, consumer protection, electronic 
communications, and banking) would fit the needs of the DMA?  
Is an agency/network needed to coordinate and steer national regulators?  
What should be the role of such a network? Would such an agency/network add value by providing 
information or setting out recommendations on best practices? 
RESPONSES 
The model of a network of independent national authorities to advise the European Commission and 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) was discussed extensively. The body of European regulators 
for electronic communications (BEREC) that assists the European Commission and NRAs in 
implementing the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications could help in coordinating 
national authorities in charge of online platforms and advise the European Commission on digital 
issues. There seems to be no issue with such a pan-EU regulator being an existing body as long as 
the advisory body is made up of independent regulatory authorities. 
Such cooperation, however, would require a lot of coordination, especially since several authorities 
will have to be engaged (the competition authority, the telecommunications authority, the consumer 
protection authority, and the data protection authority). Although the network approach was generally 
viewed as a good idea, there were concerns that – if the privacy, consumer and competition aspects 
were brought together – the experts on the panel would need to reflect the different demands, which 
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Relationship with EU competition law 
Should the regulator be empowered to prevent conduct which may harm competition while promoting 
another EU interest (e.g. a trade-off of less competition for greater investment, or perhaps allowing 
a dominant platform to discriminate against certain upstream providers in the name of making sure 
that the platform works more smoothly)? 
RESPONSES 
Where the law is relatively flexible owing to a dynamic market, the procedural fairness of the 
regulatory authorities is even more important. Having a sunset clause or a review clause is also good 
practice in EU law and would be valuable too. 
If a code of conduct is established (whether for all platforms or one type of platform) should there be 
a competition impact assessment? In other words, should the regulator test the extent to which the 
code of conduct might restrict competition? 
RESPONSES 
When pursuing a code of conduct, some elements of self-regulation or co-regulation could be 
required; the risk being that self-regulation might be self-interested. Given this, it may prove more 
effective for the regulatory body to consult about the remedies and seek feedback from stakeholders 
and then decide. This in theory would discourage platforms from undermining other parties. One 
potential element could be a ‘good faith’ element – an obligation to mediate - in any code of conduct. 
This could cover advantages, but such an approach would need to be used at the discretion of the 
regulator. 
On the issue of continuous review, it was suggested that this should fall within a remedy package. 
For example, if the remedy included a code of conduct, then there has to be the facility to revisit that; 
either where it has proved ineffective or where it is no longer relevant or appropriate.  
A potential area of conflict could be where a code of conduct requires rules on issues such as privacy 
and illegal and harmful content; would this be seen as restricting competition. Should the regulator 
be responsible for both the societal versus economic effects? How could this be taken into 
consideration when defining remedies?  
This raised two broader topics. First, how far could a platform that was meeting its threshold justify 
its actions on a non-economic basis? Also, given that there are always trade-offs between specific 
objects, whose responsibility is it to determine that balance – is it a legal or regulatory question? The 
learnings from the telecommunications industry were to provide the independent regulatory authority 
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1 Introduction 
In its Digital Strategy Communication of February 2020,215 the European Commission announced 
that the proposal of the Digital Services Act package would include one pillar aiming at achieving a 
fair and competitive economy through economic regulation. This pillar has now been renamed the 
Digital Markets Act (DMA).216 In their Inception Impact Assessment of June 2020, the Commission 
services indicate that they are considering the following three policy options: (1) revising the 
horizontal framework set in the Platform-to-Business Regulation;217 (2) adopting a horizontal 
framework empowering regulators to collect information from large online platforms acting as 
gatekeepers; (3) adopting a new and flexible ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms 
acting as gatekeepers which could be (3a) prohibition or restriction of certain unfair trading practices 
(“blacklisted” practices) and/or (3b) adoption of tailor-made remedies addressed on a case-by-case 
basis where necessary and justified.218 In October 2020, the European Parliament adopted one 
resolution on the forthcoming Digital Services Act package with important directions for the Digital 
Markets Act pillar.219  
 
This recommendations paper aims to contribute to this policy debate and is structured as follows: 
after this introduction, section 2 deals with the problems to be addressed and the recommended 
objectives for the DMA. Then, section 3 deals with the scope of the DMA, the criteria to designate 
Large Gatekeeper Platforms (LGPs), and the prohibitions and the obligations which may be imposed 
on those LGP. Finally, section 4 deals with the institutional design and the enforcement methods for 
an effective DMA. For several recommendations, the footnotes indicate existing best practices in EU 
law. 
2 Problems and objectives 
2.1 Main characteristics of the digital economy and possible need for intervention220 
Although digital intermediation platforms are diverse in their business models, they are united by 
some key features: (i) important economies of scale and scope on the supply side; (ii) massive 
direct and indirect network effects on the demand-side; (iii) massive use of personal and non-
personal data, (iv) high rate of innovation and importance of some key innovation capabilities; (v) 
uncertainty in the evolution of technology and markets; and often (vi) conglomerates that 
orchestrate entire ecosystems. 
Some of those digital platforms may have a gatekeeper function when their consumers mostly 
single-home and have no – or little - ability or incentive to multi-home because, for instance, of lack 
of information, high switching costs, biases, and heuristics or lack of viable, adequate and 
competitive alternatives and there is a low risk of disintermediation. In this case, such a platform is 
the main bottleneck to this customer base and is in a position to leverage this gatekeeper position 
to its advantage. This may raise competitive and exclusionary issues when, for example, the platform 
providing intermediation services (i.e. services connecting business users and consumers or end-
users) also competes with business users in their respective markets. This may also raise exploitative 
 
215 Communication from the Commission of 19 February 2020, Shaping Europe's digital future, COM(2020) 67. 
216 There is now an understanding that the New Competition Tool may be integrated into the DMA and, therefore, could have a 
scope which is limited to the digital platforms. This paper is about the DMA and does not deal with the NCT as such. 
217 Regulation 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency 
for business users of online intermediation services, OJ [2019] L 186/55. 
218 Inception Impact Assessment on Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with 
significant network effects acting as gate-keepers , available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-
say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-
gatekeepers 
219 European Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on the Digital Services Act: 
Improving the functioning of the Single Market (2020/2018(INL), in particular points 72-81 available at : 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-10-20-TOC_EN.html 
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and fairness issues when the platform is using its bargaining powers to the detriment of the 
legitimate interests of its users. 
However, the assessment of the economic effects of firms’ conduct is particularly complex in the 
digital economy because specific conduct often leads, at the same time, to pro and anti-
competitive effects.221 For instance, the extension of a digital platform from one core market to 
another related market to offer a more complete suite of products and enlarge the ecosystem may 
benefit consumers, as such an extension increases the ecosystem’s synergies. Such conglomerate 
diversification may also increase the economies of scope on the supply side. However, such an 
extension may lead to the exclusion of efficient niche competitors or discourage potential competitors 
from entering the market, thereby durably foreclosing the market or ecosystem. It may also lead to 
the exclusion of efficient providers of complementary products. Those examples show that assessing 
the competitive effects of conduct in digital markets often requires a difficult balancing of pro and 
anti-competitive effects. This is not specific to digital markets, but this is amplified in digital markets 
owing to the intensity of network effects and extreme returns on capital invested. 
Therefore, assessing the economic effects of digital firms’ conduct involves several trade-offs 
between different values, rights, and interests. Examples of those trade-offs are: (i) short-term and 
long-term: the conduct of a gatekeeper platform may increase consumer welfare in the short-term, 
for instance by increasing short-term competition or innovation, but at the expense of consumer 
welfare in the long-term, for instance by reducing competition and thus harming incentives for good 
value and innovation; the most difficult situation occurs where there are clear short-run efficiency 
benefits and long-term competitive harm that is more uncertain but potentially very serious; (ii) 
competition and innovation: the conduct of a gatekeeper platform such as the acquisition of a start-
up, may increase the development and/or the diffusion of the innovation of such start-up but at the 
expense of the competition that could have been brought by the start-up. To complicate the matter 
even further, trade-offs are also possible between different types of competition or different types 
of innovation. Arbitrating trade-offs is one of the main roles of regulatory agencies and the judiciary 
but such arbitration is particularly difficult in the digital economy because the trade-offs are amplified 
and have to be decided in a highly uncertain environment. 
Given those difficulties, the risks of errors, of type I and type II, may also be amplified in the 
digital economy. Those risks can be decreased by reducing the information asymmetry between the 
digital firms and the public authorities and by increasing the learning curve of the authorities. This 
can be achieved with a better understanding of the digital economy through studies, market 
monitoring sector enquiries and market investigation, individual cases, as well as with information 
disclosure through appropriate rules and presumptions. The establishment of specialised and 
dedicated authorities may also contribute to reducing information asymmetry. Errors risks can also 
be reduced by doing a careful assessment of the effects of digital platforms conducts which take into 
account the diversity of the business models as well as the risks of regulatory failures and unintended 
consequences of public intervention on the functioning of the markets. Also, the costs of type I 
and type II errors may be amplified in the digital economy. The costs of type II errors could be 
decreased, in particular through timely intervention and swifter procedures when necessary. 
 
221 Digital platforms may also generate several positive and negative non-economic effect which are not analysed in this paper, 
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2.2 Objectives of the Digital Markets Act 
Based on the characteristics of the digital economy and the possible effects of the conducts of the 
Large Gatekeeper Platforms, we recommend the objectives of the DMA to be the following: 
1. Promoting competition. The DMA should complement – and not substitute - competition law 
to promote competition, market contestability, and innovation when competition law is either 
ineffective or unable to intervene. Competition law may be ineffective because it is too slow or 
lacking the remedial measures necessary to preserve and restore the benefits of a competitive 
market to European consumers.222 Competition law may also be unable to intervene in case of 
structural competition problems where the harm to competition is driven by underlying economic 
features of these markets more than by strategic firm conduct. Those structural problems include 
structural risks for competition when certain market features (such as network and scale effects, 
lack of multi-homing and lock-in effects) and the firms’ conduct create a threat for competition. This 
applies to tipping markets, where the creation of powerful market players with an entrenched market 
and/or gatekeeper position needs to be prevented by early intervention or to unilateral strategies 
by non-dominant firms to monopolise a market through anti-competitive means.223 
2. Empowering users. To foster competition, enhance innovation, and protect end-users’ rights, 
the DMA should also provide users with relevant information and effective options to make informed 
choices. Reducing information asymmetries and giving users the tools and incentives to choose their 
preferred services could complement the ex ante regulatory intervention and steer the market in 
the right direction. 
3. Ensuring fairness in a B2B relationship.224 The DMA should also protect business users and 
partners against the unfair practices of the gatekeeper platforms on which they depend. As already 
explained in the P2B Regulation, the large gatekeeper platforms “have superior bargaining power, 
which enables them to, in effect, behave unilaterally in a way that can be unfair and that can be 
harmful to the legitimate interests of their businesses users and, indirectly, also of consumers in the 
EU. For instance, they might unilaterally impose on business users practices which grossly deviate 
from good commercial conduct, or are contrary to good faith and fair dealing”.225 
 
222 In the EECC, the insufficiency of competition law to adequately address market failures is one the three criteria justifying ex 
ante regulation: Directive 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code [hereinafter EECC], OJ [2018] L 321/36, art. 67(1). This third criterion has been 
clarified by the Commission in the following way: ‘Competition law interventions are likely to be insufficient where for instance 
the compliance requirements of an intervention to redress persistent market failure(s) are extensive or where frequent and/or 
timely intervention is indispensable. Thus, ex ante regulation should be considered an appropriate complement to competition 
law when competition law alone would not adequately address persistent market failure(s) identified’: Commission 
Recommendation 2014/710 of 9 October 2014 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications 
sector susceptible to ex ante regulation, OJ [2014] L 295/79, recital 16. 
223 See the Commission services’ Inception Impact Assessment for the New Competition Tool: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-rulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12416-New-competition-tool. 
224 In this sense, the DMA will complement the EU consumer protection law which ensures fairness in B2C relationship. 
225 P2B Regulation, recital 2. 
1 Promoting competition, market contestability 
and innovation 
2 Empowering users 
3 Ensuring fairness in B2B relationships 
4 Promoting the Digital Single Market 
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4. Promoting the Digital Single Market. Finally, the DMA should ensure that the single market 
is not fragmented by a growing volume of national rules that regulate LGPs differently. Therefore, 
the DMA should promote the single market by imposing a common set of obligations on the LGPs 
and a common set of rights for the users of those platforms which should facilitate the scale-up of 
digital start-ups across the EU.  
In achieving those objectives, enforcement action should comply with good governance 
principles, in particular the principles of proportionality, regulatory predictability and consistency, 
and respect for fundamental rights. 
3 Scope, criteria for intervention and 
prohibitions/obligations 
3.1 Scope of the Digital Markets Act 
As the DMA intervention will be an asymmetric law, the scope of the DMA should be distinguished 
from the criteria to designate LGPs and which will trigger interventions. The scope determines the 
categories of digital platforms to which the designation criteria are applicable and not the platforms 
which will be regulated. In other words, the scope is necessarily broader than LGPs and not all 
platforms in scope should be regulated. The scope of the DMA should be broad enough to capture 
all types of digital platforms whose conducts may be harmful now and in the future. 
1) Be large, which could be measured by the number of unique 
users, time on site, or the proportion of interactions 
2) Hold a gatekeeper position on which business users depend, 
which could be measured by the proportion of the large userbase 
with a low ability and/or incentive to multi-home or switch 
3) This gatekeeper position is enduring, which can be measured by 
high entry barriers to both existing services and future services, 
because of the control of key innovation capabilities in the digital 
sector 




The scope of the DMA should cover all online platforms 
to be sufficiently flexible and future proof. 
Those large digital gatekeeper platforms should be designated for a 
certain time by the EU body in charge of the DMA. 
However, prohibitions and obligations should only be 
imposed on the online platforms which meet the following 
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Therefore, the scope of the P2B Regulation which covers certain types of online intermediation 
services226 and online search engines227 may be too narrow as it does not cover other digital 
platforms (such as operating systems or B2B marketplaces) whose conducts may potentially be 
harmful.228 On that basis, we recommend that DMA covers all types of digital intermediation 
platforms. Following the OECD, this could be defined as “an information society service provider 
that facilitates interactions between two or more distinct sets of users (whether businesses or 
individuals) who interact through the service via the Internet”.229  
3.2 Four Criteria to designate Large Gatekeeper Platforms230 
The criteria to trigger regulatory intervention and designate the digital platforms on which remedies 
may be imposed should follow from the four objectives mentioned above. Besides, those criteria 
should be sufficiently flexible to adapt to different business models as well as technology and market 
evolution which evolve rapidly and can be unpredictable in the digital economy. The criteria should 
also be sufficiently clear and easy to implement to ensure legal predictability and not be subject to 
long and complex procedures. 
Therefore, we think that the intervention should be based on the following four cumulative criteria, 
each of which should be assessed with quantitative and qualitative indicators. Those criteria should 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis during the designation process which should be done at regular 
intervals to take into account the rapid evolution of digital markets. The first criterion relates to the 
size of the platforms as the larger the platform is, the bigger the harm may be.231 The three other 
criteria relate to specific features of platforms that make harm possible. 
1. Size of the digital platform: this criterion may be determined based on the following 
quantitative indicators: worldwide and EU turnover,232 worldwide and EU number of transactions 
mediated by the platforms, number of unique users in the EU,233 time on site of those users.234 
Those indicators could be calculated as in absolute value (for instance, the number of users) or a 
relative value (for instance, the market share of users for a specific service such as search, online 
 
226 P2B Regulation, art.2(2) defining online intermediation services as services which (i) constitute information society services; 
(ii) allow business users to offer goods or services to consumers, to facilitate direct transactions between those business users 
and consumers; and (iii) provide services to business users based on contractual relationships. Information Society Service is 
defined as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of 
a recipient. The key elements in the definition are (i) the service must be provided for remuneration; (ii) at a distance; (i ii) by 
electronic means; and (iv) at the individual request of the recipient of the service’: Directive 2015/1535 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services [2015] OJ L241/1, art.1(1b). 
227 P2B Regulation, art 2(5) defining online search engine as a digital service that allows users to input queries in order to 
perform searches of, in principle, all websites, or all websites in a particular language, on the basis of a query on any subject in 
the form of a keyword, voice request, phrase or other input, and returns results in any format in which information related to 
the requested content can be found. 




230 See the third issue paper for more developments. 
231 An alternative option would be to designate gatekeeper platforms only on the three last criterion and rely on the platform size 
as a jurisdictional criterion to trigger the intervention of EU law (as opposed to national law). 
232 The Commission proposal for a digital service tax also relies on such indicator as it applies to digital platforms with total 
annual worldwide revenues of €750 million and EU revenues of €50 million: Commission Proposal of 21 March 2018 for a Council 
Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services, 
COM(2018) 148, art.4. 
233 The DSM Copyright Directive imposes additional stay-down obligations for content sharing platforms when the average number 
of monthly unique visitors exceeds 5 million, calculated on the basis of the previous calendar year: Directive 2019/790 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market, OJ [2019] 
L 130/92, art.17(6). The EECC imposes on providers of number–independent interpersonal communications services the 
obligations to render their services interoperable if those providers reach a significant level of coverage and user up-take: EECC, 
art.61(2c). Some national laws on online content moderation also rely on users number as an intervention trigger. 
234 The EECC provides that Member States may impose reasonable ‘must carry’ obligations for the transmission of specified radio 
and television broadcast channels on the providers of electronic communications networks if a significant number of end–users 
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marketplace …). The advantage of absolute indicators is that they are easy to calculate as they do 
not require the definition of a relevant market or a business area. However, the disadvantage of 
absolute indicators is that they may not indicate the true economic power of the platforms as they 
are calculated independently of the size of the market or the business area.235 
2. Gatekeeper position implying that users are dependent on the platforms: this criterion may be 
assessed based on a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators related to ability and the incentive 
of both sides of the market intermediated by the platform (i.e. the business users and the 
consumers) to multi-home on several platforms or to switch between different platforms as well as 
the ability and the incentive of the platform to prevent both sides of the market from going around 
the platform to deal with each other directly. Those indicators include the numbers of users who 
multi-home and the churn rate between platforms. The lower the incentive and ability to multi-home 
are, the more probable the finding of a gatekeeper position will be.236  
3. Enduring gatekeeper position. This criterion, which relates to the strength of potential 
competition, may be assessed by the determination of two types of entry barriers:237 
- First, the entry barriers to existing services will vary according to the business models 
of the digital platforms: an important entry barrier consists of cross-groups externalities and 
network effects which tend to be amplified by big data and AI technologies and increase with 
the development and the maturation of the markets. 
- Second, entry barriers to future services that are related to the control of innovation 
capabilities; in the digital economy, those are data, key platforms elements, risky and 
patient capital, specific data, and computer skills. 
4. Ecosystem orchestrator: this criterion may be assessed with the following indicators: presence 
in multiple markets or business areas which could be ‘tightly’ connected in the same vertical value 
chain or more ‘loosely’ connected, control of ecosystems as a web of interconnected and to a large 
degree interdependent economic activities carried out by different undertakings to supply one or 
more products or services which impact the same set of users.238 According to this criterion, only 
the gatekeepers who are active in several connected markets and orchestrate an ecosystem could 
be subject to the prohibitions and the obligations of the DMA. 
  
 
235 The concept of business area is used in the BEREC Response to the Public Consultations on the Digital Services Act Package 
and the New Competition Tool, BoR(20) 138. 
236 The EECC relies on a similar gatekeeper criteria to impose different types of obligations. It imposes on the providers of 
Conditional Access Systems (CAS) from which broadcasters depend to reach any group of potential viewers to offer to those 
broadcasters, on a FRAND basis, technical services enabling the broadcasters' digitally-transmitted services to be received by 
viewers: EECC, art.62(1) and Annex II, Part I.  
237 The Commission gives the following examples of entry barriers: “economies of scale and scope, privileged access to essential 
inputs or natural resources, important technologies or an established distribution and sales network; other costs and other 
impediments, for instance resulting from network effects, faced by customers in switching to a new supplier.”: Guidance of 3 
December 2008 on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Articles [102 TFUE] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings, para.17. 
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3.3 Prohibitions and obligations to be imposed on the Large Gatekeeper Platforms239  
Large Gatekeeper Platforms (LGPs) could be subject to two categories of intervention. The first 
category, which corresponds to option 3a of the Commission services Inception Impact Assessment, 
consists of prohibitions (negative obligations). Those prohibitions aim to ensure competitive and fair 
conduct on the markets for intermediation services. The second category, which corresponds to 
option 3b of the Inception Impact Assessment, consists of a variety of tailored remedies imposed on 
a case-by-case basis and enforced by a regulatory body. Those (positive) obligations aim to enable 
competition and stimulate contestability on the markets for the intermediation services. As explained 
in the following section, the prohibitions are easier to enforce than obligations that require a 
comprehensive governance framework. As the business models of the digital platforms are different, 
 
239 See the second issue paper for more developments. 
The following contractual terms and practices by large 
digital gatekeeper platforms should be prohibited to 
guarantee fair and competitive markets: 
• Terms and practices which dis-empower consumers to multi-
home or switch, such as default and nudges, anti-steering, 
limiting data portability. 
• Terms and practices which dis-empower business users to 
multi-home or switch, such as Most Favoured National (MFN) 
or exclusivity clauses. 
• Anticompetitive and unfair leverage of gatekeeper power 
across markets, such as specific types of self-preferencing and 
bundling. 
• Unfair contractual terms and practices, such as retroactivity, 
termination/suspension. 
• Given the multiple effects of terms and conducts in the digital 
economy, the large digital gatekeeper platform should have the 
possibility to justify its terms or practices with an efficient or 
objective defence. Thus, the prohibition amounts to a reversal of 
the burden of proof from the regulatory authority to the 
gatekeeper platforms. 
Besides the large gatekeepers, platforms may be subject to the 
following obligations to guarantee market contestability: 
• Provide interoperability to key services and access to key API. 
• Share large volumes of data at the request of another firm for 
the benefit of users in general and which does not undermine 
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each category of intervention will have to be adapted to the specific business model of the LGP at 
hand. 
3.3.1 Prohibitions to guarantee competitive and fair conducts 
The first category of intervention consists of prohibiting certain conducts for which there is enough 
experience and certainty that they are harmful to consumer welfare, innovation, and business users' 
legitimate interests.  
The list of prohibited conducts could be based on the following four types, which would need to be 
adapted to the type and the business model of the LGP: 
- Practices which dis-empower consumers (one side of the intermediated market) by 
limiting their ability to multi-home on several platforms or to switch between platforms. This 
is, for instance, the case of default and nudges in choice architecture guiding users into 
making decisions that may not be in their best interests, anti-steering practice, or conduct 
that limit data portability.240 
- Practices which dis-empower business users and partners (the other side of the 
intermediated market) by limiting their ability to multi-home on several platforms or to 
switch between platforms. This is, for instance, the case of Most Favoured Nation (MFN), 
non-competing, or exclusivity clauses. 
- Practices which allow anti-competitive and unfair leverage of gatekeeper power 
across markets. This covers specific forms of harmful self-preferencing conduct, such as the 
unjustified use of business users' data.241 This covers also specific forms of bundling 
detachable and non-necessary services. 
- Unfair Contractual terms. The list of such practices could be built upon the list already 
contained in the P2B Regulation and include unilateral or retroactive changes to the contract, 
unjustified termination/suspension.242 
As uncertainty remains high and harmful conducts can often also have positive effects and the 
business models of LGPs are diverse, it is recommended to leave the LGP the possibility to justify 
its conduct based on efficiency or objective justifications.243 In practice, the LGPs should have the 
possibility to prove that its conduct is necessary and proportionate to achieve efficiency or other 
non-efficiency objectives such as the protection of the security or the integrity of the platforms. 
3.3.2 Obligations to guarantee market contestability 
The second category of intervention consists of imposing certain obligations to increase market 
contestability and facilitate the entry of digital platforms developing new services that can be a 
substitute or complementary to the ones already offered by LGP. In effect, those obligations will 
open the platforms of LGP to new entrants.244 Such obligations could revolve around the following 
two types: 
 
240 Beyond the limited data portability right provided by Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1, art.20. 
241 The prohibition of internal discrimination is also foreseen by several EU law: EECC, art.70 and Commission Recommendation 
2013/466 of 11 September 2013 on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition 
and enhance the broadband investment environment , O.J. 2013 L 251/13; Regulation 80/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on a Code of Conduct for computerised reservation systems and repealing Council 
Regulation 2299/89, OJ [2009] L35/49, arts.5,7,10. 
242 Also Directive 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-
to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, OJ [2019] L111/59, art.3. 
243 As it is the case in the draft 10th amendment of German competition law: Section 19a(2). 
244 Similarly, when the telecommunications sector was liberalized in Europe in the nineties, the deal was to maintain the vertical 
integration of the incumbent while forcing them to open their networks to competition with the Open Network Provisions (ONP): 
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- Interoperability and access to API to enable complementary services to interwork with 
the core functions of the LGP (protocol interoperability) or to enable interworking between 
platforms that are substitutes to each other (full protocol interoperability) while maintaining 
the security and the integrity of the LGP. 
 
- Data sharing involving the bulk transfer of large volumes of data at the request of another 
firm for the benefit of users in general and which does not undermine good privacy practices 
and incentives for data minimisation. This obligation will apply asymmetrically to the LGPs 
only but horizontally to all sectors of the economy. Thus, this obligation is different from the 
existing data sharing obligation which tends to be imposed symmetrically but only in a 
sector-specific manner (such as payment services, automotive, or some network industries 
(energy, telecom, postal).245 
Those obligations could be very intrusive, as they pose risks to incentives to invest and innovate 
and they are costly to implement by the LGPs. Therefore, they should be imposed:  
- with great care, only when necessary to achieve market contestability;  
- when they are proportionate to meet such objective; 
- in a tailor-made manner, according to the business model of the LGP on which the obligations 
are imposed. 
Enforcing those obligations will moreover be particularly complex. Enforcement will therefore require 
an effective and comprehensive governance framework, based on regulators having extensive 
expertise, information gathering and processing competence, and sanctioning power. It might be 
complemented by transparency or non-discriminatory obligations to ensure full effectiveness. 
4 Institutions and enforcement 
4.1 Institutional design246 
As the LGPs are most of the time global and their conduct tends to affect the users in more than one 
Member State as well as the digital single market as a whole, we recommend the DMA to be 
 
245 In addition, the Commission is examining the need to impose more data sharing obligation in a forthcoming Data Act, which 
may apply symmetrically. 
246 See the fourth issue paper for more developments. 
Given the characteristics of the digital economy, regulatory authorities 
should develop New Ways of Enforcement based on the following 
four principles: enforcement should be more participatory, 
experimental, data-based, and technological. 
Given the multinational presence of the large gatekeeper 
platforms, the DMA should mostly be enforced at the EU 
level either by the Commission or an ad-hoc body. 
Member State should also designate independent 
National Digital Agencies to support the work of the 
Commission or the EU body. All enforcement authorities 
should comply with due process and their decisions should 
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enforced at the EU level, either by the Commission247 or by an ad-hoc EU body.248 The 
advantage of choosing the Commission is that a new authority would be costly and face a significant 
learning curve. Another advantage of choosing the Commission is that it will facilitate the 
coordination of DMA with competition law enforcement as the same authority will be in charge of 
both legal instruments at the EU level as well as with the other EU policies. The disadvantage is that 
the Commission is not an independent authority but plays an increasing political or geopolitical role. 
Another disadvantage is that the Commission may not have, at this stage, sufficient resources for 
this new role.  
The tasks of the EU regulatory authority should be the following: (i) the designation of the LGPs 
based on the criteria and indicators mentioned above in section 3.2; (ii) the monitoring and the 
enforcement of prohibitions, possibly by giving more explanations of prohibitions to provide further 
guidance for LGP; (iii) the design, the monitoring and the enforcement of tailored-made obligations. 
In enforcing the DMA, the EU authority should be supported and advised by national authorities 
which are closer to the consumers and the business users of the LGPs. Thus the DMA should also 
provide that each Member State designate a National Digital Authority with the standard features 
imposed by EU law on national regulatory authorities (in particular, expertise, independence, 
resources, information gathering, and sanctioning powers).249 It will then be up to each Member 
State to designate such authority, which may be an existing one (for instance, the competition 
agency or the telecom regulator), a new one, or a national network between existing authorities. 
Such designation should build on (and respect) the recently introduced provision in the P2B 
Regulation to avoid inconsistent legislation 
The tasks of the National Digital Authorities could be the following: hear complaints from business 
users or consumers of the platforms and, when justified, forward them to the EU authority; monitor 
the enforcement of the DMA prohibitions in their national territory; advise the EU authority on the 
necessity, the proportionality, and the design of DMA obligations and, when appropriate, monitor 
the enforcement of those obligations in their national territory. Moreover, national authorities could 
particularly focus on purely national cases, while providing leeway for EU level action in cross-border 
cases. 
Given the intrinsic European dimension of the platforms and to ensure effective action and advice 
by the National Digital Authorities, these should be coordinated within a new EU network. The 
design of such a network could be inspired by one of the following existing models: the European 
Competition Network (ECN),250 the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC),251 the 
European Data Protection Board (EDPB)252 or the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC).253 
Given the great complexity of enforcing the regulation in the digital economy, the multiple and 
amplified trade-offs to be decided, it is key that all the authorities in charge of the DMA are 
 
247 As it is the case for the Code of Conduct for computerised reservation systems: CRS Regulation, arts.13-16. 
248 As it is the case for the systemic banks: Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ L287/63. The powers of the SSM are 
based on Article 127(6) TFEU. If the EU treaties do not provide for a specific legal basis, some claim, on the basis of the old 
Meroni doctrine, that the EU legislature cannot establish a new EU regulatory authority without a Treaty change as it would upset 
the institutional balance which gives executive powers to the Commission. However, the Court of Justice has recently validated 
the powers of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) which is tasked with direct supervision and enforcement 
against specific financial entities: Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:18. 
249 For instance, Directive 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market, O.J. [2019] L 11/3, arts.4-12 ; GDPR, arts. 51-59; EECC arts.6-9. 
250 Regulation 1/2003, arts.11-13. 
251 Regulation 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation 2006/2004, OJ [2017] L 345/1. 
252 GDPR, art.68-76. 
253 Regulation 2018/1971 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the Body of the 
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sufficiently independent of the market players as well as of the political power. Authorities should 
also enjoy sufficient sanctioning power and impose sanctions that are effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive when the prohibitions or the obligations imposed on LGPs are violated.  
It is also key that the investigations, the procedures, and the actions of those authorities respect 
the fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
and that the perceived need for speedy action does not reduce the guarantee of due process and 
procedural fairness protected by the Charter. Moreover, given the still limited understanding of the 
digital markets and the risks of errors, it is also key that the decisions of the regulatory authorities 
can be subject to review by an independent Court which has access to the relevant expertise to 
assess the very complex trade-offs which are to be arbitrated in the digital economy. To be 
meaningful, such a legal review should take the merits of the case into account.254 
4.2 New Ways of Enforcement 
Given the characteristics of the digital economy, in particular, the amplified trade-offs to be 
arbitrated, the rapid and often unpredictable innovation, and the large information asymmetry 
between the LGP and the regulatory authorities, new ways of enforcement need to be found for the 
DMA to be effective and not remain a piece of paper in the official journal of the EU. We think that 
those new ways of enforcement should be based on the four principles described below. 
First, enforcement needs to be participatory while being mindful of the risks of regulatory capture. 
This means that all stakeholders (i.e., the LGPs, their actual and potential competitors, their business 
users, and the consumers) should be closely involved in the implementation of the new rules. This 
should be particularly the case for the design of positive obligations aimed at increasing market 
contestability. The participation of the LGPs may be achieved by relying more on commitments.255 
However, this should not necessarily rely on self-regulation - which is often self-serving - in the case 
of gatekeeper power.256 
Second, enforcement needs to be more experimental while remaining predictable. Given the 
novelty of many issues, regulators are bound to make mistakes but should minimise those. One way 
to minimise errors is to learn from experience. Evaluation should be done ex ante by running A/B 
testing of different types and design of remedies as the LGPs are now used to do before launching 
new services. Evaluation should also be done ex post by assessing the relevance, effectiveness, and 
efficiency of the remedies after some time of implementation.257 
Third, enforcement needs to be data-based. As the LGPs themselves, the regulatory authorities 
should seize the opportunities brought by big data analytics and AI to increase the efficiency of their 
regulatory operations. This implies that authorities need to have extensive power to collect 
information from the LGP but also from their business users and customers (which corresponds to 
option 2 on the Inception Impact Assessment). Authorities also need to have efficient means and 




254 See for instance, EECC, art.31. 
255 As used in competition law (Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. [2003] L 1/1, as amended, art.9) or in telecommunications regulation (EECC, 
art.79). 
256 This is why the concept of Code of conducts, which often refers to self-regulation, should be alleviated in the DMA. 
257 On ex post regulatory evaluation: Commission Staff Working Document of 7 July 2017, Better Regulation Guidelines, 
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Fourth, when appropriate and possible, enforcement needs to be by design. This implies that the 
legal prohibitions and obligations should be as much as possible integrated into the technological 
design used by the LGPs and that the technical architecture should include, as much as possible, the 
rules themselves.258 As put by Lessig, the legislative code should move to the computer code.  
  
 
258 See the privacy by design rule imposed by GDPR, art.25(1): Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation 
and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and 
freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means 
for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as 
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner 
and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect 
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ABOUT CERRE 
Providing top-quality studies and dissemination activities, the Centre on Regulation in Europe 
(CERRE) promotes robust and consistent regulation in Europe’s network and digital industries. 
CERRE’s members are regulatory authorities and operators in those industries as well as universities.  
CERRE’s added value is based on:  
• its original, multidisciplinary and cross-sector approach;  
• the widely acknowledged academic credentials and policy experience of its team and 
associated staff members;  
• its scientific independence and impartiality; 
• the direct relevance and timeliness of its contributions to the policy and regulatory 
development process applicable to network industries and the markets for their services.  
CERRE's activities include contributions to the development of norms, standards and policy 
recommendations related to the regulation of service providers, to the specification of market rules 
and to improvements in the management of infrastructure in a changing political, economic, 
technological and social environment. CERRE’s work also aims at clarifying the respective roles of 
market operators, governments and regulatory authorities, as well as at strengthening the expertise 
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